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Abstract
Failed and fragile states that result from intrastate war pose severe threats to the
security of both the international system and individual states alike. In the post-Cold War
era, the international community has come to recognize the reality of these threats and the
difficulty involved in ending violence and building sustainable peace in failed and fragile
states. This work focuses upon the development of a comprehensive strategy for
sustainable peace-building by incorporating the tenets of the human security doctrine into
the peace-building process. Through the use of case studies of The Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia and East Timor, the development and refinement of the doctrine
of human security will occur, as well as, an understanding of how and where human
security fits into the sustainable peace-building equation. The end result of the analysis is
the development of a hierarchical pyramid formation that brings together human security
and peace-building into one framework that ultimately creates the foundation and
structure of sustainable peace-building.
With the development of a sustainable peace-building structure based upon the
human security doctrine, the role of Canada in the support of sustainable peace-building
is analyzed in relation to the form and level of involvement that Canada undertakes and
contributes to in the implementation and support of sustainable peace-building initiatives.
Following from this, recommendations are provided regarding what role(s) Canada
should undertake in the sustainable peace-building process that take into consideration
the present and likely future capabilities of Canada to be involved in various aspects of
the peace-building process.
ii
This paper outlines the need for a peace-building strategy that is designed to be
sustainable in order that failed and fragile states resulting from intrastate conflict do not
regress or collapse back into a condition of civil war, and subsequently designs such a
strategy. The linking of peace-building and human security creates the required
framework from which sustainable peace-building is derived. Creating sustainable peace
is necessary in order to increase the likelihood that both present and future generations
existing in failed and fragile states will be spared from the scourge of intrastate war.
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Introduction
The last decade of the twentieth century opened with great optimism due to the sudden
demise of the Cold War and the resulting belief that the global order would be increasingly
peaceful and progressively more effective in dealing with various international issues. This
optimism was quickly destroyed, however, as the world became confronted with the
problematique of numerous civil wars erupting in various regions of the world. These civil wars,
often characterized by ethnic discord, demonstrated to the entire international community that
the notion that the world had become more civilized and was turning towards a greater
cosmopolitanism was a grave misperception. Instead, it seemed that greater divides were arising
among people, resulting in the outbreak of civil violence and culminating in the eruption of full-
scale intrastate war.
Civil war is not a new phenomenon that suddenly emerged in the post-Cold War era, but
rather outbreaks of this form of war had been on the rise since the end of the Second World War.
Prior to the post-Cold War era, however, civil wars for the most part did not playa significant
role in setting the international agenda. The conflicts that did exist were kept in check by the
great powers, and smoldering conflicts were kept from arising for fear of the Super Powers
becoming involved and clashing with one another, creating an international security crisis.
With the collapse of the bi-polar system, civil wars no longer sat on the periphery of the
international agenda, but rather came to the forefront as they quickly became regarded as one of
the greatest threats to international peace and security. The threat that these wars posed to
international security and stability was so great that the focus of the international security agenda
shifted from the traditional interstate problematique to that of a new security dilemma centred
2around failed1 or fragile states resulting from internal strife. In the wake of the new era of
international relations, intrastate conflict became almost instantaneously understood as the most
immediate threat to regional and international security. Civil wars continue to define the
international security agenda, and as such, create a requirement for the civil war problematique
to be addressed by the international community in a manner that will create sustainable peace in
failed and fragile states. The creation and implementation of a sustainable peace-building
strategy becomes a necessity in order to strengthen or rebuild states that have either fallen into,
or are prone to falling into an intrastate conflict. Through the exploration of the dynamics of
intrastate conflicts, an analysis of strategies being employed to build peace in failed and/or
fragile states, and an examination of the doctrine of human security, a framework will be created
for a sustainable peace-building strategy built upon the tenets of the human security doctrine.
Formulating this sustainable peace-building strategy is required in order to alleviate the quandary
that civil wars have been, and are continuing to pose upon the international security agenda.
There is no arguing that interstate conflicts are still a concern on the international security
agenda, as demonstrated by the nuclear arms race developing between India and Pakistan.
However, this traditional means through which to view and assess the status and condition of
global security no longer monopolizes the agenda. Once the Soviet Union collapsed and the Iron
] The concept of a failed state is defined by Helman and Ratner [Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner,
'Saving Failed States' Foreign Policy 89 (Winter 1992-1993), p. 4.] as a state which is "simply unable to
function as an independent entity". I. William Zartman refines this broad definition by putting forth his
definition for a state collapse which "refers to a situation where the structure, authority (legitimate power),
law and political order have fallen apart and must be reconstituted in some form, old or new" [refer to
Zartman, 'Introduction: Posing the Problem of State Collapse' in Collapsed States, p. 1.] The issue of
failed or fragile states is important to the study of sustainable peace-building as it precisely these states that
are being targeted for peace-building strategies to be implemented as they are the most vulnerable to either
fall into or revert back into a condition of civil war. Thus understanding what a failed or fragile state is,
and remains important in order to begin to comprehend how to provide for them to become strong and
successful states.
3Curtain lifted, a new and expanded realm of security studies emerged. Writers like Barry Buzan2
were read in an atmosphere that was much more welcoming and open to new ideas, which
resulted in the general adoption3 of an agenda that looked at a more holistic picture and
continued to challenge the most fundamental dynamic of the international system: state
sovereignty. Buzan brought to the surface issues and dynamics that could no longer be excluded
from being regarded as pertinent elements and factors that affect international security (military,
political, economic, societal, and environmental), and with them made clear the point that
security was much more globally based than anyone had cared previously to conceptualize or
acknowledge.
When the Cold War ended, the world turned its attention towards the outbreak of the
numerous civil conflicts that had been simmering in relative silence for years. The media, which
had once brought euphoria and optimism to the global community through its pictures of the fall
of the Berlin Wall, quickly provided a counterpoint when it revealed the atrocities that were
taking place in the numerous intrastate wars that appeared to most to have emerged overnight.
The international community was faced with a challenge: it quickly realized that it was ill
2 Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear 4thed., (Boulder Colo.; Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1991);
Barry Buzan, The Idea of the State and National Security Perspectives on World Politics (New York:
Routledge, 1991; Barry Buzan, 'New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-first Century' International
Affairs vol. 60 no. 3 (July 1991), pp. 431-452. Other writers include Ken Booth, New Thinking. About
Strategy and International Security (London: Harper Collins, 1991); Richard H. Ullman, 'Redefining
Security' International Security vol. 8 no. 1 (Summer 1983), pp. 129-153; Jessica Tuchman Mathews,
'Redefining Security' Foreign Affairs vol. 68 no. 2 (Spring 1989), pp. 162-177; Igor Malashenko, 'Non-
Military Aspects of Security' International Affairs Moscow 1 (January 1989), pp. 40-51; Joseph S. Nye and
M. Lynn-Jones, 'International Security Studies' International Security vol. 12 no. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 5-
27.
3 Although the agenda set out by Buzan has been widely accepted and adopted, especially by the Western
world, there is some reluctance and perhaps rejection to support this agenda by particular global regions,
namely the developing world. The writings by Mohammed Ayoob outline the basic arguments why this
agenda is both difficult and undesirable for the developing world to adopt. [Refer to: Mohammed Ayoob,
The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System
(Boulder Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1995); Mohammed Ayoob, 'The New-Old Disorder in the
Third World,' The United Nations and Civil Wars, Thomas G. Weiss ed. (Boulder Colo.: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, Inc., 1995); and Mohammed Ayoob, 'Security in the Third World: The Worm About to Turn?'
International Affairs vol. 60 no. 1 (Winter 1993/1994), pp. 41-51.
4equipped to handle this problem due to a lack of a desire to become embroiled in the affairs of
other states coupled with uncertainty about the most effective way that intervention should be
undertaken once it was realized that these situations could no longer be ignored. When faced
with the atrocities and impending security threats that were existing in places such as the former
Yugoslavia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Somalia, the international community, under the auspices of the
United Nations, intervened in an attempt to cease hostilities and provide humanitarian assistance,
only to find out that the initiatives that were undertaken were too little too late. The result of the
misconceptions concerning the severity of the situations in these war torn and failed states
resulted in unsuccessful interventions whereby the peacekeeping forces that were deployed into
these situations were ill equipped to defend both innocent civilians and themselves.
Disillusioned with failed attempts, the international community retreated to varying extents
before fully ending the hostilities. Donald M. Snow provides a cycle that outlines the
progression of internal conflicts in terms of intervention by the international community.4
2. NGOs,
others
arrive
1. Crisis forms
10. Crisis
reforms/
returns
3. Outsider
withdraws
Source: Snow (1996:120)
3. Crisis
worsens
8. Outsider
becomes
disillusioned
4. Crisis
explodes
7. Outsider is
frustrated
5. Outsider
intervenes
6. Outsider
faces
dilemma
4 Donald M. Snow, Uncivil Wars: International Security and the New Internal Conflicts (Boulder, Colo.:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), p. 120.
5The resulting failings of the international community to intervene in both a timely
manner and with the organization and force to end the killings and bring the various factions to
the negotiation table resulted in a call by both academics and individuals working in theatre for
intervention to take place at an earlier point in the conflict, which improves the likelihood that
international involvement will gain control of the situation before a serious crisis erupts, and will
be more effective once deployed.5
The rationale behind earlier intervention and/or preventative deployment is to forestall
the outbreak of violence or to intervene immediately after violence erupts, before the situation
enters a downward trajectory and becomes out of control. Boutros Boutros-Ghali stressed in his
Agenda for Peace that for successful conflict resolution to take place, preventative deployment is
needed to safeguard the innocent and foster an environment for diplomacy to develop.6 The
United Nations Preventative Deployment Force in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
(UNPREDEP) is often cited as the example of preventive deployment in action as the mission
was designed to prevent the war in the former Yugoslavia from spilling over into the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, furthering the instability. Thomas G. Weiss regards the
deployment of well armed troops as a 'trip wire' that would provide for the outbreak of violence
to be rapidly quashed thus removing the possibility and probability of mass suffering and
5 The call for earlier intervention or prevention is addressed and rationalized in: Gerald B. Helman and
Steven R. Ratner, 'Saving Failed States,' in Foreign Policy 89 (Winter 1992-1993), pp. 3-20.; Charles
William Maynes, 'Containing Ethnic Conflict, in Foreign Policy 90 (Spring 1993), pp. 3-21; Weiss, 'The
United Nations,' pp. 139-159; and A/47/277 - S/24111 in Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace
(New York: United Nations, 1992). The issue of the requirement for improved effectiveness of
deployments can be found in: Weiss, 'The United Nations,' pp. 139-159.; Mats R. Berdal, Whither UN
Peacekeeping?: An Analysis of the Changing Military Requirements of UN Peacekeeping with Proposals
for Enhancement Adelphi Paper 281(London: Brassey's Ltd. for the IISS, 1993); Boutros Boutros-Ghali,
'Empowering the United Nations' Foreign Affairs 71 no. 5 (Winter 1992/1993), pp. 89-102; and Joseph E.
Schwartzberg, 'A New Perspective on Peacekeeping: Lessons from Bosnia and Elsewhere,' in Global
Governance: A Review ofMultilateralism and International Organizations 3 no. 1 (1997), pp. 1-15.
6 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, pp. 49-50.
6destruction.7 Resolving conflicts is never easy; however, once mass violence breaks out the
negotiation and resolution processes become even more difficult, thus decreasing the chances for
implementation of successful peace processes.
Earlier intervention and/or preventive deployment is articulated and justified from
another perspective: economics. This raison d'etre is based upon the idea that is fiscally more
judicious to finance either a prevention force or a force to intervene immediately following the
outbreak of a conflict than it would to wait and intervene later into the conflict (which it is
argued would eventually be the case in many circumstances).8 This argument holds great merit
and should capture the attention of the various actors involved with peacekeeping deployment,
but there is an impediment for having this notion fully embraced. It is "cost-effective in [the]
long run but cost-intensive in [the] short run."g Actors simply find it difficult to invest in
intervention before it is clearly demonstrated that they have no choice but to become involved in
ending a conflict.
Once intervention has been undertaken, issues arise concerning the effectiveness of the
operation in theatre. Recalling the situation in the former Yugoslavia, the UN operation faced the
problem that the operation held a Chapter VII mandate, but it "lacked any accompanying
military commitment to implement the mandate."IO According to Mats Berdal, there was also
the problem of mission statements being weak and unambitious as force was only to be
employed for self-defence, making it very difficult for the peacekeepers to gain control of the
situation. II
7 Weiss, 'The United Nations,' p. 148. Also refer to Maynes, p.6 where he discusses then US President
Clinton's suggestion of a UN rapid deployment force.
8 Weiss, 'United Nations' 149.
9 Ibid., 149.
10 Ibid., 143.
11 Berdal, pp. 30-31.
7Ineffectiveness has also been addressed from the perspective of logistical problems with
readiness and deployment, improper training of peacekeepers, intelligence and information
processing, and command and control difficulties. I2 Essentially the problem is that when the UN
deploys, its operations are comprised of soldiers and equipment from various states that are not
necessarily compatible. This provides for a situation where there is lack of cohesion within the
operation as well as difficulties with sustaining the forces in theatre. The result is the institution
of a force that is not as effective as it could or should be, thus jeopardizing the success of the
mIssIon.
Following the recognition of the need for greater effectiveness of intervention operations,
proposals for either a UN standing army or a rapid deployment force that is fully trained and
coordinated prior to deployment reemerged as a topic for serious consideration. I3 Schwartzberg
proposed the development of a United Nations Peace Corps (UNPC) that would act as a rapid
response unit in situations where intervention was required. I4 This Corps would consist of
soldiers who had received proper training for peacekeeping missions as well as a stockpile of
equipment and materials15 that would be required on missions that could be drawn upon on short
notice and shipped to the required destination. The overall goal is to produce a structure that
would provide for a force to land in theatre fully operational with the necessary equipment to
undertake its duties arid sustain itself. Greater effectiveness, it is argued, would provide for
greater success in peacekeeping missions.
Despite the fact that these two conditions (earlier and more effective intervention) have
been directly identified and articulated, and for the most part, acknowledged as essential by the
J2 Ibid., 32-50. Also see Schwartzberg, pp. 6-10; and Boutros-Ghali, 'Empowering the United Nations', p.
92.
13 Refer to Schwartzberg; and Boutros-Ghali, 'Empowering the United Nations', p. 93.
J4 Schwartzberg, 4-6.
8international community for either reducing or avoiding the downward trajectory that intrastate
conflict rapidly falls into, there still exists a fundamental inability for action to be implemented
in this manner. 16 Many issues hinder the implementation of successful interventions including
fiscal constraints for the United Nations to support numerous and ongoing campaigns, lack of
political will by the international community to become involved in particular conflicts, and the
lingering question of the legitimacy for the international community to intervene into the
domestic affairs of sovereign states. There is no doubt that these issues, as well as many others,
have to be resolved in order for future interventions to be successful in terms of ending the
fighting (or avoiding the outbreak of armed hostilities) at an earlier point in the conflict and
protecting civilians from becoming innocent victims of the hostilities.
The international community has been somewhat stranded in a position that has not been
conducive to either earlier intervention or more effective and robust engagement due to a lack of
desire by states to commit to intervention operations and the international community as a whole
having to confront the questions of legitimacy regarding involvement in the affairs of sovereign
states. The dynamics of civil wars, however, have demonstrated that intervening is not for the
most part optional, as the consequences of doing so from both the security and humanitarian
aspects are too enormous to overlook. The world now stands at a pivotal point where it has
assessed the failings of the earlier interventions and no doubt looks at undertaking more
interventions in the near and continued future, where it is hopeful that the mistakes of the past
can be remedied in order to provide for more effective interventions in the future.
15 Boutros-Ghali, 'Empowering the United Nations' p. 93.
16 Claims are made that action is being taken in many states where civil conflict has erupted; the action,
however, is not necessarily direct military intervention to cease the hostilities or protect civilians. Rather,
soft power tactics have been or are being deployed, such as negotiations with the Canadian oil company
Talisman Inc. in Sudan, international public condemnation of Russian attacks on Chechnya, and placing
sanctions upon South Africa.
9Although there is a continued need for research and debate to take place concerning
initial intervention strategies, the discussion on intrastate conflicts must now broaden itself to
include a focus upon establishing sustainable peace within war-torn states. The international
community is now faced with many situations where armed hostilities have ceased due to the
deployment of peacekeepers into war-ravaged states and the construction of sustainable peace
must begin. Despite the fact that an agreement has been reached and the mass violence has
ceased, these states are extremely fragile, and without the institution of proper peace-building
initiatives will very easily fall back into a state of civil strife. The cases of Lebanon and Angola
provide excellent examples of this dilemma. In 1958, the first Lebanese Civil War erupted and
was effectively quashed by the American forces that intervened for fear of the spread of
Communism. Even though the armed conflict was suppressed, tensions were still prevalent in
the country and the social and political institutions were experiencing great difficulties
administering the state to the satisfaction of all of the parties. Since the underlying issues to the
problems that caused the outbreak of the first intrastate conflict were not managed or resolved in
an appropriate manner, a second civil war ensued in April of 1975 and continued with
intermittent bouts of violence until the Taif Agreement was signed in 1989.17 Although the first
civil war was relatively short, the state was greatly destabilized and the institutions were unable
to cope with the demands that were being placed upon it, which resulted in the reemergenceO of
the violent civil war. In the case of Angola, following the protracted civil war that began in
1975, the United Nations instituted and monitored a free and fair democratic election through its
observation missions in 1991-1992. Although the election was a success in the fact that the
17 For an in-depth look at these conflicts refer to Walid Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon:
Confrontation in the Middle East (Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, 1981).
10
election took place, no other peace-building initiatives were undertaken, and shortly thereafter
the civil war renewed itself. I8
The notion of post-civil conflict peace-building is not a new concept, and has in a number
of cases been employed by the international community to a limited degree. These interventions
have for the most part been referred to as 'second-generation' peacekeepingI9 whereby more
robust and longer-term strategies were constructed to allow for the various states to build or
rebuild institutions according to directives by the UN. The most notable examples are the
operations that have been undertaken in Cambodia and Haiti. 20 In both of these cases, the main
focus of the missions was on the installation of democracy into the political systems. Although
there were many successes stemming from these missions, there is still a lot of work that needs
to be done in order to help ensure that these states do not regress back into conditions of internal
war. These missions (as well as the others that have been ongoing in other states) have provided
]8 For more information on the Angolan civil conflicts, the election and the role of the international
community refer to: Inge Tvedten, Angola: Struggle for Peace and Reconstruction (Boulder Colo.:
Westview Press, 1997), especially pages 51-67.
19 The notion of 'second-generation' peacekeeping is distinguishable from traditional peacekeeping in
regards to the robustness of the intervention, the diminished level of consent from the warring parties
regarding the intervention of an multi-national force, and the implementation of peace-building measures as
part of the operation. Unlike in traditional peacekeeping operations where the disputing factions invite or
approve of the deployment of multi-national peacekeeping forces, second-generation peacekeeping
operations do not necessarily require the consent of the national authorities or local warring parties.
Rather, the intervention is based upon Chapter VII enforcement whereby the multi-national force is
deployed based on the need to maintain international peace and stability. As a result, the operation is
typically more engaged militarily as the belligerents have not agreed to a cease-fire or peace plan and are
still actively fighting requiring the multi-national forces to act in a capacity as peacemakers or enforcers
rather then simply peacekeepers. Finally, second-generation peacekeeping operations include peace-
building components which are designed to assist the war torn state with rebuilding its governmental,
societal and economic structures in a manner that would help provide for peace maintenance, rather than
simply standing between the belligerents to keep them from regenerating the conflict as is the case in
traditional peacekeeping operations. For a greater in-depth discussion of second-generation peacekeeping
refer to: John Mackinlay, and Jarat Chopra, 'Second Generation Multinational Operations' Washington
Quarterly vol. 15 no. 3 (Summer 1992), pp. 113-131; and John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra A Draft
Concept ofSecond Generation Multinational Operations (Providence: Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for
International Studies, 1993).
20 In Cambodia, the mission was the United Nations Transition Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC); in Haiti,
the missions were the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), the United Nations Support Mission in
Haiti (UNSMIH), the United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH), and the United Nations
Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH).
11
valuable information regarding the institution of peace-building into post-civil conflict states.
Just as the interventions into intrastate conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda, and
Zaire have provided many 'lessons learned' which have been, and will continue to be considered
for future missions in order to increase the successfulness of the interventions, the 'lessons
learned' from the previous and present peace-building initiatives undertaken by the international
community will be invaluable to devising future peace-building strategies.
There is a necessary requirement to distinguish between peace-building that has been
articulated and implemented to date and sustainable peace-building which is required to best
secure lasting peace. The way the literature addresses or defines peace-building is quite
ambitious in relation to how the concept is implemented or applied. In his 1992 Agenda for
Peace, Boutros Boutros-Ghali describes the notion of peace-building as operations designed to
prevent the recurrence of the conflict through the implementation of programs designed to
enhance development and open up the society to allow for the exposure to, and generation of
ideas that would assist in the harmonization of the society. With this, there is a great push
towards democratization as it is believed that democracy leads to 'true peace' and 'stable
political order', which means the reduction in the likelihood of the state collapsing back into civil
strife.21 With this present notion of peace-building, the focus is upon instituting democracy with
the belief that it is the most stable form of governing structure and that its institution is
synonymous with peace. This notion has led to a situation in which the establishment of
democracy through the implementation of 'free and fair elections' has come to be understood by
many as an exit strategy enabling the international community to pullout of the state claiming
21 Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, 61-62.
12
that they have 'done something' in terms of providing for post-conflict peace-building.22 From
this perspective it is simply an exit strategy that 'looks good'.
It could be argued, however, that the justification for pulling out following the
implementation of elections is to provide the state the opportunity to rebuild itself after being set
on the right path for the development of peace. Essentially, the role of the international
community is to provide for the basics required for establishing peace and it is the responsibility
of the state and its citizens to develop the intricacies that will define its system rather than have
the international community dictate what those intricacies will be.23
The understanding of peace-building put forth in the Agenda for Peace, defines peace-
building from a state-centric position. The focus is upon the creation of a stable state through
such means as democracy and good governance, which will ultimately provide for peace.24 It is
thought that stability would provide the required space for peace to develop and be maintained.
Coupled with the focus upon state stability, Boutros-Ghali also maintains the state-centric idea of
peace-building through his view of the state being the principle actor in providing for the other
dynamics required for peace-building. Indeed, it is recognized that attaining and sustaining a
social peace (such as human rights and freedoms) is just as important as establishing stability
22 larat Chopra, 'Introducing Peace-Maintenance' In The Politics ofPeace Maintenance larat Chopra ed.
(Boulder Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1998), pp. 14-15.
23 Zartman [I. William Zartman, 'Putting Things Back Together' In Collapsed States: The Disintegration
and Restoration ofLegitimate Authority I. William Zartman, ed. (Boulder Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
Inc. 1995), pp. 267-273] discusses the necessity of establishing a legitimate authority via 'democratic
transition' (the institution of elections) in order to rebuild collapsed states. In recognizing the need for a
legitimate authority as articulated by Zartman, Clement Adibe [Clement E. Adibe, 'Accepting External
Authority in Peace-Maintenance' In The Politics ofPeace-Maintenance larat Chopra, ed. (Boulder Colo.:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1998), pp. 116-117.] cautions against the international community (acting
under the auspices of the UN) taking full authority within a state as it is easily perceived as neocolonialism
resulting in the UN not holding legitimate authority within the state and society and thus providing for the
fundamental issue of legitimacy of authority to be resolved. Thus the notion of instituting free and fair
elections in order to provide for legitimate authority followed by the extraction of the international
community comes to be understood.
24 Boutros-Ghali, Agenda for Peace, 62.
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(strategic or political peace).25 What becomes the issue here, however, is that Boutros-Ghali
looks to the state and governing institutions to provide for this process. Nowhere in his agenda is
there any discussion of using society itself as a generator for peace-building. The focus simply
remains on the state as the centre of gravity for peace-building initiatives.
Ttl~ 4gendafor Peace, being the first comprehensive document that addresses the issue
of needing to go beyond traditional peacekeeping and look towards implementing peace-building
strategies in order to combat the intrastate war dilemma, provides many of the fundamental ideas
about peace-building. This Agenda, however, only covers the basic establishment of the idea of
peace-building along with some general understandings of what is required for its
implementation. Since the idea of peace-building was introduced in 1992, the concept has had
almost ten years to develop and become refined through both lessons learned and academic
discussion and debate. Within this time, there has become a movement towards the
understanding that for peace-building to be truly effective, meaning that it will be sustainable,
there is a need to remove the sole focus away from the state and subsequently invest in
supporting other structures to provide for lasting peace.
Supporting this idea of expanding the focus of peace-building beyond the state and its
institutions, Pierre Lizee looks at the case of Cambodia and its struggle to bring a lasting peace to
the country following years of civil war and oppression of its people by the Khmer Rouge.
Specifically, Lizee examines the Paris Peace Agreement and its ultimate failure to provide for
the degree of stability and sustainable peace in Cambodia that the United Nations was striving
for. Upon examining the Agreement and its implementation, Lizee points to the fact that it was
the political actors and institutions that were the focus of the peace-building initiative as it was
25 Ibid., 62.
14
believed that it was these actors and institutions that held the capabilities of brokering an
agreement and providing the necessary components needed for a sustainable peace.26 Although
these actors and institutions were a necessary part of a peace agreement, the fundamental
problem was that the social condition of the country was not in a state that would allow for the
peace structure to take hold and develop.27 There were considerations for social and economic
rehabilitation in the Paris Peace Agreement, but the implementation of the Agreement did not
actually provide for these dynamics to be properly addressed and implemented.28 Throughout
his discussion, Lizee is emphasizing the requirement for peace-building to incorporate into its
structure social and economic dynamics, as rehabilitation and reconstruction require the support
of these two dynamics.
Charles-Philipe David concurs with the notion that peace-building requires an integrated
approach beyond what has been implemented to date. David puts forth the understanding of
peace-building from two perspectives: the 'exclusivist' view and the 'inclusivist' view. The first
view looks at peace-building as a short-term operation that is conducted for only a two-to-three
year period.29 The 'inclusivist' view, by contrast, argues that development is the underlying
philosophy behind peace-building, and that by the very nature of development work, peace-
building becomes a longer-term investment with many elements involved in the equation.3o
David continues on to discuss the fact that local conditions are the··real key to providing for
sustainable peace-building. This assertion connects with what Lizee is putting forward in his
discussion of peace-building in the sense that there is a requirement for the society and the social
26 Pierre Lizee, Peace, Power and Resistance in Cambodia (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), pp. 46-
47.
27 Ibid., 47
28 Ibid., 47-48.
29 Charles-Philippe David, 'Does Peacebuilding Build Peace?: Liberal (Mis)steps in the Peace Process'
Security Dialogue 31 no. 1 (March 1999), p. 27.
30 Ibid., 27.
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structures to be developed to a point where the changes that are implemented with the peace-
building strategy can be accepted and supported by the local civil society.
It has become evident that sustainable peace-building requires more than just overseeing
and monitoring an election, and once the election is complete declaring that democracy has been
achieved, as has mainly been the case to date. Sustainable peace-building is a notion that
recognizes that peace is a concept that needs to be nurtured for extended periods of time and
perhaps always needs to be promoted and fostered by the surrounding institutions, organizations
and systems. It is a comprehensive approach that incorporates many factors involved with
allowing for peace to be defended and maintained within a state.31
Although analyzing the 'feedback' from present and former peace-building missions is
vital for formulating future operations, there is also a serious need to analyze the link between
the tenets of the human security doctrine32 and sustainable peace-building. It is argued here that
sustainable peace-building can only be created by establishing or re-establishing human security
for the various populations within the failed and fragile states that result from intrastate conflict.
It is the premise of this paper that if human security is established and maintained, the likelihood
for a sustainable peace is enhanced. This premise is based on the idea that peace can only ensue
3] The notion of sustainable peace-building is being defined by the author as it has not as of yet become a
term that is defined by the literature. In a word, it is a concept that goes beyond simple 'peace-building'
and attempts to introduce a long-term and comprehensive approach to the institution and maintenance of
peace. The purpose of this paper is to foster a more precise definition of this concept.
32 The human security agenda has been articulated and promoted by the Canadian Foreign Affairs and
International Trade Minister, Lloyd Axworthy, whereby security is viewed from the perspective of the
individual rather than solely from the perspective of the state (which has been the traditional view of
security). Security issues are regarded from the perspective of the human being [Lloyd Axworthy, 'World
Criminal Court Needed to Advance Global Human Rights,' in Canadian Speeches: Issues of the Day 12
(April 1998), pp. 10-11.], meaning that security is defined in relation to what poses a threat to an
individual. Examining security from this perspective necessarily involves perceiving new elements as
security threats. Mr. Axworthy has cited "crime, drugs, terrorism, pollution, human rights abuses,
epidemics, and the like" as elements involved with human security [Lloyd Axworthy, & Sarah Taylor, 'A
Ban for all Seasons: The Landmines Convention and its Implications for Canadian Diplomacy,'
International Journal LIII (Spring 1998), pp. 190-191]. He has also stated that the "concept of human
security recognizes the complexity of the human environment and accepts that the forces influencing
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if people both believe and feel that they themselves are secure, in the broadest sense of the
understanding of security, which is what will happen once human security is attained.
A problem exists, however, as the human security agenda has not yet been defined and
refined to the extent to provide an outline on how sustainable peace can be obtained and
maintained in areas once stricken by civil conflict. For example, the doctrine does not declare or
indicate at what point human security is threatened or non-existent. In other words, no threshold
has been established to mark the point at which human security has been violated and action by
external forces needs to be taken. Likewise, there is no structure for a classification system that
defines the dynamics of human security. Essentially, as it stands now all fundamental elements
that constitute human security exist at the same level. There has been no categorization or
ranking of the various elements of human security in terms of which are the most basic as
opposed to those that may be more advanced or refined.33 As well, there does not exist a
comprehensive understanding about how the various dynamics relate to one another. The
dynamics of human security, although separate in their own right, cannot exist in a vacuum, void
of influence from the other dynamics. Indeed they all effectively act together to create the
overall concept of human security.
Human security is an idea that has its roots dating back to the United Nations Universal
Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly in December 1948 whereby
specific rights of all individuals (without regard to race, religious belief, or gender) were
incorporated into one formal document. Although there existed no link between human rights
and security, there was a recognition of the fact that upholding certain inalienable human rights
human security are interrelated and mutually reinforcing." [refer to Lloyd Axworthy, 'Canada and Human
Security: The Need for Leadership' International Journal vol. LII no. 2 (Spring 1997), p. 184.
17
was morally just and obligatory. After the Cold War, when the opportunity emerged for the idea
of both state and international security to be understood from a new and broader perspective. As
previously discussed, ideas such as those presented by Barry Buzan outline a more holistic or
global perspective in the understanding of security. The link between human rights and security
was formally introduced for the first time in the 1994 United Nations Human Development
Report.34 Since the introduction of this notion of security in the Report seven years ago, the
concept of human security has become further defined and established as a justifiable manner in
which to understand national and international security.
Following the debut of human security in the Human Development Report, the idea
caught the attention of Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister, Lloyd Axworthy, who subsequently
developed and promoted the doctrine of human security to the point where the human security
doctrine has been dubbed the 'Axworthy Doctrine'. Axworthy has spoken in-depth about the
shift from security being viewed from a state-centric perspective to that of a perspective that
focuses on the individual as the primary unit of security. With the individual being the focal
point, there necessarily develops a broader understanding of what constitutes security threats as
there are numerous pressure points for individuals in which insecurity can be derived. Some of
the elements that have been cited as threats to human security include "crime, drugs, terrorism,
pollution, human rights abuses, [and] epidemics.,,35
Once there was a greater understanding on the world stage regarding the basic idea of
human security, there developed two different interpretations or conceptions of what human
33 It should be noted that there is a general understanding that the absence of such dynamics as food, shelter
and protection from physical attack are the most basic elements of the human security doctrine, however
there has been no discussion pertaining to how other elements rank in comparison to these.
34 United Nations Development Program, Hunlan Development Report 1994, New York: Oxford University
Press, 1994.
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security ultimately intended to achieve. In the Canadian model, human security was centred
around the notion of providing freedom from fear, while the Japanese model understands human
security to be freedom from want.36 The driving force behind the Japanese understanding is the
idea of dignity, and as a result it has developed a broader conceptualization of the doctrine than
the Canadian model. Canada's conception of human security is a reaction to the violence that
civil war creates and the resulting afflictions that it imposes on the people who are caught in the
midst of the fighting. This explains Canada's push on issues such as reducing small arms
proliferation and stopping the use of child soldiers, declaring them to be threats to human
security.
Both of these models provide a conceptualization of human security from a unique
standpoint where one focuses on human cost and the other on human need.37 The variation in the
interpretation of what human security ultimately attempts to provide, demonstrates that the
doctrine itself is not yet fully developed to the point of being able to bridge gaps between
ideologies. In fact, one of the greatest issues facing the increased acceptance and adoption of the
human security agenda is that it lacks consonance in ideology, making it infeasible for
inclusiveness to occur at this point.
In order for states to achieve a condition of sustainable peace after a violent civil conflict,
or for violent civil strife to be averted altogether, there is a requirement for human security to be
re-established, or in some cases instituted for the first time. However, the doctrine has not yet
evolved to a point where it has either incorporated or set out the elements that need to be
considered for sustainable peace-building. This creates a unique but very opportune situation
35 Lloyd Axworthy, & Sarah Taylor, 'A Ban for all Seasons: The Landmines Convention and its
Implications for Canadian Diplomacy,' International Journal LIII (Spring 1998), pp. 190-191.
36 Amitav Acharya, 'Human Security in Asia Pacific: Puzzle, Panacea or Peril?' CANCAPS Bulletin no. 27
(November 2000), p.2.
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whereby two objectives can be reached: by determining what is entailed with instituting a
successful sustainable peace-building program while further defining and refining the human
security doctrine. Actually, each of these elements will benefit from the development of the
other as they actually serve to mutually advance one another, essentially creating a cyclical
effect. As the requirements for a sustainable peace-building program are ascertained, the
specific dynamics of the program will be incorporated into the human security agenda, thereby
further advancing the doctrine. In tum, as the human security doctrine develops with the
dynamics that were resolved to be required for sustainable peace-building, it will provide the
legitimacy needed for the initiatives to be applied, as they will have the backing of an established-
doctrine. The result will be a better articulated doctrine that can properly address a pressing
issue, and the development of a sustainable peace-building program that will provide the ability
for failed and fragile states to rebuild in a manner that will help ensure that they will not fall back
into a state of violent civil conflict.
In order to identify the necessary elements needed for the institution of sustainable peace-
building in failed or fragile states resulting from internal war, there must first be an
understanding of the dynamics involved in intrastate conflict. The discussion will provide an
overview of the unique characteristics involved with this form of conflict, the ramifications that
internal wars have on international security, and the factors involved with international
intervention. An examination of the cases of Macedonia and East Timor will follow in order to
identify what has been, and is being undertaken in peace-building operations and subsequently to
discern what the strengths and the shortcomings of the past and present programs are. The final
section will incorporate all of the information from the case studies and the synopsis of the
37 Ibid., 2.
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dynamics of intrastate wars in order to develop the idea of sustainable peace-building and link it
with the human security doctrine. The resulting analysis will then be applied in the Canadian
context where a framework will be proposed for the structuring of its peacekeeping and peace-
building strategies so it is able to provide for sustainable peace-building in future endeavours.
The information that will be generated from the research and analysis will provide an
avenue for further discussion to evolve regarding the establishment of sustainable peace in failed
and fragile states. There is an abundance of literature on peace-building; however, this paper is
designed to further the existing literature by establishing that there is a link between human
security and sustainable peace-building as well as refining the dynamics of human security to
provide for an archetype for the implementation of sustainable peace-building.
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Chapter I
Intra-State War and International Peace-building
Dynamics of Intrastate Wars
War has always been a means to an end. War provides more territory, resources, and
wealth to successful aggressors, or the preservation of such tangible goods to successful
defenders. The losses that were incurred by the fighting (whether material or human) were
looked upon as a necessary evil that were outweighed by the material gains that were either
obtained or retained. Even if war is still a means to an end, the dynamics of war have changed or
'evolved' over time. Kalevi Holsti provides an excellent understanding of this transformation in
his book The State, War, and the State ojWar38• He identifies and outlines the three forms of
war that have existed from the creation of the state system in 1648 via the Treaty of Westphalia.
The first form is institutionalized war, which characterized war as an instrument of the
state. War existed between states and was 'limited' in the sense that the warring parties were
state forces comprised of professionally trained soldiers who only waged war with one another;
civilians were not to be targeted or attacked. There were also established norms/conventions, or
as Holsti refers to them "rules of the game", that were adhered to by the engaged armed forces
that essentially provided for war to be somewhat regulated and 'civilized', as well as providing
for a clear distinction to be made between soldiers and civilians. In sum, the fighting was not
personal, and in ideal circumstances civilians would not even be aware that a war was being
fought by their state.
38 Kalevi J. Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996),
pp.28-40.
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The advancements in military technology paved the way for the rise of the second form
of war: total war. Trained soldiers still comprised the fighting forces, however, the distinction
between soldiers and civilians became ambiguous due to the technological advancements and the
rise in nationalism that had not previously been present in the former condition of war. Attacks
made from the air, and from ships and submarines meant that the traditional battlefield was no
longer the sole area where armed clashes took place. The ability to target a greater area in order
to gain a strategic advantage resulted in non-military targets being assaulted, and thus innocent
civilians casualties. The rise of nationalism during this phase meant that not all incidences of
civilian casualties were unintentional, in fact as demonstrated by the events of World War II,
civilians became direct targets of aggression in an attempt to break morale, and in some cases to
exterminate a particular group or nation of peoples. A civilian dimension to war had become
introduced in this phase of war.
The third form of war that Holsti describes is civil/intrastate war. This form of war is
characterized by heavy civilian casualties, a lack of any rules, the conflict being fought in the
interest of a community rather than in the interest of the state, and the combatants no longer
being trained soldiers and armies but rather individuals with a "personal stake in the outcome,,39.
This description clearly indicates that there exists a great difference between intrastate wars and
the wars that have been fought in the past. The fact that these wars differ greatly from the ones
of the past means that the way in which these conflicts are either managed or resolved must also
differ. Holsti provides a good synopsis of the rudimentary distinctions between intrastate wars
and wars that have transpired in the past; however, a more comprehensive understanding of the
39 Ibid., 39.
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dynamics of intrastate wars is essential in order to determine the best means for ending these
conflicts and establishing self-sustaining peace.
Intrastate wars are complex affairs (as are all forms of war), and this makes it difficult to
address all dynamics in a clear and concise manner. For this reason the discussion of intrastate
war will be broken down into three general categories: the characteristics of intrastate wars; the
security implications that civil wars impose on the international system; and the dynamics
concerning international intervention into these wars. The discussion of intrastate conflict from
these three perspectives will be used in order to provide the required understanding of the
dynamics of civil war that are essential to comprehend in order for strategies for self-sustaining
peace-building to be developed and implemented. Throughout this discussion one must keep in
mind that all civil wars contain unique elements that necessarily distinguish them from one
another; however, there are generalizations that can be deduced in order to make the study of
such wars possible.
The causes of internal wars is the best place to start when analyzing the characteristics of
this form of war. Pinpointing direct causes of civil war is a difficult endeavour due to the fact
that there are always so many dynamics that intertwine to eventually create the conditions that
lead to the outbreak of violent conflict. Rosenau's 'cascade' effect40, although designed to
describe the occurrence of events at the international level, provides an excellent description of
the many variables that interact to cause states to fall into civil strife. Even if in each situation
there are numerous dynamics that are responsible for the outbreak of civil war, there are some
common factors that have been identified that give rise to the state falling into a downward
40 James N. Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity (Princeton NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 299-300.
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trajectory and ultimately into a state of civil strife.41 Leadership, intergroup discord, and weak
state structures are the main factors that will be addressed in greater detail.
Every state holds some form of leadership structure whereby a particular individual or
individuals provide the direction that the state will advance in relation to specific issues. In
many states there exists a system whereby leaders are faced with some form of checks or
balances that are designed to ensure that leaders do not take dictatorial control of the state.
However, history often suggests that these checks and balances can be either averted or revoked
by a leader who desires extensive or comprehensive power. Hitler's ability to gain power
through the democratic process and then to establish himself as a dictator illustrates this point.
There are of course states in which there are no systems in place to restrict the power of leaders
and consequently the dictatorial or totalitarian leaders possess absolute power and control. Due
to the fact that leaders can greatly influence events and the outcomes of circumstance and
situations, it is no surprise that leaders are regarded as one of the causes for internal wars.
41 A review of the literature on the causes of civil conflicts clearly indicates that there isno one cause that
can be regarded as the sole cause of civil conflict. Instead, there are numerous elements that are outlined as
being contributors to the outbreak of civil conflict which when present in various capacities and at
particular times create situations where civil conflict is the result. It should be noted that the causes of all
civil conflicts are different as dynamics such as history, state structures and social configurations are
different in each state thus making the triggers for civil conflict vary greatly. Despite the differences that
exist there are a number of 'root' factors which have been identified as being the main contributors for
causing the outbreak of civil conflict. The 3 factors discussed in this paper -leadership, intergroup discord,
and weak state structures - were chosen based on a review of the literature and the identification of these 3
factors as being understood to be the most prevalent of the causes for civil conflict. Although there are
only 3 specific factors discussed, they are broad issue areas which provide for many of the 'smaller
dynamics', which can contribute to the outbreak of civil conflict, to be incorporated under one of the factor
categories. The literature consulted includes: Steven R. David, 'Internal Wars: Causes and Cures' World
Politics 49 (July 1997): pp. 552-576; Michael E. Brown, 'The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal
Conflict' In The International Dimensions of Internal Conflicts Michael E. Brown ed. (Cambridge: The
MIT Press, 1996), pp. 571-601; Michael E. Brown, 'Introduction' In The International Dimensions of
Internal Conflict Michael E. Brown, ed. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996), pp. 1-31; Snow, Uncivil Wars;
Michael E. Brown, 'Causes and Implications of Ethnic Conflict' In Ethnic Conflict and International
Security Michael E. Brown, ed. pp. 3-26 (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993); Rajat Ganguly, &
Raymond C. Taras, Understanding Ethnic Conflict: The International Dimension (New York: Longman,
1998); and Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1985).
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Knowing full well that intrastate wars create appalling conditions within the country, why
would any leader desire and provoke the outbreak of such conditions? The motive often stems
from the aspiration of a leader to hold onto power.42 Although there are many examples that can
be cited, such as Chechnya, Rwanda, and Somalia,43 the best example is that of the former
Yugoslavia and the then president, Slobodan Milosevic. Following the death of Marshall Tito in
1980, Yugoslavia slowly began to emerge from the repressive regime which had once ruled it,
ultimately threatening the status quo and subsequently the established elite of whom Milosevic
was a member. Responding to the threat of yielding power due to the proposals for economic
and political reform by the new up and coming elite, the established elite, headed by Milosevic,
turned to invoking ethnic cleavages within the unified and multiethnic country in order to divert
attention away from the proposed changes which would allow the established elite to continue
ruling. Once the conflict escalated to the point of all out civil war, Milosevic was able to grab
hold of the country and thus maintain his power position.44 His power remained until recently,
when he lost the election on September 24, 2000. Even after it was determined that the election
had produced another winner, he attempted to maintain control by calling for a second ballot in
order to hold office for as long as possible. Eventually Milosevic did concede power and
vacated his position. Although there were elements present for Milosovic to play upon to send
the former Yugoslavia into a state of civil war that-would result in hundreds of thousands of
people being killed or displaced, it was his desperate struggle to maintain the status quo and thus
his powerful position that provided for the ultimate demise of the former Yugoslavia.
42 David, 'Internal Wars,' pp.565.
43 Ibid., 565.
44 For a detailed account of this case refer to: V.P. Gagnon Jr., 'Ethnic Nationalism and International
Conflict: The Case of Serbia' International Security 19 no. 3 (Winter 1994/1995), pp. 130- 166.
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Intergroup discord and weak state structures are the other two factors that are often
regarded as the causes for civil war. Although these two dynamics are separate factors, they are
best addressed together as they tend to feed off of one another, thus compounding issues and
often resulting in intrastate war.
Intergroup discord commonly occurs due to the existence of serious disparities between
the status of the various groups within a society. Although not in all cases, the disparity in status
frequently exists between ethnic groups.45 Often it is the case that one ethnic group wields
greater power and influence within the state as compared to other groups that may be present.
Oppression or exploitation becomes common as the group holding power desires to maintain the
status quo in order ensure their continued influential position and prosperity. Tensions continue
to mount as the oppressed group(s) are continually denied the ability to gain equality and status
within the system. The ruling authority within the state lacks horizontallegitimacy46 from the
perspective of the oppressed group(s).
The pent-up frustrations in many cases had been subdued by colonial powers or
communist regimes that tended to rule in a manner that provided little opportunity for
dissatisfied groups to rise up. Once external powers began to loosen their grip on these states,
eventually pulling out completely, the result was weakened state structures.47 The weakened
state structures were no longer in a position where they were either able to continue to suppress
45 See Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, pp. 101-105; and H.D. Forbes, Ethnic Conflict: Commerce,
Culture, and the Contact Hypothesis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), pp. 114-122. Horowitz
argues that modernization can create disparities between various ethnic groups resulting in the creation or
increase of tensions between the groups. Forbes puts forth the idea that when there are differences in
socioeconomic dynamics between ethnic groups, there becomes little interaction between them as each
believes that there would be little common ground with one another. The result of this low-level
interaction is the decreased opportunity and possibility for negative stereotyping to be broken through
(which Forbes states on page 19 of his work, contributes to hostile attitudes rising between the various
groups).
46 Refer to Holsti, pp. 86-93.
47 Michael E. Brown, 'The Causes and Regional Dimensions' p. 576.
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the uprisings that were finally beginning to surface, nor provide protection for the various groups
from one another, resulting in the creation of a security void.48 The result was the "breakdown
of normal politics,,49 and the resulting outbreak of violence due to demands not being met or the
emergence of the belief by each group that they had to defend themselves as the state would no
longer be able to provide adequate protection. If the situation were not remedied, the intrastate
security dilemma articulated by Barry Posen50 would emerge, which commonly results in the
collapse of the state and eruption of civil war.
The combination of intergroup discord, which commonly exists along ethnic lines, and
weak state structures, act as causal agents for internal wars. Each of these factors alone is able to
48 Ibid., 576.
49 Zartman refers to the "breakdown in normal politics" as the inability or unwillingness the ruling power to
address grievances to the satisfaction of the discontented group. Refer to 1. William Zartman, 'Dynamics
and Constraints in Negotiations in Internal Conflicts' In Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil War, 1.
William Zartman ed. (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1995), p. 5
50 Barry Posen, 'The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict' Survival 35 no. 1 (Spring 1993), pp. 27-47.
The concept of a 'security dilemma' was first articulated at the international level and was applied to
interstate relations. Robert Jervis understood the international system to be basically anarchic in nature and
recognized the fact that as each state endeavors to provide for their own security (even if they have no
intent of employing aggressive behaviour towards other states) other states may misinterpret those actions
as aggressive and consequently take action to increase their security and causing the cycle to repeat itself.
[refer to Robert Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics (New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1976.] Barry Buzan continues the discussion of the security dilemma at the international
level understood as the 'power-security dilemma'. His analysis looks at the anarchic structure of the
system and the fact the power-security dilemma is inevitable (no matter if you are a Realist or Idealist),
however with one clause; as the anarchy becomes more mature (more ordered) the power-security dilemma
diminishes (but will never disappear until anarchy ceases to define the international system). Barry Posen
took the concept of the interstate security dilemma and applied it to intrastate ethnic conflicts providing for
these conflicts to be better understood in terms of comprehending why groups may come into conflict with
on another as well as why it becomes difficult to resolve the conflict. [See Chapter 8 of Buzan, People,
States and Fear 2nd ed. (Boulder Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1991)] Posen has provided for the
understanding that the various groups engaged in an internal conflict need to be provided with some form
of guaranteed security in order to both end hostilities as well as provide for reconciliation to commence
[see David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, 'Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic
Conflict' International Security 21 no. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 41-75]. The intrastate security dilemma is also
discussed in Stephen M. Saideman, 'Is Pandora's Box Half Empty or Half Full? The Limited Virulence of
Secessionism and Domestic Sources of Disintegration' in The International Spread ofEthnic Conflict,
David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild eds. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 134-138.
For a good overview of the history of the security dilemma see Alan Collins, 'The Security Dilemma' in
Security Issues in the Post-Cold War World M. Jane Davis (ed.) 181-195. (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar
Publishing Limited, 1996).
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cause much damage to a state and even produce civil war, but acting in concert these two factors
can almost guarantee"the collapse of a state.
There are many elements and factors that have to be considered when determining the
cause for a state to deteriorate to the point of civil war. The three factors that have been
discussed above - poor leadership, intergroup discord, and weak state structures - are regarded
as the major forces that cause intrastate war. Again, these three factors do not exist in a vacuum,
meaning that there are other factors acting in concert with them, but these three factors are the
most significant and perhaps can be used as indicators for states at risk of collapsing.
The"summary of Holsti' s 'evolution' of war clearly pointed out the fact that the casualties
of war are no longer restricted to the trained combatants. Instead, civilians have become the
targets of aggression whether it be by being forced to leave an area and become refugees or
being killed or seriously wounded through deliberate attack. A shocking statistic that
demonstrates this point is the one put forth by the now former Canadian Foreign Affairs and
International Trade Minister, Lloyd Axworthy, that only five percent of casualties during World
War I were civilians compared to a figure of almost eighty percent in the intrastate wars of
today.51 The increased number of civilian casualties in intrastate conflicts is the manifestation of
the 'unique' nature of these conflicts. In a word, the increased civilian casualties are the
byproduct of the manner in which these wars are fought and of the conduct which typically
transpires.
Internal wars are fought between two or more warring parties within the confines of a
state. From the outset it is obvious that there is a fundamental difference between intrastate wars
and interstate wars; the combatants share the same territory and thus are essentially unable to
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retreat back to their 'own side' at.any point during the course of the conflict. Once conflicts
start, whether due to bad leaders, intergroup discord or weak state structures, lines necessarily
become drawn and sides are established throughout the society. These lines are commonly
drawn at the ethnic level, as it is frequently the case where civil conflicts become defined by
ethnic rivalries. This dynamic provides for the conflict to undertake a greater degree of brutality
and increased intensity than interstate wars typically do.52 The intensity, according to Rosenau,
is due to the fact that the enemy is not a foreigner, but could easily have been individuals with
whom one interacted with on a regular basis, ranging from a boss to a family member.53 The
ties that previously existed are ripped apart and become replaced with hatred.
The brutalities of civil war ensue from this understanding as ordinary people begin to
take up arms and fight for what is now their cause. Organized war does not exist as 'militia
groups' form and act upon their own will. The results of this form of warfare emerging are the
atrocities that have come to be associated with intrastate wars: vicious and direct attacks upon
civilians; rape and torture; ethnic cleansing; and in extreme but increasingly common
occurrences, genocide. There are no rules to this fighting. Michael Ignatieff describes the
situation best when he provides details of the civil wars in the former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda in
The Warrior's Honour. 54 His work focuses upon the fact that the belligerents believe themselves
to be warriors as they are fighting for the ultimate cause, their existence; however, their conduct
makes them the furthest thing from being a warrior as they act in a manner that holds no honour,
which is the very essence of being a true warrior.
51 Lloyd Axworthy, 'Notes for an Address by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy Minister of Foreign Affairs
to the Societe des Relations Internationales de Quebec "Human Security and Canada's Security Council
Agenda'" in Department ofForeign Affairs and International Trade: Statement (February 25, 1999): 2.
52 James N. Rosenau, 'Internal War as an International Event' in International Aspects of Civil Strife James
N. Rosenau ed. (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 73.
53 Ibid., 73.
54 Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior's Honour (Toronto: Viking, 1998)
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The extreme violence in these conflicts causes them to become protracted in many
cases.55 For example, the civil war in Sierra Leone has been raging for over 9 years, the war in
Sri Lanka began in 1983 and still continues, and it took almost 4 years to bring peace to Bosnia-
Herzegovina. As the conflict drags on more violence and atrocities are committed. Another
element that is commonly added to the equation that allows for protracted civil conflicts is 'third-
party' support.56 For reasons such as ethnic identification or historical alliance or support, other
states will become involved in a civil war as a third-party offering support to one of the factions.
Support from the third-parties often gives the weaker party the power to present an impregnable
challenge to the stronger faction, thus providing for a longer conflict.57 The problem with
extended warfare is thus that the violence can often become even more intense and the conflict
more difficult to settle.58
This leads into the issue of how to cease hostilities and to attempt to bring intrastate wars
to an end. War can end in one of two ways: by complete military victory where one side defeats
the other, or through a negotiated cease fire or settlement where both sides agree to stop fighting
and work out an agreement to manage the dispute.59 Negotiating an end to the war is the ideal as
it means that the violence will be suspended at an earlier point as opposed to carrying on until
there becomes a decisive victor. This, however, is not always possible, nor desirable in the case
of civil wars.
55 Charles King, Ending Civil Wars Adelphi Paper # 308 (New York: Oxford University Press for the IISS,
1997), p. 24.
56 Alicia Levine, 'Political Accommodation and the Prevention of Secessionist Violence' The International
Dimensions ofInternal Conflict, Michael E. Brown, ed. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996), p. 328.
57 Ibid., 328.
58 Ibid., 312.
59 War of course can be ended through the intervention or involvement of an external party. However, the
discussion that follows focuses on the ways in which a conflict will end without external intervention. In
other words, left to its own devices war will end by either military victory or negotiated settlement. The
issue of external intervention as a means to bringing war to an end is not overlooked as this paper
continually addresses the interventionist strategies taken by international (external) forces to both end
hostilities and build sustainable peace.
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Negotiating requires that certain conditions be present in order for it to be effectively
undertaken. Zartman identifies four elements or "component conditions" that are necessary for
producing an effective negotiation, but are difficult to secure in intrastate war situations. These
conditions are a willingness to compromise, a willingness to accept trade-offs, the recognition of
legitimate spokespersons for each faction, and a hurting stalemate.6o Intrastate wars are
generally based upon the philosophy of zero-sum whereby the belligerents regard their cause in
an all-or-nothing manner thus leaving no room for either compromise or trade-offs. The zero-
sum rational stems from the fact that civil wars contain the personal dynamic discussed above.
Since the conflict is at the individual level (a person becomes the enemy and target simply
because of his/her ethnicity) compromise or trade-offs are not regarded as an option as the
conflict ultimately comes to be understood by the belligerents as a fight for their very existence.
Trade-offs and compromising can therefore not be options.
Negotiating requires that representatives from each of the warring factions come together
to work out an agreement that is acceptable to all. This may seem like a simple task, however,
when a faction refuses to recognize the existence or legitimacy of the 'other' group it is not
possible to hold negotiations, as there is no one to negotiate with according to one or more of the
factions. In the case of intrastate war, the government or ruling power often refuses to officially
recognize the existence of the opposing group, as it would be acceding to insurgents' principal
demands.61 Providing recognition denotes that there is legitimacy to the 'rebels' cause which
most governments or ruling powers do not want to acknowledge as it forces them to address the
insurgent's complaints. Without recognition, negotiation cannot take place.
60 Zartman, 'Dynamics and Constraints' p. 10. The last two conditions are also addressed in 1. William
Zartman, 'The Unfinished Agenda; Negotiating Internal Conflict' In Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars
End Roy Licklider, ed. (New York: New York University Press, 1993), pp. 26-27.
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Finally a "hurting stalemate" is necessary for negotiations to transpire, but internal wars
do not lend for this to easily occur. A hurting stalemate refers to the condition produced when
"the parties see conceivable escalation [a significant change in the nature of the conflict] as
unlikely to bring about the desired results.,,62 The problem in civil wars, unlike in interstate
wars, is that the parties refuse to acknowledge the stalemate and take the opportunity to end the
conflict through negotiation. Instead, the factions "retrench on their element of strength and
harden their positions.,,63 One must keep in mind that in intrastate wars, the political threshold of
incurred costs, such as death and destruction, is very high, thus allowing for wars to continue
beyond a point that they normally would in interstate conflicts.64 It is obvious that the zero-sum
dynamic surfaces again at this point. If the existence of a stalemate is not acknowledged by the
warring parties they will see no reason for negotiating an end to the hostilities.
Achieving the 'ripe' moments for negotiation in intrastate conflicts in many cases is very
difficult to seize due to the fact that civil wars often do not provide for the dynamics required for
establishing negotiation. Although negotiating the end to civil wars is the desirable manner in
which a conflict is brought to an end, there is some contention that negotiated settlements do not
provide for the settlements to be incredibly stable. The argument is that outright military victory
by one side can produce a more stable arrangement.65 Although a negotiated settlement can
produce a more equitable result than a military victory (where one side effectively becomes the·
61 Zartman, 'Dynamics and Constraints' p. 10. Also refer to Milton J. Esman, Ethnic Politics (New York:
Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 218.
62 Zartman, 'Dynamics and Constraints' p. 19.
63 Zartman, 'The Unfinished Agenda" pp. 26~27.
64 David, 'Internal Wars,' p. 561.
65 King, 'Ending Civil Wars' p. 25. The idea of ripe moments for negotiation is articulated by Zartman as a
moment "composed of a structural element, a party element, and a political alternative - that is, a mutual
hurting stalemate, the presence of valid spokespersons, and a formula for a way out."[refer to Zartman,
'Dynamics and Constraints' , p. 18]. Hampson also discusses the concept of ripeness, however he takes the
discussion one step further and injects the idea that there is a potential for 'unripening' to occur (even if a
peace process has begun during a ripe moment) resulting in the parties reverting back into a state of armed
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International Security Implications
The international system was founded upon, and functions under, the concept of state
sovereignty. In its truest form, state sovereignty means that each state is free to conduct its
internal affairs as it chooses without interference from other states. Essentially, it is the
condition of absolute and exclusive authority over domestic affairs. Intrastate conflicts,
according to the doctrine of state sovereignty, are thus not the concern of the other states or
actors within the international system as the conflict is one that is occurring within sovereign
territory. This, however, is no longer the case as civil conflicts are simply not just the concern of
the specific state engulfed in internal strife. Intrastate conflicts now have ramifications upon
many countries within the same region, as well as the international community as a whole. The
security threat that civil wars pose to the international system can be regarded from two
perspectives: the traditional state centric or 'hard power,72 security perspective, and the more
recent non-state or 'human based,73 security perspective. Both of these perspectives will be
addressed in detail concurrently in order to articulate the implications that intrastate conflicts
71 Ibid., 27.
72 Hard power is the institution of military might within the system. This concept of power is traditionally
associated with the phenomenon of interstate war [Kalevi J. Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War,
82.] and is generally linked to the discipline of strategic studies [see Barry Buzan, An Introduction to
Strategic Studies: Military Technology and International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1987)]. Hard
power focuses on states being the primary actor in the system and the persuasion or coercion that exists
occurs between states and is based upon military force or the threat of its use. Hard power is contrasted by
(and should not be confused with) the notion of soft power, which as defined by Joseph Nye and William
Owens as: "the ability to achieve desired outcomes in international affairs through attraction rather than
coercion. It works by convincing others to follow, or getting them to agree to, norms and institutions that
produce the desired behaviour. Soft power can rest on the appeal of one's ideas or the ability to set the
agenda in ways that shape the preferences of others." [Joseph S. Nye, & William A. Owens, 'America's
Information Edge,' in Foreign Affairs 75 no. 2 (March/April] 996), p. 21.]
73 This 'human based' security perspective refers to the human security agenda that has been widely
articulated and promoted by the now former Canadian Foreign Affairs and International Trade Minister,
Lloyd Axworthy, whereby security is viewed from the perspective of the individual rather than solely from
the perspective of the state (which has been the traditional view of security). Although the human security
doctrine has become 'popularized' via the work ofAxworthy, the term has been previously used by the
former United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his 1992 Agendafor Peace, as well as
in the United Nations Development Program Human Development Report 1994.
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have on international security, which will clearly illustrate why these conflicts have come to
dominate the international security agenda.
Security is necessarily a very important element that each state wishes to attain and
control. Indeed, it is one of the hallmarks of state legitimacy. The dynamics that are involved
with globalization inevitably dictate that threats to one states' security will most likely have
some effect on the security of the international system. Civil wars have demonstrated all too
well the notion that the world is essentially one unit and states no longer exist in isolation. The
idea of absolute state sovereignty begins to erode in this context as states necessarily have to
respond to internal affairs of other states in an attempt to ensure the security of their own
borders.74 There are three main dynamics of civil wars that pose security dilemmas to the
international system: the creation of mass refugees, conflict spillover, and the partition of
states.75 Each of these dynamics singly can become a great threat to the security and stability of
the international system, when they occur in concert, however, that threat increases dramatically.
Refugees or displaced persons76 occur when people are driven from their homes either by
forced evacuation or due to the inability to obtain the essential goods that are necessary to sustain
74 Boutros Boutros-Ghali during his tenure as UN Secretary-General stated in his 1992 Agenda for Peace
that "[t]he time for absolute and exclusive sovereignty [... ] has passed" followed by a statement
recognizing the requirement for a "balance [to be established] between the needs of good internal
governance and the requirements of an even more interdependent world." Although Boutros-Ghali stated
that the fundamental dynamics of state sovereignty need to be maintained in order to provide for
international advancement. Refer to Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Second Edition with the
New Supplement and Related UN Documents (New York: United Nations, 1995), p. 44.
75 The three main dynamics that are addressed here were chosen based upon a general consensus that is
present in the literature. There is no one source that states that these three specific dynamics are the main
security threats that civil wars pose, however after reviewing the literature, the information regarding this
issue of international security implications resulting from civil conflicts can be consolidated and understood
under these three main (and purposely broad) categories. The literature consulted to establish these three
categories was as follows: Michael E. Brown, 'Introduction,' The International Dimensions of Internal
Conflict, Michael E. Brown, ed. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996), pp. 1-31; Michael E. Brown, 'Causes
and Implications of Ethnic Conflict,' Ethnic Conflict and International Security Michael E. Brown, ed.
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 3-26; Mohammed Ayoob, 'New-Old', pp. 13-30;
Snow, Uncivil War.
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their existence. In situations of civil war, especially those defined by ethnic divides, people are
often forced from their communities and/or cities by the opposing faction for the purpose of
attaining an area that is ethnically cleansed. Ethnic cleansing took place in many areas within
the former Yugoslavia where Serbian combatants forced Muslim and Croatian populations to
leave their homes and seek refuge wherever they could. The number of refugees that are
characteristically created in situations of intrastate war is so phenomenal that it becomes easy to
understand how a global security predicament can occur.77 The number of people displaced due
to civil conflict is striking, especially when one takes into consideration that the vast majority of
those people need to be absorbed into the population of other states. The following table
provides an illustration of the number of persons displaced in various civil wars around the
world.
Country
Al eria
Azerbaijan
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Cambodia
Croatia
Ken a
Liberia
Rwanda
Sierra Leone
Bangladesh
Sudan
Somalia
Source: Brown (1996: 4-7)
Year Hostilities
Began
1992
1990
1992
1975
1991
1992
1989
1990
1991
1982
1983
1990
Total
Number of
People
Displaced78
40
1,700
2,500
500
320
300
1,700
2,000
660
50
4,500
1,000
16,270,000
76 In this context, displaced persons is referring to persons who have been displaced externally as opposed
to internally, and who have been displaced due to civil war rather than for haphazard reasons such as
natural disasters.
77 Michael E. Brown, 'Introduction,' p. 7.
78 Numbers are represented in thousands.
79 This chart is a less detailed and selective rendition of Table 1. Major Internal Conflicts (as of 1995)
found in Michael E. Brown, 'Introduction', pp. 4-7.
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In these twelve states alone, there have been over fifteen million people who have had to
leave their homes either because of force or the threat of force. When these people are
compelled to leave their place of residence they must seek refuge in other regions or states. Due
to the protracted nature of civil wars, refugees may not be able to be repatriated for months and
in some cases years from the time of their expulsion thus extending the burden, and ultimately
insecurity, that the host countries must endure.
The traditional sovereign borders that divide neighbouring states from the failed states
become virtually non-existent as hundreds of thousands of people begin to spillover the border
in a desperate attempt to flee from the violent conflict. In many cases people are fleeing to avoid
physical harm or death that would be bestowed upon them due to their ethnicity or religion. The
massive influx of refugees that neighbouring states experience is very difficult for the host state
to absorb and deal with as camps must be established. Food, water and basic necessities must be
provided. The camps also need to be monitored and/or guarded in order to control the influx of
the refugees in order to contain them in the foreign state. One must consider that the regions
where civil conflicts have transpired and are prone to occur (Africa, the Balkans and the Middle
East for example) are not noted for their overall stability. The states that are forced to accept
refugees usually maintain some degree of instability, and their state structures become even more
vulnerable to that instability when thousands of refugees flow across their borders.
Consequently, security for these states is weakened, which will ultimately increase their
susceptibility to state failure themselves which will have further implications on the international
system. The prime example of this occurred in 1994 when Rwanda experienced a mass exodus
of people into the surrounding states. In a single day, 250,000 Rwandans fled into neighbouring
Tanzania. Within a few months over 2 million refugees had tried to escape the massacres taking
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place on account of the civil war by entering Tanzania, Zaire and Burundi. 80 None of these
states were in a position to accept this mass influx of people, and as a result tensions rose within
the host countries, increasing their own instability.
Refugees do not only threaten the security of the proximal and partially unstable states.
Recent history has demonstrated that Western countries are also susceptible to problems within
their own states due to the inflow of refugees from civil conflicts. As migration of these refugees
into industrialized democracies occurs, racial tensions increase as the 'balance' between
'nationals' of the receiving state and 'foreigners' becomes disrupted. 81 This disruption can lead
to severe cleavages within the society as xenophobic attitudes begin to surface due to beliefs that
the refugees are an economic and social burden on the system.
The actions undertaken by the American government under the Clinton administration in
1992 demonstrate that the issue of civil war refugees is a serious concern to Western nations. In
1991 refugees from Haiti's civil war began to seek asylum in the United States, however, the
massive numbers of refugees became too great for the Coast Guard to process. Subsequently the
U.S. Department of Defense set up temporary facilities on its base at Guantanamo Bay to
provide accommodations for the refugees during the screening process. Again, the influx of
refugees proved to be too excessive to safely accommodate. Attempts by refugees to enter the
U.S. without properly being processed increased as the processing procedure was becoming
severely backlogged but the need for escape of the civil war continued. Consequently, President
Clinton ordered the Coast Guard to intercept any vessels that were transporting illegal passengers
from Haiti into the U.S. and return those passengers to Haiti without establishing whether or not
80 Cited in Brown, 'Introduction,' 3.
81 Mohammed Ayoob, 'The New-Old Disorder', p. 27. Also refer to Milton J. Esman, Ethnic Politics (New
York: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 181-182 to get a better understanding of how 'altering' the
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they qualified as refugees.82 Clinton's Executive Order did become overturned by the U.S.
Supreme Court thus disallowing persons to be returned to Haiti prior to their refugee status being
declared.83 Even though the Order was eventually overturned, the fact that it was ordained
clearly indicated that civil war refugees are not only a security problematic for semi-unstable
state regional to the conflict, but also pose great security threats to 'stable' states in the western
world.
From a human based security perspective, civil war refugees threaten both neighbouring
and distant states due to disease. Due to the conditions the refugees are forced to endure
(crowded refugee camps, poor sanitation facilities, and reduced availability of proper food and
clean water), the spread of disease becomes a major concern, not only amongst the refugees, but
to other areas as well. This problem became an issue for Canada when the Kosovar refugees
were flown into Canada to be housed in order to alleviate the pressure that the massive number
of refugees were putting on the various and quasi-unstable states in the Balkan region.
Bringing over the approximately 6,50084 refugees seemed to be the best thing to do given
the situation at the time, however, the issue of some of these refugees bringing with them
communicable diseases was not taken into account. Through no fault of their own some refugees
were infected with Tuberculosis (TB) and subsequently spread it to at least six of the flight
attendants who volunteered to work on the flights that transported the Kosovar Albanians to
Canada.85 TB is a disease that is easily transmitted through the air and was also virtually
existing balance by increasing the number of foreigners into an area can result in local dilemmas that can
escalate into national and international security issues.
82 Refer to William R. Solmonson, Fundamental Perspectives in International Law 2nd ed. (St. Paul MN:
West Publishing Company, 1995), pp. 171-173.
83 Refer to Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc. Supreme Court of the United States, 1993 _ U.S. _,113
S. Ct. ]25 L.Ed2d 128. Found in Salmonson, Fundamental Perspectives, 173-174.
84 Arben Kallamata, 'Refugees Thankful for Canadian Experience' Ottawa Citizen 8 July 1999, A7.
85 Canadian Press, 'TB Hits 6 Kosovo Mercy Flight Attendants' Toronto Star 27 September 1999, A3.
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eradicated in Canada. The reemergence of this disease in Canadian society necessarily poses a
national security concern for Canada.86
A second dynamic of civil wars which presents a security dilemma is that these conflicts
generally do not remain isolated as other states tend to become involved in the conflict in
numerous ways. The result is a spillover of the conflict into other states.87 This phenomenon
most commonly transpires when the civil conflict occurs due to secessionist aspirations and
movements by one or more parties within the states, however, it is not limited to this form of
intrastate conflict. When spillover occurs, other states are brought into the conflict in varying
degrees and capacities, which can necessarily have severe security implications for other states
as well as regions as a whole. Spillover can occur in numerous ways ranging from the actual war
spreading into the borders of another state, to causing interstate tensions among or between states
that are normally on amicable terms with one another.
The spread of internal conflicts into the borders of other states occurs quite frequently
and can be especially destabilizing in particular regions. As mentioned above, the areas where
internal conflicts tend to erupt are generally not noted for their overall stability, thus spillover
can be quite detrimental as it may be difficult for surrounding states to the conflict to not fall into
a state of turmoil as the war begins to have effects within their own borders. In the case of civil
war in Rwanda, the 1994 genocidal activities of the Hutu's and the Tutsi's against one another
did not stay confined within the Rwandan border. The fact that there were Hutu and Tutsi
populations in neighbouring Burundi caused an uprising in 1995 within its own borders and thus
86 Infectious diseases are included in the list of elements that Canada considers threatening to national
security. For this list see Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Human Security:
Safety for People in a Changing World [www.dfait-maeci.gc.calforeignp/HumanSecurity/secure.htm], p. 2.
87 Ayoob, 'New-Old Disorder,' p. 19.
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a spread of the war and genocide.88 In most areas of the world state borders do not necessarily
coincide with ethnic boundaries, resulting in people of the same ethnicity existing in many states
within a region. This allows for animosities to go beyond state boundaries and thus facilitates
the physical spread of civil conflict, as was demonstrated by the Rwandan civil war spilling over
into Burundi in 1995.
Although intrastate wars can spread to states proximal to the conflict via the physical
conflict literally spilling into these states, resulting in other states within the region suffering
severe security quandaries, it is not the sole way in which civil wars spread, creating far reaching
security issues and problems. Civil wars commonly spillover into other countries through
modes such as acts of terrorism, and civil unrest or uprising by diaspora communities who
maintain sentiments related to the civil war 'back home'. This is how security in Western states
most commonly comes to be compromised by the spillover of intrastate conflict. Although India
is not considered a Western state, the assassination of India's former prime minister Rajiv
Ghandi in 1991 by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), who were fighting the
Sinhalese in Sri Lanka for an independent Tamil state, outlines a clear example of terrorist
activity taking place in one country as a consequence of internal fighting in another.89 There are
many other examples of terrorist attacks around the world that are directly linked to intrastate
conflicts in other countries. The bombing of England's intelligence headquarters, MI6, in
London by the Real IRA, provides one of the latest examples.9o International terrorism is assisted
by the increase in technology which has provided easy escape from the point of attack as well as
88 Ganguly & Taras, p. 242-243.
89 See Chapter 7 'Protracted Ethnic Wars: The Tamil-Sinhalese Conflict in Sri Lanka' in Ganguly, &
Taras, pp. 184-224 for greater information about the Sri Lankan civil war and the involvement of India.
90 See Mark Palmer, 'Missile Attack Rattles London,' The Globe and Mail (August 22,2000), A3.
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the CNNfactor which draws attention to the terrorists' cause.91 Due to these factors, there is an
increased motivation to undertake terrorist activity in other countries.
Diaspora communities commonly maintain a tie with the country from which they
migrated. This link generally occurs in the form of a material and/or sentimental connection.92
This continued connection, despite how 'integrated' a group becomes in their new society,
provides for the spillover effect of internal wars to occur, posing a potential security issue for the
state(s) in which the diaspora community resides. This attachment to the homeland can be
problematic because when there is an internal conflict in the homeland, the diaspora can become
connected to it even though they are no longer residing in that state. Essentially, this means that
the intrastate conflict in the other foreign country is now played out in the context of another
state, forming a triadic relationship.93 This spillover dynamic is differentiated from the earlier
one whereby the physical conflict in state A spills over the borders into neighbouring state B
causing state B to become engulfed in a war itself. Rather, this form of spillover occurs due to
the support that diaspora provide for the civil conflict back home. This 'support' can take the
form of uprisings and demonstrations, facilitating arms transfers, and causing or exacerbating
rifts between various groups within the host society.
In 1999, when the NATO campaign was waged against the Serb forces in Kosovo in an
attempt to cease the aggression, the Serbian diaspora revolted by staging demonstrations in
91 Andrew J. Pierre, 'The Politics of International Terrorism,' Orbis 19 no. 4 (Winter 1976), p. 1253. Note
the term 'CNN factor' was not used by Pierre but has been inserted as it applies to the context which is
being presented.
92 Esman, p.7
93 The notion of triadic relationships (relations between ethnic diasporas, their host states, and their states of
origin) is noted in Gabriel Sheffer, Modern Diasporas in International Politics, (London: Croom Helm,
1986). Sarah Wayland takes the idea further by introducing the idea that ties of ethnic diaspora can be with
their ethnonationalist group rather than strictly with the home government as outlined by Sheffer. See
Sarah Wayland, 'Diaspora Engagement in Homeland Conflict: A Case Study of Sri Lankan Tamils in
Toronto' unpublished paper prepared for presentation to the Immigrant Politics Seminar, Centre for
European Studies, Harvard University, September 2, 1998.
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Toronto denouncing NATO bombing its people. These demonstrations were, for the most part,
somewhat peaceful in the sense that they did not erupt into large-scale violence, however, the
skirmishes that did take place provided concern that the situation could result in greater security
issues.94 In terms of arms transfers again Canada became the 'victim', as it was discovered that
in 1994 an 'LTTE front organization' funded the purchasing of arms that were shipped to Sri
Lanka to support the LTTE in its fight for independence in its civil war.95 lllegal arms trade is a
clandestine and criminal activity that can necessarily compromise the security of a state. Finally,
the renewed violence between the Israeli and Palestinian people in the Middle East has caused
tensions between the two groups to spill into Canadian society. The vandalism that has taken
place against each groups' community centres, as well as an exchange of contemptuous remarks
between the groups, highlight how already delicate relations can easily become inflamed by
events related to internal conflict within the homeland.96
Spillover of intrastate conflicts is a sincere threat to international security. Generally
spillover is thought of primarily as a problem for the proximal or regional states, however, it has
been demonstrated that spillover can affect states allover the world, even those which may not
formally be involved in the foreign conflict, thus destabilizing the system to an even greater
extent.
The final civil war dynamic that poses an international security threat is the secessionist
desires by one or more of the warring factions in their attempt to secure autonomous rule. This
is most commonly the case in the intrastate wars defined by ethnic discord. Although the
principle of ethnonational self-determination has been endorsed by the international community
94 Refer to Estanislao Oziewicz, and Murry Campbell, 'NATO Hits Serbs Harder, Toronto Protests Turns
Ugly. The Reaction: Demonstrators Start Fire at US Consulate' The Globe and Mail (March 26, 1999), pp.
Al & A19.
95 Paul Kaitha, 'Banker, Tiger, Soldier, Spy,' Maclean's (August 5,1996), p. 32. Cited in Wayland, 13-14.
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via the United Nations Charter97 , a problem arises whereby if all 'peoples' who so desired self-
rule through state secession were to attain it there would be an explosive increase in the number
of states within the system. Mohammed Ayoob98 and Hurst Hannon99 recognize that if
fragmentation of multi-ethnic states into numerous nation-states were to occur to any significant
degree, there would be a great potential for increased international insecurity. If the world is
already considered anarchic due to the lack of an overarching governing body or established
regimes that guarantee particular behaviours, then adding a significant amount (possibly even
hundreds) of states into the international system would simply add to the existing anarchy,
culminating in greater insecurity.loo
Another understanding to the quandary that will be faced regarding the mass break-up of
states through secession is that it is not necessarily the number of states that will result that will
be the problem, but rather the fact that if international norms or regimes are broken to in order to
establish an independent state -which is what happens when civil war breaks out - then the
international order has been defied. lol The result of going against the international order would
be the hindrance of "both economic development and political cooperation"I02 and ultimately the
increase in international insecurity. One could rationally assume that if a state were established
by violating established norms, then that state holds a lack of respect for the existing
96 For an account of the events refer to Colin Freeze and Amy Carmichael, 'Mideast Rage Spills on to
Canadian Soil' Globe and Mail (October 11, 2000), p. All.
97 See Article 1 section 2. Although this section of the Charter does provide for self-determination, it is
widely understood that the intent of this particular section was for purpose of decolonization and not for all
ethnic peoples to establish their own nation-state. Also see Max M. Kampelman, 'Secession and Self-
Determination: An Urgent Need to Harmonize Principle with Pragmatism' Washington Quarterly 16 no. 3
(Summer 1993), p. 6.
98 Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament', pp. 168-169.
99 Hurst Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The Accommodation ofConflicting
Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990), p.49.
100 Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament, 168.
101 Kamal S. Shehadi, Ethnic Self-Determination and the Break-up ofStates Adelphi Paper # 283 December
1993 (London: Brassey's Ltd. for the IISS, 1993),51.
102 Ibid., 51.
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international order, which leaves one question: what is stopping that state from defying the
international order in other situations when it deems such an action convenient?
One would think that the simple solution to this problem is for the international
community not to allow for succession to take place except in the most extreme situations.
Essentially that means that the international community would instead promote a condition of
tolerance, equality and co-operation. However, Chaim Kaufmann is quick to point out ethnic
separation is perhaps the best means of establishing and maintaining peace after a civil war has
occurred. t03 The animosity and scars are simply too deep between the ethnic factions for them to
be able to come together and build a unified and peaceful state. Kaufmann believes that the only
real solution is to separate the parties and erect a sovereign border between them, essentially
creating an independent state for each. From Kaufmann's perspective, ethnic civil war
inevitably will create a situation whereby more states will be admitted into the international
system thus providing for the problems outlined above.
The disintegration of multiethnic states into numerous relatively homogeneous states,
whether it be due to the successful outcome of a civil war for the faction desiring autonomous
rule, or the need to separate the warring parties in order to keep the violence from recurring,
threatens the stability of the established international order. Should the international system
become more anarchic due to the introduction of more states, the security of each state as well as
the system will be compromised.
103 Chaim Kaufmann, 'Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,' International Security 20,
no. 4(Spring 1996), pp. 136-175; and Chaim Kaufmann, 'When All Else Fails: Ethnic Population Transfers
and Partitions in the Twentieth Century,' International Security 23 no. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 120-156.
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International Intervention
Given the disturbing characteristics of the intrastate wars, coupled with the security
threats that they pose to the international system, it is not surprising that the international
community has focused its attention on this problematique and subsequently intervened104 in a
number of cases in an attempt to bring the violence to an end. There are two other aspects that
need to be considered in relation to the issue of intervention. The first one is the
politics/legitimacy of intervening into another sovereign state. The second considers why the
international community has not been consistent in terms of intervening (or not intervening) in
various conflicts; essentially outlining the factors entailed with motivating the international
community to intervene.
The international system is based upon a system whereby state sovereignty is supposed to
be the foundation. Both the Covenant of the League of Nations and the United Nations Charter
specifically upheld this idea. Strictly speaking, states have no legal right to intervene in the
internal affairs of other states, which necessarily includes civil wars. However, this strict
interpretation has not been upheld as the international community has been intervening in
sovereign states in an attempt to quell the violence that civil war produces. Initially, intervention
was undertaken in the form of traditional peacekeeping whereby the parties to the conflict agreed
to or invited international forces to enforce a cease fire or peace agreement. lOS The legality or
104 Intervention is to be understood in this context as military intervention either through the deployment of
peacekeeping, peacemaking or peace-building forces. In this context, the involvement of humanitarian
agencies in internal conflicts is excluded as their goal is to provide assistance to those afflicted by the
conflict rather than try to either stop the fighting and monitor/enforce the peace agreement.
105 See Berdal, Whither UN Peacekeeping?, pp. 6-8; and Marrack Goulding, 'The Evolution of United
Nations Peacekeeping' International Affairs 69 no. 3 (July 1993), pp. 452-458.
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legitimacy in these instances was not an enormous issue as the international forces had been
invited to intervene.
In the aftermath of the Cold War, however, intervention became more proactive whereby
international forces enter into states without permission of either the government or warring
factions. The United Nations sanctioned the involvement of troops into the former Yugoslavia,
Somalia, and Rwanda without gaining 'domestic' permission to do so for example. The NATO
air strikes on Serbia in the spring of 1999 with the intention of ceasing the human rights abuses
being inflicted upon the Kosovar Albanians took an even greater proactive stride as the
intervention was not sanctioned by the United Nations, but rather the NATO member states acted
independently of the rest of the world body and took action. It is these peace enforcement or
peacemaking operations that have created a debate concerning the legality and legitimacy of
international involvement in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state.
The legality of undertaking interventionist actions without the 'permission' of the
domestic powers is argued under the Chapters VI and VII of the United Nations Charter dealing
with threats to international security and stability. The new push now comes from intervention
undertaken for humanitarian reasons. This understanding is an extension of the human security
doctrine that recognizes the security quandaries created from a lack of human security.
Essentially, there is·an attempt to classify extreme human suffering as a threat to international
peace and security.l06 The 1992 intervention into Somalia poses as the prime example of
intervention undertaken for humanitarian purposes with the justification for such action being
inserted into the realm of international peace and security. Broadening the scope of what should
and can be classified as 'threats to international peace and security' has raised concern regarding
106 Robert Cooper, and Mats Berdal, 'Outside Intervention in Ethnic Conflict' Survival 35 no. 1 (Spring
1993), p. 120.
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the ambiguity of the phrase and the negative repercussions that can result from this ambiguity.lO?
Since it has not been formally established what actually constitutes a threat to international peace
and security, a problem arises whereby intervention can be either arbitrarily or inconsistently
instituted by virtue that each situation is evaluated through an objective lens. In other words,
there are no standards by which to empirically establish that the threshold has been crossed
thereby declaring that international peace and security has been threatened, and international
intervention can legitimately occur. 108 A concern thus arises that intervention is being
undertaken for a wide variety of reasons but being declared necessary from the humanitarian
standpoint. l09
This leads to the issue of what influences the international community to undertake an
intervention. It is widely known that there have been many civil wars that have been transpiring
for years, but receive virtually no response from the international community, however, there are
other cases where the international response has been quite expeditious. For example, the civil
war in Sierra Leone has been raging since 1991, but has captured almost no international
attention until recently, despite the magnitude of the atrocities that were occurring. By contrast,
the response time in reaction to the outbreak of violent conflict in East Timor following the
independence vote in September 1999 was almost unprecedented. 11 0 In light of these examples,
one must inquire as to why there exists an inconsistency in terms of undertaking interventionist
activities by the international community. The essential issue thus becomes what motivates the
107 Refer to Shridath Ramphal, 'Law and Intervention' Peace Review 8 no. 4 (December 1996), pp.493-498.
108 Stanley Hoffman provides an understanding of the ambiguity of the phrase "threat to international peace
and security" by stating that it is "an all purpose parachute" Quoted in Weiss, p. 146.
109 Ibid., 495.
lID It should be noted however, that prior to the independence vote, there had been very little international
attention or response to the violence and conflict that was taking place in East Timor as a result of
Indonesian oppression and abuse of the East Timorese people.
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international community to act and intervene into intrastate conflicts. The two most prominent
responses to this interrogation are state interests and the role of the media.
Although intervention takes place at the international level as it is undertaken by a
coalition of states - mainly under the United Nations or by proxy - analyzing the factors involved
with prompting action needs to take place at the state level as it is individual states that are
responsible for providing the military personnel and equipment and funding that are used for
intervention. In other words, in the end, it is individual states that make the decision whether or
not to take action, and the form or the degree to which the action is undertaken. I II This
comprehension provides for the two motivators to necessarily be understood in this context. In
the first case (state interests) the connection is self-evident, however, in the second case this
understanding translates into investigating the effects that media has on state action.
The argument of state interest as a motivator for intervention first requires a
comprehension that not all states are being considered in this dialogue. In fact, it is really only
the interests of a handful of states that really matter. Intervention, for the most part, happens
under the United Nations auspices, whether it be under direct UN command or via delegation of
authority to a particular state or organization of states (peacekeeping by proxy). Any
III There is no doubting that the international system has become multidimensional whereby states are no
longer the sole actors. Various actors ranging from individuals (civil society) to multinational corporations
to NGOs all participate in the global arena to varying degrees and can be and are powerful enough to
influence activities and conduct of states. [refer to: James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel,
Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1992); James N. Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a
Turbulent World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Seyom Brown, New Forces, Old
Forces, and the Future of World Politics (New York, HarperCollins, 1995)] Although these other actors
are present, however, the design of the international system is still such that states are the only actors which
ultimately determine whether action will be undertaken or not. James Rosenau makes this point when he
states that "the outcomes of [..] deliberations may be formally adopted by the votes of states, but their
substance is in many ways a product of the pressures from outside to which they have been subjected by
diverse non-governmental constituencies." [Rosenau, Domestic-Foreign, p. 350] Rosenau uses this
quotation to demonstrate how much influence non-governmental actors have on the decisions of states.
This is not being contested here (in fact this issue follows in the paper within the discussion of the
motivators for state action), however the fact that Rosenau points to the fact that it is states that are signing
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interventionist action endorsed by the UN must first be authorized by the Security Council which
is comprised of3 permanent member nations who each hold veto power. This ultimately means
that the permanent members (P-5), the United States, China, Russia, Britain, and France, are the
main players and that it is their state interests which need to be affected in order for action to
take place. 112 Added to this equation is the fact that the U.S. holds even greater weight as "it
alone has the firepower, transport, command and control, communications, intelligence, logistics,
and power projection capabilities needed for large-scale operations."113 The significance of the
role that the U.S. plays thus increases as it is no longer just a need for the U.S. to be interested
enough in a conflict to simply agree with the other Council members, but it must be interested to
the point where it is willing to provide troops and equipment to the operation. In light of the
makeup of the Security Council (three of the five members are Western countries) and the
additional influence that the United States wields, it is obvious that there is a tendency or
potential for a bias to exist in terms of deciding to take action in particular civil wars, as there is
a overwhelming need for conflicts to be of interest to the West
The influence of national interestl14 or Realpolitik 'cannot be overlooked when
considering the motivating forces behind civil war intervention. 115 Indeed, from the perspective
of the discipline of foreign policy analysis the literature acknowledges that state interests playa
significant role in the construction of a states' foreign policies. 116 There is necessarily a direct
the product of the deliberations supports the assertion that states are ultimately the final decision maker
when it comes to deciding whether or not, and what form intervention should take.
]]2 Refer to Chantal de longe Oudraat, 'The United Nations and Internal Conflict' in The International
Dimensions ofInternal Conflict Michael E. Brown ed. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996), pp. 5] 8-519.
]]3 Ibid., 516.
]]4 State interest can include such elements as strategic, economic, historical, or geographical interest.
]]5 Cooper and Berdal, p. 134.
]]6 For arguments concerning the role of national interests in foreign policy construction see Thomas W.
Robinson 'National Interests' in International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and
Theory James N. Rosenau ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 182-190; and l. Martin Rochester,
'The "National Interest" and Contemporary World Politics' The Review ofPolitics 40 (1978), pp. 77-96.
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connection between a states' foreign policy and its involvement in the civil conflict in another
state, as intervention is an act contrived by, and reflecting upon a states' foreign policies. It thus
makes sense that the factors that are involved with influencing/determining foreign policy in
general are likewise concerned with motivating a state to intervene into the internal war of
another country.
De longe Oudratt produced a chart delineating the probability of UN action in internal
conflicts based upon interests of the P-5 coupled with the condition of whether or not the conflict
was contained.! 17 The following chart is a summation of her findings.
Internal Conflict
P-5 Interests
Contained Not Contained
Yes
No
25%
11%
69%
53%
Source: de Jonge Oudratt (1996: 521)
From this chart it is apparent that state interest is an important variable in determining if
intervention will be undertaken by the UN. Indeed there is also another factor that is brought
forth by these findings; the regional impact of a conflict. There is greater likelihood for
involvement if a conflict is not contained and thus has great potential for spreading into other
countries in the region. However, state interests still appear to play an important role as a
motivator for intervention especially when one considers that states, other than simply P5 states,
117 de longe Oudraat, 519-521.
118 This table is an edited rendition of Table 15.4 Internal Conflict and UN Action found in de longe
Oudraat,521.
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that may be located directly in the affected region, will likely push for UN intervention due to the
vested interests they will have in trying to secure the peace within their region.
Although state interest emerges as a major factor for determining whether or not
intervention will occur in an internal conflict, there are numerous cases where states held
moderately low interest in a conflict but eventually did intervene. For example, why was there
eventually international intervention into the conflicts in Rwanda? This country held little
interest for the major powers yet troops were eventually deployed to it. What then accounts for
the undertaking of operations where state interests are low and possibly non-existent? The role
of the media becomes the second motivating factor that is examined.
The images of the atrocities that were taking place in Somalia and Bosnia as well as other
countries, caught the world by storm as the gross violations of human rights were brought to
light and displayed in the living rooms of people around the world. The conflicts that had once
been virtually ignored by the world community were being played out in front of an audience
who reacted by asserting that 'something had to be done' .119 The display of these gross
violations coupled with media criticism for the lack of action, spawned pressure upon individual
governments to develop and adopt a policy that would address the problem. 12o
It is vital not to overestimate the effect that the media can have on influencing a
government to 'send in the troops' as governments still carefully calculate the situation and
determine if intervention is a viable option. 121 This does not mean that the media does not have
119 Cited in Peter V. Jakobsen, 'National Interest, Humanitarianism or CNN: What Triggers UN Peace
Enforcement After the Cold War? Journal ofPeace Research 33 no. 2 (May 1996), p.206.
120 Ibid., 206.
12l Brian Buckley, The News Media and Foreign Policy: An Exploration (Nova Scotia: Centre for Foreign
Policy Studies Dalhousie University, 1998), p. 37.
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influence upon policy decisions, but rather it does not and cannot have exclusive power over
decisions to intervene. 122
One way to view the effect of the media on international intervention into internal
conflicts is to understand it in terms of bringing the issue to the surface in order that it be
addressed by the policy makers. 123 There is of course no guarantee that intervention will follow.
However, 'forcing' policy makers to assess the situation raises the chances that action will
follow as opposed to if it had never been seriously examined or reviewed. Another way to
consider the effect is to regard it from the perspective of providing legitimization for action that
is undertaken. 124 With the increase in the number of operations undertaken for humanitarian
purposes, it is important for states to have domestic support for their involvement due to the
question of legality for such action, as discussed earlier. If the'general population' is witness to
the human rights violations, appalling conditions of refugee camps, and genocidal acts, via the
media, a consensus is created that these conditions are unacceptable and intervention that is
undertaken to rectify the situation is both legitimate and righteous. The result of this may in fact
be the further definition/clarification of what the threshold is for humanitarian intervention.
The CNN Effect acts as a motivator for states to intervene into internal conflicts where
their state interests may not be strong or readily apparent. The media may not be able to force
states into action, however, its ability to grab the worlds' attention, even if it is through
sensationalism at times, necessarily coerces governments to focus upon the issue, increasing the
probability for an interventionist operation to be undertaken. Also, through the media
international awareness increases, which augments the expansion and refinement of norms
122 Ibid., 37.
123 Jakobsen, 208.
124 Ibid., 206.
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regarding the acceptability of intervention into internal conflicts on the grounds of humanitarian
and moral obligation. The ambiguity of the interpretation of Article 42 of the UN Charter
(threats to international peace and security) 125 has proved to be somewhat of a slippery slope as
states may desire to become involved in a conflict in an attempt to cease the hostilities, however,
they are concerned with providing precedents that may one day provide for other states to
become involved in their internal affairs.
Intervention has become, in many instances, inconsistent as intervention occurs at
varying points in conflicts and not at all in situations where intervention is greatly required but
has not happened. The two factors that were discussed help to explain why this inconsistency
exists. Of course there are many more than just two factors that are involved with the decision
process regarding the implementation of an interventionist operation, however, state interests and
the media do act as two of the major forces for motivation. The discussion of dynamics involved
with intervention will continue to be debated, as it is a major key to instituting operations with a
greater success rate in the future.
Towards Human Security and Peace-Building
The dynamics of internal wars have provided a quandary.in which the international
community has become embroiled as it tries to better develop its methods for addressing the civil
war problematique. The difficulty that has been faced in terms of trying to quell the violence as
125 Article 42 of the United Nations Charter states: "Should the Security Council consider that measures
provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by
air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such
action may include demonstrations, blockades, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members
of the United Nations." The problem arises when one looks at Article 2(7) that provides for states not to
interfere in the domestic issues of other states save for incidences where Chapter VII (international peace
and security) can be invoked. State control over issues of domestic jurisdiction thus becomes overridden
when it is deemed that incidences constitute a threat to international peace and security.
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well as institute programs designed to restore peace and order and strengthen state structures has
been tremendous. This is not to suggest that all attempts have been total failures, but rather to
highlight the fact that there is a need for efforts to be better directed. In a word, the international
community must embark upon new operations which are designed to bring about sustainable
peace in these failed and fragile states.
The following case studies of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)
and East Timor will provide a greater understanding of the dynamics involved in intrastate
conflicts, as the elements and issues discussed above will be put into context. More importantly,
however, these two cases will provide for an analysis to be performed regarding the dynamics of,
and the initiatives undertaken in the peace-building strategies being implemented in both
countries. The cases of Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and East Timor differ greatly
in terms of both the issues that they face and the involvement that the international community
has, and is still playing, in bringing about and maintaining peace in each country. For example,
in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia the emphasis has been on conflict prevention as
the FYROM was a very weak and fragile state when it broke away from the former Yugoslavia
in 1991, by contrast, however, in East Timor the emphasis is focused upon building a viable state
that can exist independently following years of Indonesian repression. The FYROM represents a
case of 'successful' conflict prevention in a state which had an established and functioning
governing structure, while East Timor for all intents and purposes has been void of any such
independent system. Despite the differences that these cases present, they provide excellent
information regarding peace-building processes. In fact, the distinctness of these cases is
important because being able to find commonalties between these two differing situations will
act to strengthen the applicability of the analysis and conclusions.
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The scope of the analysis of the case studies will be fairly broad in order to accommodate
the focus of human security and peace-building. Although the focus of the case studies is broad,
emphasis will be placed on dynamics such as security, the rule of law, the economy, political
governance, and civil society as these are all elements that are considered within the realm of
human security. It is imperative to gain a great understanding of the both the situation/conditions
of the states and the peace-building strategies and process that have been employed in order to be
able to later analyze the cases from a human security perspective. In a word, the aim is to be
able to deduce and reveal when and how human security fits into these two differing cases of
peace-building. Once the information is examined from the human security perspective, the
findings of the analysis can then be applied in order to allow for the concept of sustainable
peace-building to be fully conceptualized. The end result will be the development of a pyramid
that better defines the idea of human security as well as creates a model for sustainable peace-
building. This pyramid will provide the necessary outline from which both present and future
operations can be built upon in order for them to become more effective in creating a lasting
peace.
Finally, from this new understanding of human security and sustainable peace-building,
an analysis of what Canada's role should and can be in supporting the sustainable peace-building
process will be addressed. Given Canada's historical commitment to peacekeeping and peace-
building operations through various means, coupled with a realistic analysis of its ability to
continue its contributions at various levels, a proposal will be provided for the direction of
Canada's foreign policy in the area of both peace-building and human security.
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Chapter II
Case Study: The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)126 is a unique case to study as it
poses a somewhat irregular situation in terms of peace-building: the State has not fallen into a
state of war itself, nor with its neighbours. It is, however, a fragile state existing in a very
volatile region that consequently is exasperating the domestic problems within the FYROM, as
well as providing for many additional pressures being put on the State. Building peace in this
fragile country has been aprocess that has been unfolding since the country became independent
in 1991.
The fact that peace-building initiatives have been ongoing for approximately ten years,
coupled with the fact that the Macedonian State was fully functioning and viable when the
peace-building process began, allows for an examination that takes into consideration how
peace-building interacts with pre-existing and functioning social and governing structures. As
well, the focus of this work is upon sustainable peace-building which embodies the notion of an
extended process and a long-term commitment for fostering peace, and as such, becomes a
requirement for a case study that is in the later stages of peace-building to be considered as it
would provide the information necessary for establishing the tenets of sustainable peace-
building.
Given that the FYROM has successfully been implementing peace-building strategies for
approximately ten years and the fact that it was not a failed state but rather a fragile state,
]26 The original name of the state was simply Macedonia, however, due to the contention that Greece has
over the use of this name, Macedonia is recognized as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
(FYROM). It should be noted, however, that Turkey does recognize the FYROM with its constitutional
name of Macedonia
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provides a unique opportunity for an analysis of this case to be undertaken. First, the analysis
can be performed from the standpoint of a 'successful case' of peace-building which -allows for
an examination of peace-building dynamics that have proven to work in this case. Second, since
the FYROM was not a failed state, it was able to be directly involved in the peace-building
process right from the onset and thus in a position to implement some of the peace-building
processes itself, rather than have to depend fully on the support of the international community.
It was established at the end of the last chapter that each case study will be examined in
the context of the five elements that are considered in the realm of human security: security, the
rule of law, the economy, political governance and civil society. In addition to this structure, this
case study focuses upon three central questions that are designed to highlight more precise and
unique developments in the case as well as yield necessary information to base the analysis upon.
The first fundamental questions that need to be addressed are what were the peace-building
initiatives that were undertaken domestically and what was the role of the international
community in the peace-building process. Following this, the fact that the FYROM represents a
case of the peace-building process being in the medium- term phase and entering into the long-
term phase127 it becomes important to grasp an understanding about how the peace-building
process proceeded. In short, what peace-building initiatives were undertaken, and at what point
were the initiatives either instituted or became the focus. Finally, given that the peace-building
process is entering the longer-term phases, the commitment of the international community over
127 David M. Last presents the phases of intervention in his article 'Defeating Fear and Hatred Through
Peace-building: Multiplying the Impact of a Military Contribution' which can be comprehended as peace-
building phases. He presents 4 phases that are differentiated by the time frame in which they are to be
implemented and the activities that are to be undertaken at each phase. The 4 phases are: immediate (2-6
months); short term (1-2 years); medium term (5-10 years); and long term (20 years or more). It is from
this basis that the statement that the FYROM is in the medium term phase and is entering the long term
phase is derived. See D.M. Last 'Defeating Fear and Hatred through Peace-building: Multiplying the
Impact of a Military Contribution' Canadian Foreign Policy 5 no. 2 (Winter 1998), 166.
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the long term to assist with the peace-building process falls into question. As mentioned in the
initial pages ofthis text, there has become a realization that the international community needs to
undertake a longer-term commitment to be involved with the establishment of sustainable peace.
Questioning the commitment of the international community to assist with the peace-building
process in the FYROM over the long term is thus significant.
As this case study progresses, a pattern will begin to emerge that begins to build a
configuration for a hierarchy in both human security and peace-building. In a word, what will
emerge is an understanding of how the various peace-building and human security structures and
phases interact with one another and thus an ability to develop a systematic process for providing
human security and building sustainable peace. In this process, the connection between human
security and peace-building will begin to emerge. This case will also provide an illustration why
it is imperative that the international community continues to invest in the peace-building
process over the long term. In fact, this case study will demonstrate that human security and
peace-building are not simply linear concepts, but are in fact, concepts that require continued
support for, and sometimes refocusing, on the primary elements or else the system can cease its
progression or collapse.
The break-up of the ex-Yugoslavia in 1991 became the centre of world attention as it, for
all intents and purposes collapsed when four of its regions, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia,
Croatia and Macedonia declared their independence from the once unified State. The demise of
the ex-Yugoslavia was mainly along ethnic lines whereby each newly declared 'state' held
within its borders a majority of its own 'nationals'. Violent civil war broke out in Croatia,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and within what was left of the ex-Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) as
the various ethnic groups became pitted against each another and began an attempt to
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'exterminate' one another seeking to create ethnically homogeneous nation-states. Slovenia did
not experience acivil war itself, however, it did find itself fighting against the Yugoslav forces
that were attempting to resist the demise of the country. The Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia was the only new state that was spared the carnage of war as it was the only new
state that at the time of declaring its independence from the ex-Yugoslavia on September 7,
1991, that did not fall into a state of civil strife or find itself at war against the Yugoslav
government. It managed to secede from the former Yugoslavia in peace, and subsequently
maintain that intrastate peace to date, despite the obstacles that it faced both externally and
internally.
Using the FYROM as a case study may seem like an inappropriate selection for this work
as it has not experienced an intrastate war, however, it is for that exact reason that it is relevant to
the discourse on sustainable peace-building. Despite the pressures that the FYROM has had to
endure since its independence, it has been able to survive as a state without the outbreak of
ethnic civil violence or war, unlike the other breakaway Yugoslav republics. This situation
became even more remarkable in light of the eruption of the Kosovo conflict in 1999, and the
very recent and unfolding events concerning the clash between the Macedonian security forces
and Albanian rebels in the hills just outside of Tetovo, which have necessarily bestowed even
greater pressures on the fragile state. The peace-building process in this State is thus important
to analyze as it will provide valuable insight into the dynamics that need to be incorporated into
the sustainable peace-building equation.
The study of the FYROM will proceed by first briefly identifying the problems that the
fragile State has been faced with, followed by an examination of the peace-building measures
which have been instituted to date. The examination of the peace-building strategy will be
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addressed from two perspectives: the domestic role and the international role in the process.
Separating the peace-building process into the two categories is important as it is designed to
identify the distinct roles that the internal and external actors play in the peace-building process,
making it easier to understand the overall peace-building process.
For a newly independent state, the FYROM has had to face many challenges which
could have easily brought the country to its knees, and virtually forced its collapse. When the
FYROM declared its independence in 1991, despite that it did not fall into a state of civil strife,
the secession was not without difficulty. When the Republic of Macedonia left the Federation,
the Yugoslav National Army (INA) departed from Macedonian soil taking with it the country's
weaponry, rendering it virtually defenceless. The fear that followed was of Serbian invasion in
order to 'recapture' the Republic which it had lost from its control. 128 In addition to this
problem, Greece, being discontent with the new state using the Greek word 'Macedonia' to name
the country, initially refused to recognize the state129 and then instituted two separate economic
blockades against the FYROM. 130 The hardship that these blockades caused were exacerbated
when the FYROM was forced to comply with the economic sanctions placed against Serbia (one
of the FYROM's largest trading partners) by the United Nations131
Coupled with all of these problems that were externally induced, the internal dynamics of
the FYROM have been, and still are, extremely problematic. The problem is mainly due to
intrastate ethnic tensions. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is not by any means a
homogeneous state as its population consists of Slav Macedonians, Albanians, Turks, Gypsies,
128 See Duncan M. Perry, 'Macedonia: Balkan Miracle or Balkan Disaster?' Current History 95 no. 599
(March 1996) 114-115.
129 Greece finally granted recognition when the name 'The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia' was
adopted as the official name of the state.
130 For more information on the blockades refer to: Richard Read Dion, 'Macedonia: Coming in from the
Cold' World Affairs 160 no. 2 (Fall 1997) accessed online via Academic Search Elite: 2
]31 Dion, 'Coming in from the Cold' 2.
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Vlachs, Tsintsars, Serbs, Torbeshi, and Bulgarians. The Slav Macedonians comprise the
majority ethnic group with a population of 1.3 million followed by the Albanians numbering
between 400,000-500,000 officially and estimated as high as 700,000 by Albanian
nationalists. 132 The third largest ethnic group is the Turks which total about 100,000.133 The
long and disputed history of Macedonia renders an explanation and understanding why there is
such a variety of divergent ethnic peoples existing within the borders. 134 The Balkan region in
general is an area that has endured much upset in terms of territorial transitions of state
boundaries over the centuries due to the recurrent overthrowing of the occupying elites. The
Macedonian region has not been immune to these structural alterations, and as such, now faces
the resulting dilemmas.
Although there are a number of ethnic groups that comprise the state, the primary point of
contention that is threatening the stability of the state is the disharmony between the Macedonian
majority and Albanian minority that reside within the state. Since its independence, the FYROM
has been forced to address the 'deep rooted' 135 ethnic tensions that exist between the
132 Duncan Perry, 'Macedonia: A Balkan Problem and a European Dilemma' RFE/RL Research Report 1
no. 25 (19 June 1992) 35. The reason for the discrepancy in the number of Albanians in the FYROM is
that many Albanians did not participate in the latest census in 1994. It thus becomes impossible to know
the exact statistics.
133 Ibid., 35.
134 The history behind the FYROM is quite extensive and beyond the scope of this paper, however, a basic
overview outlines the fact that the area which comprises the FYROM is part ofa larger whole; the 'greater
Macedonia'. This greater region is historically claimed by Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and now
Macedonians. Traditional Macedonia is an area that encompasses a greater land area than that which the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is presently comprised. There are three geographic areas that
comprise the 'greater Macedonia' area: 'Aegian Macedonia' which is a large section of land existing
between Greece and the FYROM; 'Pirin Macedonia' located in Southwestern Bulgaria; and 'Vardar
Macedonia' which is the present territory of FYROM. Consequently the Vardar region only represents 39
percent of the entire historical Macedonian domain. The fact that these 'regions' are not united and are
contained within three separate states necessarily has provided for the ethnic makeup of the population as
well as for interesting land claims in the entire region. What becomes more interesting is that Greece,
Serbia and Bulgaria have claimed that that Macedonian people are simply an extension of their own ethnic
nationalities.
135 For a greater understanding of the historical relations between these two ethnic groups refer to: MRG
Greece, James Pettifer and Hugh Poulton, Minority Rights Group International Report: The Southern
Balkans (United Kingdom: Manchester Free Press, 1994), pp. 25-31.
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Macedonians and the Albanians in an attempt to manage the conflict before it becomes
uncontrollable.lhere are numerous points of contention between the two groups, however,
going into explicit detail of all them is not necessary as the focus is the peace-building initiatives
that have been and are being undertaken. However, a short overview is necessary in order to put
the discussion of the peace-building mechanisms into context
The Albanian minority in the state is not content with the status that has been bestowed
upon them via the state constitution.136 Although the Albanians, as well as the other ethnic
groups, maintain an equal status as citizens in relation to the Macedonians, they are not satisfied
with the notion that they are considered a minority group within the state. The Constitution
declares that "Macedonia has been constituted as a national state of the Macedonian people ... ,,137
resulting in all other nationalities being understood to be minorities within the state as they can
have no claim to the State whatsoever. The Albanians resent being considered a minority as they
believe that they themselves are a constitutive nation of the state and thus want their own
autonomous territory, not just equal citizenship status. 138
Coupled with this is the fact that the Albanian language is not recognized, as
Macedonian is established in the Constitution as the only official language of the State. 139 There
is free use of the various nationalistic languages permitted within the FYROM, however, the
Albanians want their language to receive an official status. 140 In 1995, a conflict erupted over
the establishment of a privately funded Albanian language university in Tetovo whereby the
university was violently shut down by the Macedonian government, resulting in the death of one
136 Alice Ackermann, 'The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: A Relatively Successful Case of
Conflict Prevention in Europe' Security Dialogue27 no. 4 (December 1996) 411.
137 Gjorgi Caca, 'Status and Rights of Nationalities in the Republic of Macedonia' The New Macedonian
Question, James Pettifer ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999) 154.
138 Ackermann, 411.
139 Caca, 156.
140 Ackermann, 411.
64
Albanian and ethnic tension increasing".141 The Macedonian government justifies its recognition
of only the Macedonian language as a means to avoid a situation of "linguistic and professional
ghettoisation142 by having everyone function in the same language.
In addition to this dissatisfaction with their status, Albanians are underrepresented in two
of the most important sectors of society, the police force and military. The police force is made
up of only 4 per cent Albanian representation and the military only has 7 per cent
representation. 143 Thus the Albanians feel threatened by the state security institutions and fear
that intimidation and violence will be inflicted against them by these forces. 144 Lake and
Rothchild recognize this form of fear as being prevalent in situations where ethnic conflict
subsists, and if not rectified can make managing ethnic conflicts very difficult if not
impossible.145
The threat of Albanian secession or the demand for autonomous rule is an issue that has
caused much stress within the State. In January 1992 there was a declaration of autonomy of the
western section of the FYROM by the Albanians. They claimed this section to be the 'Republic
of llirida' which was to be a preliminary step toward a union with Albania. It has been the fear
of many in the Balkan area of the desire by the Albanian peoples spread throughout the area to
establish a 'Greater Albania' which would necessarily mean that land within various states
would be seceded to the new great state. 146 Although this declared secession of the Republic of
Ilirida did not result in any action being undertaken, tensions and fears greatly increased.
141 Dion, 5.
142 Caca., 157.
143 Ackermann, 411.
144 Duncan Perry, 'Destiny on Hold: Macedonia and the Dangers of Ethnic Discord' Current History 97 no.
619 (March 1998) 122.
145 Daivd A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, 'Containing Fear' International Security 21 no. 2 (Fall 1996) 41-
75.
146 Perry, 'Destiny on Hold' 121.
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The severity of this issue is compounded by the presence of illegal or insurgent groups
and the illicit arms transfer activity that has been occurring. Unikom is an Albanian terrorist
organization that aspires to have the western section of the FYROM secede and ultimately unite
with Albania. 147 The use of violence to attain this end is advocated by the group, and there is
suspicion that Unikom is interacting with 'groups' from the Middle East. 148 From the ethnic
Macedonian side, there is evidence that suggests that the IMRO Defense Committee has been
established and functions as a terrorist organization as their objective is to assassinate the
Albanian leaders striving to create autonomous Albanian regions. 149 Essentially two extremist
factions have been formed that rival one another and have the potential to cause great disruption
to the fragile peace existing within the State.
Illicit arms transfers are perpetuating the problem even further as it is realized that there
is a mass of weapons infiltrating the FYROM borders; mainly from the Albanian and Serbian
border areas. 150 The focus is primarily upon the 'import' of weapons by the Albanians. It has
been a prediction and fear by the Macedonian government that "the majority of Albanians in
Macedonia may be armed and may be able to form some kind of paramilitary force.,,151 In fact,
the Macedonian Minister of Internal Affairs, Tomislav Cokrevski, believes that the Albanians are
maintaining stockpiles·of arms in the FYROM which are numerous enough to seriously
challenge the established state forces. I52 The 1~99 uprisings in Kosovo did not help the situation
as Macedonia became the passageway for arms to be transferred from Albania into Kosovo.
147 Gus Xhudo, 'Macedonia: The Trouble From Within' Terrorism and Political Violence 5 no. 4 (Winter
1993), p. 323.
148 Ibid., 324.
]49 Quoted in Xhudo, 324.
]50 Xhudo, 324 and Pettifer, 143.
151 Quoted in Xhudo, 324 from Sum/nary of World Broadcasts, Eastern Europe, 14 November 1992.
152 Perry, 'Destiny on Hold', 125.
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Estimates hold that between 20,000 to 30,000 light weapons were transported into Kosovo from
Albanian through Macedonia in 1999.153
This fear became somewhat of a reality in February 2001 when Macedonian forces
launched an offensive against armed Albanian rebels who were demanding greater equality for
Albanians within the State and were determined to use violence to attain this demand. An armed
confrontation between the Albanian insurgents and the Macedonian forces ensued in the
Albanian populated areas in the northern region of the country by the border with Kosovo, and
continued into April when it appeared that the Macedonian forces had successfully dispersed the
rebels. The rebels, however, rose up again in late April to challenge the authority of the
Government with their continued demands for greater equality. The Macedonian forces are
presently still fighting against the rebels who are still insisting on using violence and force to
obtain their demands. The use of violence as their means to have their issues of concern
addressed has been condemned by the political leaders, both Macedonian and Albanian, as there
has been a call for the issue to be dealt with in a diplomatic and democratic fashion. In fact, the
Macedonian and Albanian parties came together to form a coalition government that is focused
upon national unity in order to quell the armed insurgency by the rebels. 154
The discussion so far has focused mainly upon the Albanians and the dissatisfaction
which they hold with the system in the FYROM. The Macedonians, however, feef threatened
themselves due to the Albanian demands being placed upon the State. The Macedonians believe
that "the preservation of their hard won status and country are of paramount concern"155 which
necessarily increases the difficulty in addressing the Albanian demands, as there is great
]53 Perry, 'Macedonia's Quest for Security and Stability' Current History 99 no. 635 (March 2000), p. 133.
]54 Refer to: AP and Reuters, 'Macedonia Fashions National-Unity Cabinet' Globe and Mail 14 May 2001,
AID.
]55 Perry, 'Destiny on Hold' 122.
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reluctance to 'give in'. A dilemma is created whereby the demands that the Albanians put on the
State create an uneasiness or threatening feeling within the Macedonian population, which in
tum makes it difficult for the Albanian demands to be met, thus increasing the disharmony
between the two groups.
It must be understood that the two populations intermix very little within the wider
society.I56 Communities are established along ethnic lines, and are for the most part, closed off
from outsiders. There is lack of intermixing in the domestic economy as well. Albanians
maintain their own economy through relations with the Albanian diaspora in the surrounding
Balkan region. I5? This voluntary segregation can be explained by the fact that the Slavic
Macedonians and Muslim Albanians have different lifestyles due to their differing cultures,
religions, and historical backgrounds. 158 Integration thus becomes more difficult to institute as
both ethnic groups feel unwelcome and uncomfortable when they venture into each other's
ethnic sectors. With a lack of interethnic communication a common result is misunderstandings
between the groups resulting in the rise of stereotyping which easily leads to increased ethnic
tensions. I59
The economic state of affairs in the FYROM has experienced great obstacles, mainly due
to the blockades imposed upon it by Greece, the UN embargo against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, and, more recently, the conflict that erupted in Kosovo in 1999. The embargoes that
were imposed by Greece in 1992 and 1994 (which were lifted in 1995), due to the use of the
word 'Macedonia' for the State name, as well as the use of the Star of Vergina160 for the national
156 Ibid., 120.
157 Ibid., 121.
158 Ibid., 120.
159 Forbes, p. 19.
160 The Star ofVergina originates as the emblem of the ancient Greek kingdom of Macedonia. The emblem
thus has a Greek origin which necessarily upset Greece when the FYROM adopted it as symbol on it
national flag.
68
flag, is estimated to have cost approximately $700 million.161 To compound this loss, the UN
embargo against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FYROM's largest trading partner) cost the
FYROM over $3 billion. 162 The result of the war in Kosovo was not as severe as was
predicted/feared, but the economy in the FYROM did experience a setback in the first half of the
1999 fiscal year. 163 Official figures indicate that Macedonia endured damages amounting to
$630 million as a result of the NATO bombing and the subsequent refugee flow across its
borders. 164
The economic problems that the FYROM was, and still is, facing have been contributing
to the in-ter-ethnic tensions that were already present in the country. 165 Both the political and
social stability within the state has suffered due to the economic conditions that the FYROM has
been enduring. 166 The upset in the social and political conditions caused by the struggling
economy necessarily increases the stresses on the peace-building process as it provides for an
atmosphere that is not overly conducive to reconciliation.
A prominent gray, or informal economy, is known to exist in the country. It is estimated
that this sector accounts for up to 35 per cent of the gross domestic product. 167 Financial
corruption is also a great problem in the state. Compounding the issue is the fact that
161 Cited in Dion, p. 2.
162 Cited in Dion, p. 2.
163International Monetary Fund, IMF Staff Country Report No. 00/72, Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia: Recent Economic Development (July 10,2000), p. 5.
164 Agence France-Presse, 'Macedonia has Potential for Investors: Business Leader (October 29, 1999), p. 1
available online from Dow Jones Interactive at http://ptg.djnr.com/ccroot/asp/publib/story_ clean_cpy.
asp?articles=AFPR9930207003'IN' .
165 Refer to: UN Document S/1997/631. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Preventive
Deployment Force Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1110 (1997), 11 August 1997, p. 5; and UN
Document S/1997/911. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Preventive Deployment
Force Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1110 (1997), 20 November 1997, p. 6.
166 United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 'UNPREDEP: A First in United Nations
Preventive Deployment' [www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unpred_b.htm]. p. 26.
167 Perry, 'Destiny on Hold,' p. 121.
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government officials have been the ones implicated in the scandals, which provides for decreased
investor conficIence. 168
The poor economic conditions in the FYROM, ranging from blockades to elite level
corruption, have increased the internal strains that the country must deal with. Although there
are signs that there may be some relief in the future, as the European Union has been undertaking
trade relations with the FYROM and has indicated that the relations will feasibly continue to
increase, which will necessarily benefit the FYROM,169 there is still a great struggle that the
FYROM faces in regard to its economic security. Gaining economic stability with the country is
an important factor in the peace-building equation within the FYROM as it is connected to inter-
ethnic tolerance and concordance.
It can be understood that the economic stability and prosperity within the FYROM is a
necessary element for fostering increased political stability and engagement of civil society.
This creates a construction whereby the political governance and civil society dynamics are
contingent upon the economic factor for their development and sustentation. In terms of the
construction of a hierarchical structure, economics is thus placed 'below' civil society as it acts a
supporting base, and on a similar 'level' with political governance as it acts to nourish political
stability.
There are evidently numerous issues that are present within the FYROM that are
providing for the destabilization and fragility of the State. Despite this, however, the FYROM
has managed to sustain itself as a state without collapsing into a civil war. The peace-building
initiatives that have been undertaken to date must necessarily be regarded in a positive light as
168 Ibid., 121.
169 Refer to: European Union, Commission Report on the Feasibility on Negotiating a Stabilisation and
Association Agreement with the Former Yugoslav Republic ofMacedonia Com (1999) 300, Brussels, 16
June 1999. Available online at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/fyrom/coffi_1999_300.htm.
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they have achieved their purpose and kept the FYROM from collapsing under the pressure.
This does not mean, however, that the peace-building process is without flaw or is by' arty means
complete. An analysis of the peace-building process and procedures in terms of the domestic
and the international roles will provide an understanding as to how the undesirable has been
averted to date.
The ethnic tensions that exist in the FYROM have been fully recognized by both the
political actors and the individuals within society. As a result of this awareness, coupled with the
desire to not have the State follow the path of its fellow breakaway Yugoslav republics and break
down into civil war, there has been movement from both the political elite and the societal level
in an attempt to address the quandaries before the situation spins out of control. The domestic
peace-building initiatives are occurring both from the top down and a bottom up perspectives.
The analysis of the peace-building initiatives will focus upon two areas: the moderate political
leadership and the undertakings of civil society to build greater tolerance and establish greater
understanding between the two ethnic groups.
The political leadership in the FYROM has been extremely important to the survival of
the State. Former president Kiro Gligorov, who headed the state from the time of independence
until the recent presidential election in 1999, governed the state in a manner that was perhaps
critical to the survival·of the FYROM. He ruled in a moderate manner by mediating between the
Macedonians and Albanians and has tried to be as accommodating to the demands of both sides
as possible. His rule has been in the best interest of the country as a whole rather than in the
interest of one ethnic group over another. 170 It is thus understandable why Gligorov was both
well liked and respected by both sides. By taking this stance to ruling he became regarded as a
vital element to the stability of country. He was regarded as so vital in fact, that when an
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assassination attempt was made against him in October 1995 through a car bomb which critically
injured him, there grew a great concern both from within the state and throughout the world that
the state would simply crumble.171 Gligorov has since retired, and in 1999 he was replaced by
Trajkovski who is also a moderate and has pledged that he will rule in the interest of the state
rather than along ethnic lines. 172
In terms of the elected government as a whole, there appears to be the beginnings of
consociationalism.173 The elected parliament up until 1998 was dominated by Macedonian
representatives, however, there were five ministerial positions offered to Albanian members and
there was an appointment of the first Albanian general to the state military.174 There still exists
some animosity from the Albanians as they claim that these ministerial positions are not
important portfolio positions. Greater strides have been made since the 1998 parliamentary
elections as there has been movement of the traditionally extreme ethnically based politically
parties more towards the centre. There has also been the recognition by most parties that
cooperation and conciliation needs to exist between the parties in order for national stability.175
The fact that the government is a coalition may be significant as it requires that for the
government to continue there must be a degree of unity and moderation amongst the parties
which include both Macedonians and Albanians. Although political parties are still established
along ethnic lines (except for the Democratic Alternative-which is multiethnic, but does not yet
hold much power), the political environment seems to be making progress in terms of having the
ethnic groups being more accommodating and cooperative rather than being pitted against one
170 Perry, 'Balkan Miracle' 117.
171 Dion, 6.
172 Perry, 'Macedonia's Quest' 130.
173 For a full understanding of this concept refer to: Kenneth D. McRae, 'Theories of Powersharing and
Conflict Management,' Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies, Joseph V. Montville ed.
(Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1990).
174 Ackermann, 414.
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another. The recent coalition government that has formed in order to address the issue of the
Albanian rebelsdemonstrates that there has been notable progress made as there is there is desire
by most parties (both Albanian and Macedonian) to have a stable and peaceful state that is able
to properly address concerns and issues in a diplomatic and democratic manner.
The political leadership has been important in trying to alleviate the ethnic tensions and
keep the state from collapsing. An important note is that the moderate leadership took hold in
the state from its independence. In terms of conflict management timing is important as "the
earlier a country starts working on interethnic accommodation the better.,,176 There is more work
that needs to be done in term of the country's leadership, however, because accommodation
policies were instituted at an early phase of the States' history, there becomes a greater chance
for success in managing the ethnic tensions.
With the presence of moderate leadership there has begun some granting of concessions
to some of the Albanian demands in hopes of easing the tensions between the two factions.
Although not all of the Albanian demands have been met or even addressed as of yet, there has
been some headway. The Albanian language is in the process of being recognized as a national
language, which has provided for the Albanian university in Tetovo to be sanctioned by the
governing authorities. I77 Thus the contentious issue of the status of the Albanian language has
begun to be addressed favourably for the Albanians, although the Albanian insurgents believe
that the process has been too slow up to this point. The rules that addressed the use of Albanian
symbols in public (for example flying the Albanian flag) are being repealed in order to provide
175 Perry, 'Macedonia's Quest' 130
176 Donald L. Horowitz, 'Ethnic Conflict Management for Policymakers' Conflict and Peacemaking in
Multiethnic Societies, Joseph V. Montville ed. (Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1990) 119.
177 Perry, 'Macedonia's Quest' 136.
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for the use of these symbols to be legal. 178 Finally, there has been the release of some Albanian
nationalists from jail.179 Since these concessions have occurred so recently it is difficult to say
exactly the extent of the effect that they will have, however, it is almost certain that the
Albanians are a bit more content, which will necessarily ease the tensions to some degree.
The fact that the political leadership in the FYROM has been acting in a manner that is
attempting to reduce ethnic tensions and demonstrate ethnic cooperation and accommodation
within the governing structures, provides a positive example for civil society to follow in terms
of encouraging interethnic dialogue and conflict resolution via diplomatic means. The presence
of this form of moderate political governance creates an environment that is conducive for civil
society to act within as there becomes an understanding that the governing elites will both accept
and encourage the development of a civil society that is acting to further enhance interethnic
accommodation and conflict resolution. It can thus be understood that good/moderate political
governance is a prerequisite for the development of an effective civil society therefore placing
political governance 'below' civil society in the hierarchical structure.
The involvement of civil society in the peace-building process has become an area that is
receiving greater attention as it focuses upon individuals as the actors rather than just the
traditional political institutions. Initiatives have been undertaken in the FYROM to get civil
society involved in changing conflicting relationships and reducing ethnic tensions. This
initiative has received support from non-governmental organizations such as the Search for
Common Ground, the Soros Society, National Endowment for Democracy, and Catholic Relief
Services.
178 Ibid., 136.
179 Ibid., ]36.
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Each of these organizations focuses on different aspects of civil society and works on
developing various elements of society in order to get the general population involved in creating
and building an environment that is conducive to long-term peace. Many of the programs
introduced focus upon teaching conflict resolution techniques and encouraging interethnic
dialogue while trying to create an environment of greater understanding and less prejudice.
Some of the projects/programs that have been instituted include the establishment of interethnic
roundtables to discuss divisive issues and propose cooperative solutions, training the media to
report the news in a noninflammatory (nonbiased) fashion,180 the promotion of democracy
through the promotion for the independence of information channels servicing the public such as
the radio and television stations, and the print media,181 and the institution of workshops and
organizations that teach children and parents peaceful and effective means of resolving disputes
without resorting to violence. 182
There are a number of internal peace-building initiatives that have been embarked upon
which have contributed to the management of interethnic tensions, leading to the stability that
has existed in the FYROM thus far. Although these internal peace-building initiatives have been
a crucial part of ensuring the stability of the FYROM, the involvement and role of the
international community has been a fundamental component within the peace-building equation.
180 John Marks and Eran Fraenkel, 'In Practice: Working to Prevent Conflict in the New Nation of
Macedonia' Negotiation Journall3 no. 3 (July 1997) 248-250.
181 The Soros Society and National Endowment for Democracy are the two groups focusing on
strengthening democracy by supporting independent information/media outlets. Refer to: Janie
Leatherman, William DeMars, Patrick D. Gaffney, and Raimo Vayrynen. Breaking Cycles of Violence
(Connecticut: Kumarian Press, 1999), p. 167.
]82 Catholic Relief Services developed a Parent Teacher Association (PTA) that brings parents together in
local areas to encourage them to address problems that have become 'ethnicized' in a framework which
teaches inter-ethnic tolerance. Refer to: Leatherman, et aI., pp. 169-170. The Search for Common Ground
organization holds workshops for school children that teach peaceful methods of conflict resolution. Refer
to: Marks and Fraenkel, p. 249.
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The international operations will thus be explored in order to identify their successes and
failures.
The international community has been involved in the FYROM since early in 1992, less
than a year after it gained its independence, mainly to provide protection and stability to the state
in order that the conflict in the Balkans not spillover and pull the FYROM into the conflict or
create internal conflict within the State itself. However, it can easily be argued that the
involvement of the international community has provided more than simply a defence from
conflict spillover. The operations undertaken by the international community have established
the security needed in order to provide and protect the space for the internal top down and
bottom up processes (political elite and civil society) to operate. The establishment and
preservation of this secure space has been essential to the overall peace-building process in the
FYROM.
The United Nations became engaged in the FYROM in June 1993 following a request
from the then president of the FYROM, Kiro Gligorov, to have an observer force placed on the
borders in order to protect the new and vulnerable country from having its borders encroached
upon by external forces. 183 There was also concern that since the general Balkan area was
particularly volatile due to the breakup of the ex-Yugoslavia and the continued civil wars that
were ensuing, that the conflicts in the other regions could easily spillover into the FYROM
causing that State to descend into civil war itself. Recognizing the reality of the situation, and
desiring to prevent the existing wars from drawing in another victim, the United Nations acceded
to the request and subsequently expanded the mandate of the pre-existing United Nations
183 At the time of the request for external military observers, the FYROM was particularly concerned of
invasion from Serbia and Albania.
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Protection Force (in Yugoslavia) to include the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 184
The FYROM component of the operation would later, in 1995, became autonomous from the
UNPROFOR operation and become an independent mission in 1996. The ensuing mission was
established by the adoption of Security Council resolution 983(1995) and became known as the
United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP).
The mandate of both of these operations was to "monitor the border areas with Albania
and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); strengthen, by its presence,
the country's security and stability; and report on any developments that could threaten the
country.,,185 This operation was the first of its kind in respects to the fact that it was the- first
preventative deployment operation to be instituted throughout the world by the United Nations.
The operations (UNPROFOR and UNPREDEP) were multidimensional in the sense that
they included more than simply just military peacekeepers. The missions incorporated an armed
military force, military observers, civilian police monitors, civil affairs staff, as well as
administrative staff and local interpreters.186 The troop strength was the principal element that
was continually being altered as the contingent began with a strength of 700 and peaked at a
strength of 1,050 at the end of the mission mandate on February 28, 1999. During this
timeframe, the troop strength progressively increased until 1997 when it was decided by the
Security Council that a phasing·out or exit strategy for the military component should
commence. The troop strength was to be reduced by 300 (dipping to 750 from 1,050),187
however, due to the increasing insecurity in neighbouring Kosovo, the force was replenished
184 Refer to United Nations Security Council Resolution 795(1992).
185 United Nations, 'UNPREDEP: A First' p. 4.
186 Ibid., 5.
187 United Nations, Department of the Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Preventative Deployment Force Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1J10 (1997), 11 August
1997, p. 5.
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back to the 1,050 troop strength by resolution 1186/1998 in July 1998. 188 For the duration of the
UN missions CONPROFOR and UNPREDEP) the number of CivPol officials remained steady at
either 25 or 26 deployed in theatre l89.
UNPREDEP did not receive a renewal of its mandate past February 28, 1999 due to
China's invocation of its veto on the Security Council claiming that peacekeeping operations
(including this preventive deployment mission) should not be open-ended and the situation had
sufficiently stabilized to allow for the operation to be terminated. 190 The vetoing of the renewal
of the UNPREDEP mandate was a great disappointment to most of the other members of the
Security Council. The member countries that supported a renewal of the mission commented on
the necessity of upholding the mission especially in light of the increasing tension in Kosovo and
the threat that the explosion of that region could have on the stability of the FYROM. 191
As mentioned above, the mandate of the UN forces was to focus upon patrolling the
borders, mainly those on the northern and western frontiers, which are the border areas of
southern Serbia, Kosovo, and the northern section of Albania. 192 This placement is significant as
it focuses on the areas where there are concentrations of ethnic Albanians bordering the
FYROM. The conditions in Kosovo had been increasingly deteriorating which was leading to
the concern of an influx of ethnic Albanians into the FYROM, which would result in upsetting
the balance of Macedonians and Albanians, and the possibility of facilitating separatist
activities.193 Maintaining an international military presence on the border helped to provide
some security to the Macedonians in the FYROM by reducing the fear of Albanians outside of
188 United Nations, Security Council, Security Council Resolution 51186/1998 (July 1998).
189 United Nations, 'UNPREDEP: A First', p. 12.
190 Refer to Security Council press release SC/6648 February 25, 1999, available at
[www.un.orglNews/Press/docs/1999/19991225.sc6684.html].
191 Ibid.
192 Ibid., 4.
193 Ackermann, 413.
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the country joining forces with the Albanians inside the country to alter the present conditions.
With the attempt at Albanian secession having occurred once before, the fear of Macedonians is
substantial and perhaps legitimate. The peacekeepers in this case were essentially providing
some of the security needed to help reduce and contain the fear that as mentioned previously, can
be detrimental to the management or resolution of ethnic tensions.
The mandate of the UNPREDEP forces was broadened under resolution 1169(1998) to
include the reporting of illicit arms transfers occurring over the borders being monitored. This
task is important to note as there had been a continual fear by the Macedonian authorities that the
Albanian population was arming itself, which was necessarily increasing tensions by throwing
the society into a security dilemma. An average of 400 patrols per week were undertaken by the
UNPREDEP military forces which included 300 border and community patrols all designed to
monitor the border as well as gather information regarding the particulars about the arms
transfers, such as the type and amount. 194 The intensity of the patrols, however, became difficult
to maintain as there was limited resources in terms of personnel, leaving UNPREDEP stretched
to the limit.
Refugees have been a large concern of the FYROM as the northwestern section of the
country borders onto Kosovo, which is both unstable and populated by Albanians. Not only
could a massive influx destabilize the existing balance in the FYROM, as mentioned above, but
there is also great potential that if domestic security forces have to control the situation there
could be a clash between the Macedonian dominated forces and the Albanian refugees. 195
Should a situation arise whereby the Macedonian dominated security forces had to use force
194 United Nations, 'UNPREDEP: A First' p. 7.
195 Stuart J. Kaufman, 'Preventive Peacekeeping, Ethnic Violence and Macedonia' Studies in Conflict and
Terrorisln 19 no. 3 (1996) 240.
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against the Albanian refugees no doubt accusations would arise between the Albanians and
Macedonians wIthin society, again increasing tensions.
When the mass exodus of Albanians from Kosovo began in March 1999, Macedonia
experienced the influx of approximately 360,000 refugees. 196 The UNPREDEP operation had
expired only the month prior when the NATO air strikes began against the Serbians in ihe
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It became clearly obvious that the expiration of UNPREDEP
and the subsequent withdrawal of the military forces was premature. The FYROM was very
lucky, however, that NATO forces were present in the FYROM. There were 10,000 troops in
the country due to the FYROM complying to a request for NATO troops to use the country as its
work-up area for the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps that was to be deployed as part of the NATO
implementation force (IFOR) for the Rambouillet Peace Agreement. 197
The NATO forces provided as much assistance as they could to address the refugee crisis
in the FYROM. They provided the infrastructure for some of the refugee camps, set up feeding
stations, and assisted with the transport of supplies. 198 By having logistical capabilities well
beyond those of the humanitarian organizations, the NATO forces were able to control the
humanitarian disaster that had a great potential for destabilizing the FYROM. There is no
denying that great strains where put on the FYROM due to the Kosovo situation, however, the
country was able to pull through, with ethnic tensions being kept to a minimum, due to the
presence of NATO forces which ultimately guaranteed the security and stability of the country
while the events of the Kosovo dilemma unfolded.
196 Duncan Perry, 'Macedonian's Quest' p. 132.
197 NATO, Press Conference held by Secretary General Javier Solana & SACEUR General Wesley Clark,
March 25, 1999. Available on-line at [www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990325a.htm].
198 NATO, Press Conference held by Spokesman Jamie Shea & Air Commodore David Wilby, April 3,
1999. Available on-line at [www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990403a.htm].
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Not surprising, even in the aftermath of the Kosovo conflict, the FYROM has requested
that KFOR andLJNMIK operations increase their efforts to suppress the organized transnational
crime and to strengthen the surveillance, monitoring and control of the FYROM border. 199 This
request by the FYROM's Minister of Foreign Affairs clearly illustrates the need to maintain a
military operation in the country in order to guarantee the peaceful subsistence of the country.
The UNPREDEP troops did not have a mandate that allowed them to become involved in
intrastate affairs. The international civilian police or CivPol were the segment of the
UNPREDEP operation that assisted with the internal dynamics of state and societal security.
Between 25_26200 CivPol were deployed during the tenure of the UNPROFOR and UNPREDEP
operations. The role of CivPol was to assist and monitor the local police forces in the FYROM,
especially in the regions where high concentrations of minorities exist.2ol One must recall that
the police force was not by any extent representative of the population as the force was
comprised of only 4 per cent Albanians leaving the remaining positions to be occupied by
Macedonians. This inequality in representation was causing great fear among the minority
groups (especially the Albanians) which was not conducive to an environment for which
sustainable peace could prosper as was afore-mentioned.
The involvement of CivPol was designed as a confidence-building measure whereby with
impartial monitoring of the police forces the minorities would become more trusting of the
authorities and the police officers would be held accountable for any 'inappropriate' or
'improper' behaviour which they would perhaps do if not being overseen.202 CivPol also acted
on numerous occasions in conjunction with the military forces by undertaking border patrol
199 NATO, Address by Mr. Aleksandar Dimitrov, Minister ofForeign Affairs of the Republic ofMacedonia
May 25, 2000. Available on-line at [www.nato.int/docu/speech/2000/S000525n.htm].
200 United Nations, 'UNPREDEP: A First', p. 12.
201 Ibid., 25.
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duties. Following the adoption of resolution 1160(1998), the number of patrols executed on a
weekly basis was increased by 100203 due to the assistance of CivPol.
Complementing the tasks of the international civilian police in trying to safeguard and
enhance the rule of law within the FYROM state, a special project was designed under the
auspices of the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Division, and
UNPREDEP. This project included a police training program which provided three training
seminars for senior Macedonian police officers addressing the topic of modern management.204
A second project was also undertaken which focused upon reducing corruption and necessarily
included a police training component that addressed issues suc-h as community policing and
provided additional training to improve police skills in preventing and controlling criminal
activity associated with corruption.205
Despite that the UN forces and CivPol did not become involved in domestic societal
affairs (as the mandate did not provide for such involvement) they did playa vital role in an
indirect way to averting or reducing ethnic tensions within the state. This is what led President
Gligorov to state that the UN force is "the most stabilizing force inside the country.,,206
The task of providing or enhancing security and stability in the FYROM via international
intervention was generally left to the UNPREDEP and UNPROFOR operations (as well as by
NATO following the expiration of the UNPREDEP mission). However, recognizing the internal
problems that the FYROM was having in terms of a deep divide existing between the
202 Ibid., 23.
203 Ibid., 7. This figure also includes the number of community patrols undertaken.
204 United Nations, Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Work of the Centre for
International Crime Prevention: Report of the Executive Director Eighth Session (27 April - May 6, 1999),
p.13 [available online at: www.uncjin.org/Documents/8comm/2e.pdf].
205 United Nations, Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Division, United Nations Action Against
Corruption and Bribery September 1997, p. 14 [available online at:
www.unjin.orgIDocuments/coITupt.htm]
206 Kaufman, 240.
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Macedonians and the Albanians, along with the rise of a faction within the generally moderate
Albanian Partytor Democratic Prosperity that was articulating a more extreme and r,rdical
agenda, the European Union became involved in trying to hold the FYROM state together.207
There was a threat from the Albanian politicians that in light of such events such as the 1992
Bitpazar incident that resulted in the deaths of four Albanians, co-operation between Albanians
and Macedonians within the government would no longer be possible.208 This necessarily led to
the fear that the FYROM would become so politically divided along ethnic lines that the country
would no longer be able to function, and would essentially collapse. In response to this threat,
the EU, led mainly by Britain, held meetings and discussions with the FYROM Ministry of the
Interior in order to provide assistance with security matters. As well as advice, the Ministry of
the Interior was also supplied with material support in order to carry out their security program.
This program resulted in the arrest of many prominent Albanians charged with trafficking
weapons and trying to subvert the state by instituting a secessionist Albanian state.
There was a hope to strengthen the state by removing 'supposed' dissidents, which would
then influence Albanian politics to move away from its radical position towards a more
conservative stance.209 This desire for the institution of greater state strength was not completely
successful, however, as the actions undertaken resulted in the radicals in the PDP breaking from
the party and creating the more extreme PDP(Sh) which has gained support in many of the
Albanian towns. The outcome of the actions undertaken by EU to strengthen the FYROM can
perhaps be explained by the state-strength dilemma identified and discussed by Kalevi Holsti.210
The state-strength dilemma proposes that as weak states attempt to gain strength, the methods
207 James Pettifer, 'The Albanians in Western Macedonia after FYROM Independence' The New
Macedonian Question, James Pettifer Ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999) 139.
208 Ibid., 139.
209 Ibid., 140.
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that they have to undertake in order to gain this strength actually end up creating a situation
whereby the state becomes weaker as certain groups become dissatisfied by the methods
undertaken and consequently rise up and revolt against the state.2II
The involvement of the ED in assisting the FYROM in trying to strengthen its internal
security may have created tensions within the Albanian community, however, greater tensions
may very well have occurred if these individuals were able to execute their plan to declare
independence once again. It is difficult, if not impossible, to always determine what was avoided
by certain actions being undertaken, however, it can be safely assumed that if another secession
attempt had been made by the Albanians, the negative response from the Macedonians could
have increased tensions to cause political divides that could have brought down the government
or severe violence breaking out between the groups.
The continuance of good and cooperative political governance within the FYROM was in
jeopardy due to problems with maintaining security. A direct connection between increasing
security and the continuation of good political governance is thus demonstrated, allowing for the
understanding that security acts a prerequisite for the establishment and maintenance of the
political level in the hierarchical structure of building sustainable peace.
Finally, the international community has unodertaken a diplomatic role in the wake of the
recent outbreak of the confrontation between the Macedonian security forces and the Albanian
insurgents. The international community has publicly condemned the actions of the Albanian
rebels and has praised the Macedonian Government and forces for their efforts to end the
violence in accordance with the rule of law.212 Although there has not been any direct
international intervention to assist with subduing the rebels, there has been an increase in the
2]0 See chapter 6 in Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War.
2]] Ibid., 117.
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number of monitors placed in the area of the conflict coupled with the already present KFOR
forces which have increased their monitoring of the border area and their efforts to stop illicit
arms transfers in the region.213 The international community is greatly engaged in this conflict,
as there is a great concern that the conflict could spark another Balkan war. Although there is
great reluctance by NATO or the UN to become officially engaged in the armed confrontation,
the international community is still providing as much assistance as it can in the situation, and
perhaps will be willing to undertake greater involvement should the situation escalate to a point
where regional stability is in great jeopardy. The return to focusing upon the security situation in
the FYROM by both internal actors and the international community in order to stabilize the
country and ensure continued progression for building peace, demonstrates the significance of
the security element in the peace-building. Indeed, the establishment and maintenance of
security emerges as the basic element for creating and sustaining peace. From this, it becomes
reasonable to deduce that security occupies the 'lowest' or most fundamental level within the
hierarchical structure as it appears to be element that has so much impact on the stability of the
state and the continuance of the peace-building process.
The FYROM lacked the ability to exclusively provide for adequate security and stability
within its society due to both the lack of resources (insufficient numbers of troops and- military
equipment) and the lack of legitimacy for its forces to act due to the deficiency in representation
within the forces. Without the capability of providing for a secure environment, it becomes
extremely difficult if not impossible for the internal dynamics (the political elite and civil
society) to develop and administer an apparatus that would provide for sustainable peace-
building. The role of the international community to provide for the stability and security of the
2]2 United Nations, Security Council Resolution 5134512001 (March 2001).
213 Ibid.
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state therefore became indispensable in the sustainable peace-building equation in the FYROM.
The presence of a moderate leadership open to compromise in order ensure the peaceful and
unified continuance of the state, as well as the mobilization of civil society in an attempt to
breakdown the social divides between the ethnic groups are sine qua non to establishing and
maintaining a state of peace within the FYROM.
The FYROM has provided a case study which looks at the peace-building process that has
been through both the short and medium term phases and is now entering the long-term phase.
The information that this case study has been able to provide in respects to peace-building has
be-en quite plentiful due to the fact that the process has been ongoing for about 10 years.
Coupled with this, the fact that the peace-building process has been successful to date, especially
taking into consideration the extreme pressures that the country has faced in the past couple of
years, makes the case ideal for study as it provides an example of peace-building "success".
Although the FYROM demonstrates a case where a peace-building has been sustainable
it also highlights some areas where there are weaknesses or problems with the process that could
become problematic in the future. The main issue is the fact that the security base is still
vulnerable. There is no doubt that there has been great improvement in the capabilities of the
State to provide for its own internal and external security, as has been demonstrated by its being
able to launch a strong campaign against the Albanian rebels, however, security is still a concern
for the country. Also illustrated are the changing focuses of the peace-building process in order
that the state and society are able to progress and strengthen the country as a whole. The
progression is witnessed through the analysis of the case study, as it mapped out the
developments in the peace-building process as they related to the stabilization of the country
overall. The imperative issue that arises is that while new initiatives are undertaken to expand
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the realm of the peace-building process, the previous initiatives and phases must not simply be
overlooked or unsupported. Instead, these fore-going phases must always be maintained and
receive adequate support when difficulties arise, as each phase requires the previous phases to be
sustained in order for the subsequent phases to be properly executed.
The doctrine of human security provides for the maintenance of all phases of the peace-
building process, thus ensuring that as the process advances the previous initiatives are not
forsaken. Throughout the case study, a hierarchical structure has begun to develop whereby an
understanding of the existence of 'levels' in the doctrine of human security begins to become
recognized in relation to the phases of peace-building. Since human security is involved with all
phases of the peace-building process, having the overall objective of instituting and upholding
human security as the means for the establishment of sustainable peace-building necessarily
requires that all phases receive continued observance, and support when required. ·The fact that
the FYROM has had to continually refocus on the security dynamics of the state while
continuing to build the other dynamics of human security, has demonstrated the requirement for
the hierarchy to be constructed in such a manner that the structure demands that all 'lower' levels
be continually maintained while 'new' levels are progressively become the focus.
The information gathered in this case study provides an understanding about the
connection between the 'levels' of human security and peace-building and how they interact with
one another. A hierarchical structure has begun to develop which will be supported and built
upon with the information that will be gathered from the East Timor case study. The fact that the
FYROM has been a case study of a successful peace-building operation has allowed for a
structure to be identified for building sustainable peace and recognizing how the role of human
security can fit into this structure.
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Chapter III
Case Study: East Timor
East Timor is the most recent case of internal war and intervention by the international
community to both quell the violence and rebuild society in order for it to become more peaceful
and prosperouse Rebuilding perhaps is not the proper term to describe the efforts by the United
Nations in East Timor. Rather, due to the historical conditions of the soon to be independent
state, the United Nations is faced with actually developing the society from virtually nothing. In
a word, there is a void in terms of any form of an established political, administrative,
economical or social structure. This is a contrast to the FYROM State where these structures
were both established and functioning. To borrow the words of James Traub214, the international
community has been charged with 'inventing East Timor'. Due to the magnitude of the UN
operation whereby the state and society will basically be constructed from the bottom up, an
opportunity is created whereby the lessons learned from the previous peacekeeping and peace-
building operations can be observed, and a design formed and implemented to provide for the
most successful mission undertaken to date. This design, in order to be successful, however,
needs to incorporate the tenets of sustainable peace-building.
The intervention in East Timor is still on-going with new developments occurring
regularly. Despite this, there still exists the ability for the operation to be analyzed in a manner
that provides for an understanding of the framework of the peace-building initiatives that have
been, are presently, and plan to be undertaken and instituted. The key questions that are raised in
this case mainly revolve around the issue of the establishment of a structure that will foster peace
214 James Traub, 'Inventing East Timor' Foreign Affairs 79 no. 1 (July/August 2000), pp. 74-89.
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over the long term. In the immediate and short-term phases of peace-building 215 -East Timor
nas passed through the immediate phase and now stands in the short-term phase - what has been,
and what is now the main focus of efforts for building peace? As the peace-building process
progresses, there necessarily emerges new concerns. Given this, and the fact that there will be a
continuing change in the focal point of the peace-building process as it progresses, it becomes
important to ask what is the relationship between the new centres of gravity and the former.
Essentially, the point of interest is to discern how do the phases and their corresponding centres
of gravity correlate with one another. By researching this question, the human security and
peace-building hierarchical structure will develop as it had in the previous case study of the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and more information will be added that will help to
refine the configuration. The final point of interest that is being addressed in consideration of
this case involves the attainment of some understanding regarding how the peace-building
process will advance. In other words, at this point what is the form of progression that the peace-
building process will most likely undertake taking into consideration the foundations that have
been established to this point.
East Timor has a long and ominous history that has provided to current conditions. Up
until 1974, East Timor was a colony of Portugal, and as such· was treated as most colonies were,
with suppression and deprivation, and a general disregard for the needs or desires of tlie
population. When Portugal withdrew in 1975, a result of the Revolutionary Front for the
Independence of East Timor (Fretilin) which had been formed in 1974 calling for a general
armed insurrection, territorial control by Fretilin was attained and the Democratic Republic of
215 Refer to note 112 regarding the establishment and distinction between the phases of peace-building.
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East Timor was subsequently proclaimed.216 This self-proclaimed "independence" endured for
only a short time before Indonesia annexed the former colony nine days later when it"invaded the
newly autonomous 'nation'. The actions of Indonesia were condemned by the international
community, and as such, Indonesia's rule has been regarded as illegitimate. Under Indonesian
authority, East Timor fell captive to the brutally repressive Indonesian regime that constantly
inflicted mass human rights violations upon the East Timorese. During the occupation that
spanned over twenty-five years, it is estimated that over 200,000 East Timorese (which translates
into roughly one-third of the East Timorese population at the time when the occupation began)
were killed by the brutish occupiers in the first eleven years alone.217
Due to the continual abuse and domination of what became Indonesia's 27th province,
there was little opportunity for East Timor to develop or formulate the structures that are
normally present in a properly functioning state or society. The per capita gross domestic
product (GDP) of the province was $200, ranking East Timor lower than both Cambodia and
Bangladesh.2lS The social structure was very limited as the majority of the province was
structured into small hamlets that were sustained through farming (the main, virtually exclusive
export being Arabica coffee). The literacy rate at the time of decolonization in 1974 was a mere
10 per cent2I9 and has only improved to less than 40 per cent220 since then. Once the Indonesian
authorities pulled out, any structure that had existed under their administration collapsed, leaving
a complete structural void in the entire region.
2]6 It should be noted that Portugal never officially recognized the independence declaration of East Timor,
as a result, East Timor has never really been considered independent on the world stage. This issue
recently came into play when the UN turned to Portugal to hand over administrative authority in order that
UNTAET could undertake a transitional authority.
217 Shelia Nair, 'Human Rights, Sovereignty, and the East Timor Question' Global Society 14 no. 1 (2000),
p.l18.
2]8 Alistair Mack, 'Intervention in East Timor - From the Ground' Rusi Journal 144 no. 6 (December
1999), p~ 21.
2]9 Ibid., 21.
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Independence had been desired by the majority of the East Timorese both during the
colonial rule of the Portuguese and the occupying rule of Indonesia. There were, however,
groups that supported maintaining ties with Portugal in the form of a federation, and those which
advocated for integration with Indonesia. As a result, the Timor Democratic Union (UDT)
endorsing the idea of a federation-type structure with Portugal, and the Timor Popular
Democratic Association (APODETI) advocating integration with Indonesia were established.
These 3 movements clashed with one another until Fretilin was able to remove the colonial rule
of Portugal in 1975 with the support of the Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East
Timor (Falintil), its fighting forces. After the failure of Portugal to maintain its authority over
East Timor, the conflict became polarized between the other two movements: pro-integration,
d . d d 221an pro-In epen ence.
The independence movement (Fretilin), which in 1978 came under the command of
Xanana Gusmao (commander-in-chief), was faced with great resistance by the Indonesian forces.
The conflict was basically one of guerrilla warfare that continued until 1999 whereby the
Indonesian forces were pitted against the Falintil forces that were unsuccessful in their struggle
to drive Indonesia out of East Timor.
Surprisingly, Indonesian President Habibie announced in January 1999,222 that the future
of East Timor would in fact be decided by the East Timorese themselves in a referendum that
220 Warren Caragata, 'A Bloody Birth' Maclean's (September 13,1999), p. 33.
22J Following the 1975 invasion by Indonesia, members of the UDT and the APODETI, acting as the
'People's Assembly', approved the annexation by Indonesia and the installation of East Timor as
Indonesia's 27th province on June 2, 1976. The UDT later maintained its presence within East Timor by
allying itself with the FRETILIN and forming the National Convergence which was the new nationalist
movement for independence.
222 In June 1998, President Habibie announced a proposal to work towards greater autonomy for East
Timor, but it was not expected that full autonomy would be granted for a number of years. Indonesia had
experienced many difficulties in the previous few years due to the Asian economic collapse and a growing
difficulty for Jakarta to maintain control over growing unrest within its 'territories' including East Timor.
The replacement of President Soeharto in 1998 by Dr. B.J. Habibie initiated a political transformation in
Jakarta that allowed for the opening of dialogue regarding the loosening of Indonesia's repressive grip over
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was to provide two clear-cut choices: to continue as an Indonesian province with much greater
autonomy being granted, or obtain official separation that would eventually lead to full
independence. The May 5 Agreements, worked out between the United Nations and the
Portuguese Government, provided the framework for the referendum whereby the United
Nations established the United Nations Assistance Mission to East Timor (UNAMET) on June
11, 1999 with the mandate to oversee the referendum scheduled for August 30, 1999 and any
subsequent transition. UNAMET was not designed to be a security force as Indonesia refused
the deployment of a international security/peacekeeping force in the pre-ballot period. 223
Security in the territory remained the responsibility of the Indonesian Government, however,
pro-integrationist militias were posing difficulties by "creating a climate of fear and intimidation
throughout the territory.,,224 In light of the erupting violence prior to the ballot, there became
increased concern for the explosion of great violence following the vote. As a result of this
concern Australia placed its troops on a higher state of readiness should they be required if the
concerns became a reality. 225
Despite the pre-election violence, 451,792 voters registered with a monumental
percentage of voter turnout of 98.6 per cent.226 The result of the vote was an overwhelming
support for independence rather than integration as 78.5 per cent voted for separation. Mass
parts of its 'territory'. President Habibie's proposal was warmly greeted by the international community
and the UN, Portugal and Australia began to work with Habibie to both support his proposal and discuss
various means for instituting the process for eventually granting autonomy to East Timor. It took the
international community by surprise when Habibie suddenly announced that a referendum would be held to
determine the future of East Timor, as it was believed that such an event would nat take place for a number
of years and more negotiations with the international community would be required. Refer to: Alexander
Drowner, 'East Timor - Looking Back on 1999' Australian Journal ofInternational Affairs 54 no. 1 (April
2000) available from Academic Search Elite, pp. 1-2.
223 The indication that Indonesia was not going to accept an international peacekeeping force stemmed from
the Bali Summit of April 27, 1999 where a formal approach was made to President Habibie concerning the
unacceptable eruptions of violence within East Timor and the need for the Indonesian forces to provide
greater security to the territory. See Ibid., 3.
224 Drowner, 3.
225 Ibid., 3.
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violence erupted following the announcement of the election results whereby the pro-
integrationist militias unleashed their fury against those who had supported independence.
Australia, already standing ready for intervention, pressed for an interventionist force to stop the
carnage and uphold the decision of the election. President Habibie agreed to such a force on
September 12 and resolution 1264 was subsequently adopted on September 15 which established
the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) lead by Australia. This force was, in
comparison to previous interventionist activities, assembled and deployed quite rapidly. In fact,
the speed at which the deployment occurred has lead to some optimism that the international
community was finally learning from the mistakes of the past and intervening before the
situation spiraled downward beyond the point of no return. INTERFET was a Chapter VII
operation endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 1264 (1999) but was not a UN
peacekeeping mission. Rather, it was a multinational force acting under a unified command until
such time the UN could establish a UN peacekeeping operation. Since the force was not led by
the UN, the INTERFET mission came to be understood and regarded as a 'coalition of the
willing' .227
INTERFET forces began deployment five days following the adoption of the resolution
on 20 September with an ambitious and unambiguous mandate. The mandate was twofold:
restore peace and security: and protect and support UNAMET, which included the facilitation of
humanitarian assistance programs. This mandate was backed by the authorization for the
involved states to undertake all necessary means in order to fulfill the elements stipulated in the
mandate. In a word, INTERFET was a strike force designed to regain control of the territory by
226 Ibid., 3.
227 This phrase has been adopted in light of the East Timor crisis and is predicted to define future missions
in terms of defining the involvement of the interventionist actors. See James Traub, 79.
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stopping the violence and deterring militia activity while providing humanitarian assistance
whenever possible.
During the little over five months that INTERFET was in operation, the troop strength
grew to over 9,000 from more than 16 countries.228 The task of instituting and maintaining
security in the territory during this timeframe was quite arduous due to the complexity and
multifaceted tasks that needed to be performed in order to do so. INTERFET became charged
with overseeing the withdrawal of the 15,000-17,000 Indonesian troops from East Timor who
were making an extremely destructive exit, stopping the militias from committing atrocities,
disarming the militias, and restoring a condition of law and order sufficient enough to allow for
refugees to be able to return to the territory.229
On October 25, 1999 the Security Council passed resolution S/RES/1272 (1999) which
effectively established the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)
and is still presently in theatre. As a transitional authority, the UNTAET mission is a
multidimensional operation designed to rebuild the society and administer it until such a time
that East Timor is able to independently administer itself.23o Given the condition of East Timor
where virtually no structures of any kind functioned, as previously outlined, this operation was
provided with the greatest mandate·since the UNTAC mission in Cambodia in the early 1990s.231
228 Downer, 4.
229 Mack, 23-24.
230 Specifically, the UNTAET mandate identifies 6 elements: "to provide security and maintain law and
order throughout the territory of East Timor; to establish an effective administration; to assist in the
development of civil and social services; to ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian
assistance, rehabilitation and development assistance; to support capacity-building for self-government; and
to assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable development." See United Nations, Department
of Peacekeeping Operations, East Timor- UNTAET Mandate available online at [www.un.org/
peace/etimor/UntaetM.htm].
231 The destruction and degree of state collapse was so extensive that when the UN did move in to begin
administering the territory they had to bring their own chairs and desks in order to work. See John McBeth,
'Whose Future is it Anyway?' Far Eastern Economic Review (November 9,2000), p.?l.
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UNATET began its work to build East Timor while INTERFET was still in theatre.
UNATET included a peacekeeping component in its integrated design, but the transfer of
military authority to UNATET from INTERFET did not occur until February 1,2000. The
authorized 8,950 troop strength for UNATET was slightly smaller than the peak number of
troops deployed under INTERFET but included an additional 200 military observers and 1,640
Civilian Police (CivPol) officers. Together these three components are charged with ensuring
the maintenance of security and stability within the territory.
The military elements have been facing virtually the same problems that their
counterparts in INTERET had; although the situation has greatly improved since the initial
outbreak of the post-election violence in terms of stabilizing the territory. This does not mean,
however, that the security quandary has dissipated. There are continuing problems with the
militias, which are believed to be supported by the Indonesian military232. There has been an
increase in the capabilities of the militias since the outbreak of the violence last fall. 233 At that
time "they were armed with pipe guns and machetes. Now they carry automatic rifles and hand
grenades.,,234 Presently, the most significant problem with the militias is the attacks being waged
upon the refugee camps and the blocking of routes that would provide for refugee repatriation
from West Timor. The killing of three UNHCR staff members on September 6, 2000, who were
working at an agency office during the day with 10 Indonesian police officers present, represents
the boldness and savageness of the militias which the intein·ational peacekeepers are trying to
counter.
232 Dan Murphy and John McBeth, 'Days of Reckoning' Far Eastern Economic Review (October 7, 2000),
p. ]8.
233 Refer to: BertiI Lintner, 'The Fight in East Timor' Far Eastern Economic Review (September 21, 2000).
234 Quoted in Bertil Lintner, 'The Fight in East Timor' Far Eastern Economic Review (September 2],
2000), p. 20.
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In light of the persistent militia activity and the continuing threat that they pose to the
security of East~Timor, the international community has called for Indonesia to step up its
activities for disarming and disbanding the militias and to prevent/cease the border incursions as
well as ensure the security for the refugee camps.235 In response, Indonesia instituted an amnesty
period for the voluntary surrender of weapons (in which Indonesia claimed that a large number
of weapons were relinquished) followed up by proactive operations to confiscate remaining
weapons.236 Following the first stage of the disarmament program (the voluntary surrender)
Indonesia stated that 1158 weapons of various types along with 29,000 rounds of ammunition
were handed over to the Indonesian authorities.237
Although there appears to be some effort being undertaken by the Indonesian authorities
in order to help remedy small arms proliferation within the militias, a problem arises as there is a
discrepancy between Indonesia and the Western forces in terms of the number of weapons that
are held by the militias.238 This discordance makes it difficult for Indonesia to be completely
trusted to fully disarm and disband the existing militias. The UN peacekeepers are therefore
needed to protect the border and provide security for the refugees until such a time that the
militias no longer pose a security threat. This may be required for an extended period of time as
it is believed that it is "[t]he aim of the militias .... to wait out the UN".239
Although there may be UN troops stationed in East Timor for an extended period of time
in order to assist with protecting the territorial integrity of East Timor, there is also a need for
235 Security Council Resolution 1319(2000) section 1.
236 United Nations Security Council Press Release SC/6928, 29 September, 2000.
237 Statement by Makarim Wibisono of Indonesia in Press Release SC/6928 provides greater detail of the
types of weapons surrendered as well as a summary breakdown of the numbers of each type. For example
there were 888 home-assembled weapons, 34 standard weapons, seventeen grenades, four units ofM-16s
and 215 unspecified weapons.
238 For example the Indonesian military claims that the militias hold between 100-200 military weapons
while the Western officials claim that the numbers are closer to 1000. Refer to John McBeth, 'Up in Arms'
Far Eastern Econolnic Review (October 19,2000), p. 22.
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East Timor to develop its own forces that will eventually be able to undertake this task in the
future. The initial desire by the East Timorese was to have Falintil restructure itself and
effectively comprise the new security force. Indeed Falintil has been assisting the international
forces with border patrols, due to their expert knowledge of the terrain. On January 29, 2001 the
National Council of East Timor adopted the draft regulation for the establishment of the East
Timor Defence Force on 1 February. Training of the new Defence Force was to begin with 600
former Falintil force members.24o Although training is now underway for the establishment of
the East Timor Defence Force it is believed that it will take until 2003 to have the force up to full
strength and able to act without a UN peacekeeping presence.241 Thus UN peacekeepers are
expected to stay and function in some capacity within East Timor for another two years in order
to help ensure the security of the country.
The civilian police component has assumed the responsibilities for restoring and
maintaining law and order through upholding the rule of law within the society as well as
recruiting and training individuals for the East Timor police force which is being established.242
The conditions in East Timor (high unemployment and rapid increases in unplanned urbanization
and cost of living) have facilitated an environment which has led to an increase in low-level
crime concerning persons and property.243 For example, reported assaults rose 57 per cent and
reported thefts rose 56 per cent in the period from January to June 2000.244 Due to the fact that
once the Indonesian forces withdrew from the territory no domestic policing system existed, the
239 Lintner, 20.
240 United Nations, UN Newservice, 'East Timor Establishes Territory's First Defence Force: UN Mission'
January 30, 2001, [available online at www.un.org/news].
24] United Nations, Press Release SC6961, 28 November 2000, p.1
242 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in East Timor 4 October, 1999,
available online at [www.un.org/peace/etimor/sgl024.htm].
243 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration in
East Timor (for the period 27 January - 26 July 2000), S/2000/738, 26 July 2000, p. 6.
244 Ibid., 6.
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full executive powers granted to UNATET have necessarily been extended to the CivPol units
providing for the CivPol mission to be armed.245
In addition to providing law and order, CivPol is responsible for the establishment of the
East Timor Police Services (ETPS) which is intended to become the independently functioning
police force for East Timor. Although a police force did exist in East Timor prior to UNATET
intervening, the ETPS is for all intents and purposes being rebuilt from the bottom up. Only fifty
former East Timorese police officers were selected to continue policing in their districts after
partaking in a three day refresher course, and thirty-one were selected to assist CivPol in patrols,
but were not granted normal police powers, such as the power to arrest.246 This formula whereby
a limited number of East Timorese participate in policing duties but are still under the full
control of CivPol, provides for maintaining complete control over law and order in the interim as
well as providing an East Timorese presence while conducting policing duties, making the
population more comfortable with the operation.247 However, it should be noted that there is
resentment among some of the East Timorese who were previously full police officers as they
are now being stripped of their authority and expected to be assistants to CivPol officers, some of
whom are from very underdeveloped countries themselves. 248
The ETPS has established a rigorous training program designed to produce police officers
who will be capable of implementing the rule of law in a manner which is consistent to
245 Art Crosby, 'Policing Timor Lorosa'e' Peacekeeping and International Relations 29 no.. 3-4 (May-
August 2000), p. 1.
246 Ibid., 4. This group designed to assist the CivPol authorities is known as the Police Assistance Group
(PAG). All members of this group who wish to become a police officer in the new ETPS will have to
apply to and attend the CivPol police college just the same as anyone else who would apply to become a
police officer.
247 Ibid., 4.
248 Traub, 85. Traub quotes from an interview he had with Ramos-Horta (a Nobel Prize winner) where
Ramos-Horta states that having senior police officers serve as assistants to CivPol is "stupid and insulting".
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internationally accepted norms concerning police conduct and activity.249 The length of the
CivPol mandate' is presently estimated at three years in order to accommodate a training period
that should yield a 3,000 strong and fully trained ETPS force. 25o
Working in conjunction with the CivPol undertaking policing duties and the
establishment of a new East Timor police force, the legal and judicial system is beginning to be
rebuilt so that the administration of justice can be pursued. Consistent with the fact that the
education level in East Timor is quite low, for a capable judicial system to be established there is
a requirement for training to be provided for all positions, including judges, lawyers, clerks and
prison officers.25t On January 5, 2000, the Transitional Judicial Service Commission was
established and subsequently selected 1°judges and prosecutors to comprise the initial corps of
the judicial system.252 There have been continued appointments since this first selection in order
to try to deal with the massive backlog in cases. In the S/2000/738 report (dated 26 July 2000),
there was an identification of six hundred cases that were still pending, clearly outlining the
problem of the courts experiencing immense backlog.253
The establishment of the judicial system is well underway, however, it will no doubt be
an extended period of time until the system will be at full strength and be able to act
independently. At present there is continued and extensive on-the-job training as well as
mentoring programs to assist the justices and lawyers whom have been appointed. 254 The
249 For more specific details about the training process refer to: Crosby, 25.
250 Ibid., 25.
251 United Nations, Report ofthe Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration in
East Timor (for the Period 27 July to 16 January 2001), S/2001/42, 16 January 2001, p. 4.
252 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration in
East Timor, S/2000/53, 26 January 2000, p. 10.
253 United Nations, Report ofthe Secretary-General, S/2001/738, 26 July 2000, p. 6.
254 Ibid., ·6.
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international community is also directly engaged in the judicial process as international judges
have been appointed to adjudicate in cases that are more serious in nature.255
While the security, and law enforcement forces are working to ensure the stability of East
Timor, the civilian administration component of UNTAET is working to rebuild or establish the
administrative structures in order that East Timor will be able to function peacefully and
independently. Holding executive power over the territory until such time that it is deemed that
East Timor can govern itself, UNTAET holds the final authority over all affairs concerning the
governing of the territory.256 Specifically, the administrative arm of UNTAET is focusing upon
reestablishing and providing such services as courts, a governing council, facilitating the
distribution of humanitarian aid, rebuilding infrastructure, repatriating refugees, developing the
economy and financial institutions, rebuilding the educational system and facilities, and prepared
for the August 30, 2001 general election.257
UNTAET's mandate allows for the deployment of up to 1,640 administrative officers to
administer the territory until the transition takes place. In combination with undertaking the
administration of the territory, UNTAET civil administration is also attempting to hire and train
East Timorese in various occupations as well as convince the professional class to return from
the various countries where they and their families fled to escape the violence.258 This process of
integrating East Timorese into the administration framework, however: is very slow due to the
low education level of the majority of the East Timor population. There are simply not enough
people able to takeover the middle and upper-level positions from the UNTAET
255 Ibid., 6.
256 It should be noted that the research for this thesis was comepleted prior to the May 2002 presidential
elections, and as such, the executive power yeilded by UNTAET at the time of writing will possibly be
challenged by the new elected authority as there will likely become a shift in power in order to initiate the
transfer of authority to the state itself to provide for eventual full autonomy.
257 The Report of the Secretary-General S/2000/738 outlines the administrative areas which UNTAET is
managing.
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administration.259 The result is a low level of domestic employment and a resulting resentment
by the local population that the UN is acting as somewhat of a colonial power by 'dictating' what
changes need to be made and how they will be implemented.26o The UN is thus caught in a bind
in terms of developing a country that will hopefully be self-sustaining and peaceful.
The UN needs to implement certain reforms or build structures in a particular way in
order that East Timor will be able to participate in the global system as well as peacefully sustain
itself, however, "if the East Timorese don't participate, then they won't own the future.,,261 This
is not to say that the international community will be one hundred per cent right in determining
how a stable and prosperous country should be built, however, there are basic criteria that are
recognized that need to be integrated into the state structures in order help ensure that sustainable
peace and prosperity ensue.262 There is of course always the need to develop the structures in
concordance to some of the traditions, rules and customs of the local population or else the local
population will not respect the new system nor will they have a vested interest in maintaining it.
UNTAET has developed a working relationship with some of the established groups in
East Timor as well as established various organizations within the society in order to better align
the reforms with the particular dynamics of the population and territory, which would increase
the legitimacy of the reforms. The National Council of East Timorese Resistance (CNRT),
which is the political wing of the pro-independence movement headed by former Fretilin leader
Xanana Gusmao, is the main group with whom UNTAET is working with. Gusmao, the leader,
is understood to be a very charismatic man whom enjoys the support of the East Timorese
258 Traub, 83-84.
259 Ibid., 84. Also see John McBeth, 'Ghosts in Paradise' Far Eastern Economic Review (August 31,
2000), p. 19.
260 John McBeth, 'Whose Future' p. 68.
261 Quoted in McBeth, 'Whose Future', 68.
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people. It has been said that he is " ... a phenomenal and charismatic leader..... He is to East
Timor what Maiidela is to South Africa.,,263 His politics to this point have been moderate and he
has demonstrated that he is willing to work with the international community to build a peaceful
and strong independent state. Although the CNRT has expressed some concerns that the UN has
not included the East Timorese people enough in the design and initial implementation the new
administration, it realizes that UNTAET is perhaps doing the best it can given the situation. 264
UNTAET took the initiative of establishing the National Consultative Council, which
provided for a form of co-governance between UNTAET and the East Timorese people. Within
this Council there are various portfolios held by either the UN or an East Timor member. With
the exception of the foreign affairs, justice, finance and defence portfolios, all cabinet positions
can be held by an East Timor member. It should be noted, however, that due to the executive
powers of UNTAET, in theory UNTAET still holds power over all cabinet positions. Jarat
Chopra is quite critical of this as he believes that democracy is not being fostered due to the fact
that there is no executive power-sharing.265 The criticism may perhaps be warranted, however, it
must be remembered that as outlined above, there is a serious shortage of East Timor people who
possess the skills required to properly administer a nation.
Building a prosperous and sustainable economy in East Timor is one of the largest
challenges that is being faced as there little to build from and there exists little in terms of
resources, both natural and human. During the turmoil following the vote for independence,
Dili, the most progressive city in East Timor, was literally burned to the ground, destroying all
infrastructure that had previously existed. In terms of the human resource base, it is virtually
262 It is recognized that there needs to be respect for basic human rights, democracy should be instituted to
allow every person to have a voice, and an economic structure needs to be developed in order to reduce the
unemployment and/or poverty rate.
263 Graham Day, Unpublished Lecture, Lester B. Pearson Peacekeeping Training Centre, February 1,2001.
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nonexistent as both the middle and professional classes left either prior to the outbreak of the
violence or shortly thereafter. This has b-een the most crippling problem that East Timor faces. 266
Building a viable economy is a difficult process, especially when it is, for the most part, being
built from scratch. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has assessed the situation and has
made numerous statements concerning the establishment of the private sector. Not surprising,
the IMF has stated that "first and foremost, there must be a strong sense of internal security and
political stability" in order for private sector development,267 which is a requirement for the
reduction of both the unemployment and poverty rate that is still quite high in East Timor.268
This statement by the IMF places security and political governance as the essential
elements for the development of a strong economy. This placement helps to further construct the
hierarchical structure by positioning security and political governance 'below' economics and
thus providing more detail about how the overall structure will be formulated.
Regional involvement in investing in the economy of East Timor is also regarded as a
necessity in order for East Timor to avoid becoming one the "world's failed micro-states.,,269
The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is the regional organization that should
respond to the needs of East Timor. If East Timor does not receive the economic support of the
ASEAN nations, it will easily become isolated, possibly generating greater instability on the
island and creating a wider problem for the region as a whole.27o ASEAN is thus facing a test in
264 John McBeth, 'Whose Future', 70-71.
265 Jarat Chopra, 'The UN's Kingdom of East Timor' Survival 42 no. 3 (Autumn 2000), p. 33.
266 Day, Unpublished Lecture.
267 International Monetary Fund, 'Statement by Mr. Luis Valdivieso Senior Advisor, Asia & Pacific
Department of the IMF at the Donors Conference for East Timor Brussels' December 6, 2000 [available on
line at www.imf.org/external/np/dm/2000/120500.htm]. p. 2.
268 Ibid., p. 1.
269 Alan Dupont, 'ASEAN's Response to the East Timor Crisis' Australian Journal ofInternational Affairs
54 no. 2 (July 2000), available from Academic Search Elite, p. 6.
270 Ibid., 1.
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terms of its commitment and ability to provide assistance in its region in terms of implementing
policies and practices that support peace-building initiatives.
The role of civil society in East Timor has been minimal to date. One must keep in mind
that the society that existed prior to the outbreak of the conflict was not highly developed, as
well, it existed under a repressive regime that did not promote or sanction civil society
movements. Despite this, however, there has been slow movement towards the mobilization of
civil society in the area of the media. UNTAET, for example, has been assisting with re-
establishing an independent East Timor free press.2?1
There is a lot of work that needs to be done in terms of fostering a strong and effective
civil society in East Timor as the country does not contain the roots that provide for an active and
beneficial civil society. Thus a civil society movement must both be born and nurtured in an
environment that offers little precedent for how this is to happen and exist.
East Timor represents a case study that is still very much ongoing as there is much more
work that has to be done in terms of establishing a society and a nation that can function
independently and prosper. The international community has invested heavily in East Timor in
respect to protecting and administering it. Due to the fact that this case is quite recent, and thus
in the early stages of peace-building, the main focus has been on obtaining and maintaining the
territorial security of the region, establishing law and order via the rule of law, and generating a
system on which the political structure can be built. The other dynamics such as economic
reconstruction and active participation of civil society are not yet central issues. These dynamics
are not being passed over, but rather they are details that will be more directly addressed once the
basic elements (security, the rule of law, and political governance) are more firmly established.
271 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, S/2001/42, 16 January 2001, p. 8.
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The East Timor case has provided a very recent example of an international initiative to
both intervene in an intrastate conflict and subsequently undertake the institution of extensive
follow-up peace-building programs designed to establish a state that will be able to peacefully
administer itself. The peace-building process is still in the early stages and maintains a strong
focus on ensuring the territorial integrity and security of East Timor. There is no doubt that there
has been great efforts to rebuild the society and institute a form of governing structure that will
allow for the transition of authority from UNTAET to the East Timorese to occur as soon as
possible. The general election that took place on August 30, 2001 created the East Timor
Constituent Assembly headed by Fretilin. Although there are some reservations about Fretilin
holding a majority of seats in the Assembly due to the fact that Fretilin has rejected the idea of a
national unity government272, democracy appears to be taking hold. In the aftermath of this
election, the international community is now forced to demonstrate its commitment to the
establishment and fostering of sustainable peace through the continued investment in the peace-
building process. As mentioned in the initial section of this paper, there has been a tendency for
peace-building initiatives and investment to decline or cease once an election that has been
deemed to be free and fair has been instituted. The international community is thus soon going
to be faced with demonstrating its commitment to ensuring that East Timor will be able to
maintain a sustainable peace-building process.
Despite that East Timor is still in the early stages of peace-building, there is a definite
pattern that can be identified regarding how peace is being built in the country that appears to fall
in line with the hierarchical structure that was being developed in the case of the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The East Timor case has been able to provide valuable
272 The Economist, 'After the Vote, The Constitution' The Economist (September 15,2001), p.3?
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information that not only reinforces the idea, but also helps to build upon it by providing a better
understanding about where an element fits into the hierarchy. For example, this case has
demonstrated that security remains the underlying element for which to build all of the other
dynamics upon, as it has been the priority of the international community via the UN, and
initially INTERFET, to establish and maintain security in the territory. Also, the fact that certain
dynamics such as the economy and civil society have not become the main focus of the peace-
building process identifies the fact that there are indeed stages for the implementation of various
dynamics as there is a requirement for certain prerequisites to be attained before they can in fact
be implemented. This understanding will help to further the idea of the hierarchy, which will
create a structure for sustainable peace-building.
In order to institute a sustainable peace-building structure, there is a requirement for more
initiatives and programs to be instituted as the initiatives that are presently being developed take
hold within the society. In other words, as East Timor continues to build and strengthen its state
and society, there is a need to continue to build upon the existing structures in order to ensure the
continued strengthening of the state and society together. Coupled with this, there is a need to
ensure that the apparatus that has been built is maintained. The basic issue that follows from this
is where to concentrate efforts at this point in the peace-building process. Understanding
sustainable peace-building as the restoration and institution of human security will provide the
direction for the peace-building process to proceed in, while ensuring that the established
structures do not become disregarded in the process. As will be discussed in great detail in the
next section, the full institution of human security necessarily requires that many different needs
are met and upheld and that these needs are fulfilled in a particular progression pattern. With this
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in mind, human security will outline how the peace-building process should proceed in this case
in order for sustainable peace-building to be instituted and maintained in East Timor. -
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Chapter IV
Human Security and Peace-Building:
Towards a New Agenda
The cases of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and East Timor provide very
interesting information regarding the issues that are faced by fragile and failed states and the
subsequent peace-building strategies that have been employed in an attempt to build and
strengthen these states. Each of these cases provides a different look at peace-building strategies
and initiatives, as the cases are very much different in terms of the nature of the conflict and the
subsequent issues that they have been, and are presently facing. Coupled with these differences
is the fact that both of these cases are at different points in the peace-building process as the
FYROM has been undertaking peace-building initiatives since its declaration of independence
over ten years ago, while East Timor only began in 1999 following its vote for independence
from Indonesia. Despite these differences, however, they are both faced with a common issue:
building sustainable peace in order for conflict to be averted in the future. More specifically,
each case poses a problem in regards to the peace-building process that needs to be successfully
addressed so that sustainable peace-building can be achieved. In short, the FYROM raised the
issue that as the peace-building process progresses, there is a necessity to ensure that the
previous phases are not simply overlooked and support ceased. East Timor poses the problems
of how to ensure continued support for peace-building will be maintained following the August
30, 2001 general election, and how should the peace-building process proceed in the near and
continued future.
The answer to these issues and problems lies in using human security as the basis for
constructing a peace-building model. This being said, however, human security as it is defined
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in the literature at present does not provide enough information on how to do this. The human
security doctrine must therefore be conceptualized-and developed in a manner that will enable it
to be utilized as a peace-building structure. Essentially, the doctrine of human security needs to
evolve into a more defined understanding of its formulation and organization. This section
focuses on taking the existing understanding of human security and combining it with
information from the two case studies in order to develop this refined understanding of human
security which will ultimately provide for sustainable peace-building.
The cases to this point have not been understood in terms of how and where human
security has fit into the peace-building processes. Indeed the scope of the case studies was
designed to be fairly broad, while at the same time purposely focusing on issues that are
understood to be components of human security. _To summarize, those issue areas were as
follows: security, the rule of law, economics, political governance, and civil society. Not only
are these categories related to human security, but as it will be established, they are also the
fundamental building blocks of peace-building. Thus sustainable peace is built upon the
establishment or reestablishment of human security.
The Dynamics of Human Security
Human security, as briefly outlined in the introductory section of this work, is a new
perspective from which to analyze security. It is a doctrine that works on a micro level rather
than from a systemic standpoint as it is the individual that is the centre of analysis. The general
explanation that was provided indicated that there is a broad range of dynamics that human
security necessarily encompasses. Indeed the literature concerning human security lists and
outlines many factors that are involved with the security of a person, such as human rights,
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safety, the basic amenities for survival, freedom, environmental degradation, and infectious
disease. This, h~bwever, is a very disorganized way of attempting to understand human security,
as there are effectively no categories established under which to methodically study it. It is from
this lack of structure that the five categories were established in order that there can be some
greater sense of understanding to the doctrine, and that it can be effectively analyzed and
incorporated with other concepts (namely peace-building structures).
In its most basic understanding, human security incorporates anything that affects an
individual by causing him/her to feel insecure regarding his/her present condition. This
necessarily can range from issues concerning the ability to obtain enough fo-od and water to
survive to issues regarding a person's status in society. Organizing the components associated
with human security into general categories allows for a clearer understanding to be established
regarding the correlation between human security and peace-building. Five general categories
have been established for this purpose: security, the rule of law, political governance, economics,
and civil society. Each of these categories holds within it numerous individual elements that
pertain to human security, however, as broad categories it becomes easier to assess how they
relate to the human security doctrine and to peace-building. Prior to understanding the
correlation between human security and peace-building it is important to properly define the
parameters of these categories coupled with understanding how they relate to human security.
Essentially, there is a need to define these 5 dynamics and discuss their relationship to human
security.
Security is one of the more self-evident dynamics that is being presented here as it
addresses a basic, yet fundamental element of human security. The security category
encompasses a wide range of dynamics but mainly addresses the issue of protection from
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physical harm or the threat thereof. How this is interpreted in the context of post-conflict or
failed and fragile states and the peace-building process is that·it refers to the dynamics that are
associated with protecting the population and providing an overarching zone of security in which
the population can feel safe and function within. One of the primary ways in which this can be
understood is the defence or protection of a geographic area (state boundaries) in order that the
people residing within that area are safeguarded against large-scale violent attacks or threats of
assault from forces external to, and in some cases internal of, territorial borders. In the case of
East Timor for example, security in this context is referring to the intervention of the INTERFET
forces to end the war and fighting, the protection of the population from attacks by the pro-
integration militias, and the protection of the border from invasion by those same militias. In the
FYROM, it is understood as the guarding of borders to reduce or cease the influx of both mass
amounts of unwanted persons and weapons, as well as from either encroachment or attack from
surrounding states (namely Serbia in the initial period following the breakup of the ex-
Yugoslavia). The recent events also illustrate that security also refers to opposing internal
factions whom desire to use violence and challenge the state as their means to bring their issues
of contention to the forefront of attention
Following from this, there is necessarily a connection between security and the
cantonment and ultimately disarmament and demobilization of the contending forces within a
state. Indeed, the forces which had previously attacked or threatened the various populations
within a state need to be neutralized in order for a zone of security to exist. The efforts to have
weapons held by the pro-integration forces in East Timor surrendered followed by a proactive
confiscation program to further disarm the forces was instituted in order to assist with securing
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the state against armed aggression continuing from both within and from outside the border.273
As well, in the FYROM there was a continuing effort to prevent arms from flowing over the
FYROM border from Albania in order to help ensure that armed factions did not present
themselves in that country which would be able to effectively challenge the State security forces.
Although there was no technical disarmament program in place in the FYROM, there was a
preventive program instituted that was designed to help ensure that armed factions did not
develop and create a security problem for the State.274
Security is one of the most fundamental dynamics of human security as it addresses one
of the most basic emotions of people, fear. People who live in a constant state of fear, resulting
from no overarching and functioning security structure that can provide a good measure of
assurance that the area will not come under siege via external invasion or internal factions, such
as rebel groups or militants, do not possess human security. In a word, human security does not,
and cannot exist where there is effectively a security void.
There is a more refined element of the security dynamic that is very relevant to the
human security doctrine and is greatly associated with situations of intrastate conflict. The
ability to acquire a sufficient amount of food, water and shelter in order to survive is at the heart
of the human security doctrine as these are the basic staples required for survival and thus human
security. In intrastate war, there is commonly a difficulty in acquiring these basic necessities as
regular supply routes are commonly cut off or restricted due to either infrastructure damage or
the presence of various factions that either through continued fighting or simply not permitting
supplies to pass or people to be repatriated to their homes. For example, it is not uncommon for
paramilitary or militia groups to effectively wield control over particular regions or areas and not
273 Refer back to page 95.
274 Refer back to page 83.
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allow food convoys to enter into, or pass through their zones in order to reach the populations in
need, or while there is an attempt to repatriate displaced persons, refugees and evacuees (DPREs)
the militia groups effectively hinder the process by attacking the returnees. In East Timor the
pro-integration groups were shooting at the refugees who were trying to return East Timor from
refugee camps in West Timor (still under the control of Indonesia), thus hindering the
• . 275
repatrIatIon process.
Reestablishing overall security within a state provides for the ability for individuals to be
able to receive the basic necessities that are being provided by, or facilitated through various
organizations acting in theatre in order to assist those in need. If people are not able to attain the
basic necessities required for survival then human security in one of its most basic forms is non-
existent. Ensuring that safe passage is available for both supply convoys and returning DPREs
by securing the state (or affected regions) is necessarily a vital element of human security.
Security in the terms in which it has been defined here addresses the most primary
components of the human security doctrine. Establishing and maintaining security within a state
allows for individuals to live without a constant feeling of fear that essentially would otherwise
dominate their lives. Coupled with this, security allows for the facilitation of the delivery of the
basic necessities for human existence such as food, water, shelter and medical aid. Security thus
provides for the basic factors associated with human security.
The rule of law is the second category that was analyzed in the case studies. The rule of
law refers to both the policing activities which includes crime deterrence and law enforcement
coupled with an investigative apparatus for crime solving, as well as the institution of a system
that is able to properly provide for the execution of justice via the institution and enforcement of
275 Refer back to page 94.
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societal laws (particularly criminallaws).276 The concept of the rule of law is similar to that of
security in that it deals with the safety and protection of people, however, rule of law -is much
more specific in terms of what issues it addresses and how those issues are addressed. Indeed,
there is necessarily an overlap between the security realm and that of the rule of law as they both
have a desired goal of ensuring that individuals within a society are protected from becoming
victims, however, the rule of law encompasses different mechanisms for providing protection to
society.
The institution of the rule of law is a much more personal form of operation as it is an
activity that necessarily has a direct link to the community and the people. David Last discusses
the connection between peace-building and the building of relationships within the torn society.
He points directly to the fact that effective policing is heavily dependent on the links and ties that
the law enforcement officials have to the community.277 It is for this reason, he states, that
international civilian police are generally employed to assist, monitor and train, rather than
undertake independent policing duties as the international police have no connection with the
communities. In the FYROM this in fact was the case as the UN CivPol merely acted to support
and monitor the existing police force. 278 In East Timor, however, the situation was much
different as the CivPol held full executive authority and undertook independent policing
activities. It should be noted, however, that a great effort was made to bring as many qualified
276 United Nations, Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis, An Inventory of
Post-Conflict Peace-Building Activities (New York: United Nations, 1996), p. 49 classifies law and order
under the title of 'crime prevention and the administration of justice' and outlines the policing and
administration of justice roles which can be summarized in the manner put forth in the description provided
in the text.
277 David Last, 'Organizing for Effective Peacebuilding' International Peacekeeping 7 no. 1 (Spring 2000),
89.
278 Refer back to page 80.
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East Timorese onto the police force as soon as it was possible in order that the population would
feel more comfortable.279
The judicial system, is also a vital component of the rule of law as it provides the
structure within which justice can be served in fair and impartial setting. Without a functioning
judicial system, the policing forces essentially become ineffective as there is no structure that
would be able to prosecute offenders and ensure that innocent persons are not held under
arbitrary arrest without a means of providing a fair defence. Indeed, it is the judicial system that
is responsible for applying the laws that have been adopted (either through written or common
law practices) by the state and society that the police forces are charged with enforcing. Coupled
with this, the judicial system provides a mechanism for which disputes can be arbitrated without
individuals resorting to violence to settle a matter.
Human security holds a direct relationship with the rule of law due to the connection
between the rule of law and human rights. The proper implementation and administration of the
rule of law provides for individuals to have their basic human rights respected via the fact that
laws are designed to protect members of society from each other as well as from the state. With
the institution of the rule of law individuals retain a degree of protection that provides them the
ability to function within the society with the assurance that their basic human rights will not be
violated, and if they are, those responsible for the violation will be held accountable. Human
rights are one of the fundamental dynamics of human security as basic human rights are what
comprise security for an individual. If a person is being denied his/her basic human rights that
person's human security necessarily becomes jeopardized.
279 Some local police officers were maintained on staff to work with the IPTF, and the police training
program is designed to produce a qualified domestic police force in East Timor as fast as possible. Refer
back to pages 97-98.
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Political governance is commonly regarded as one of main defining factors of a country
as it defines the-ideology by which a country is administered. The form of political role that a .
country assumes holds a direct barring on how individuals within that country are regarded in
respect to the state. More specifically, political governance also includes the management of
political affairs by the elite and leaders and in whose interest they rule. This connects with the
ideas presented in the Introduction regarding leadership as a factor that can be responsible for the
outbreak of civil war.
Due to the power that governing structures hold in a state, they necessarily have the
ability to make decisions and conduct themselves in a manner that will have great repercussions
on the entire society. With this, it naturally follows that human security holds a link with
political governance. If a government abuses its citizens through fraud and corruption,
effectively stealing and governing in a self-serving manner, that abuse violates the human
security of its citizens by undermining their trust as well as creating great uncertainty with in the
state. Just the same, if a government rules in a biased manner that favours one group to the
detriment of another, rather than in a manner which seeks to consider all and benefit the country
as a whole, then resentment and prejudice will begin to prevail in the society which creates
instability. The groups that are being treated unequal cannot feel secure in this environment as
they will not be sure how they will be violated next, while the rest of the society is at risk of a
revolt by the victimized.
The FYROM provided an example of political governance that has been making efforts
to act in the best interest of the country rather than govern directly in favour of the majority
ethnic Macedonian population.28o There is no doubt that there are a number of issues that are
still needing to be resolved, however, the political leadership has acted as a stabilizing force even
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in the wake of the outbreak of the clashes between the Albanian rebels and the Macedonian state
forces. It is obvious that there is a prevailing trust in the governing authorities as theiT calls for
the rebels to surrender their arms and raise their contentions through political channels has
managed to assist with keeping the situation from exploding.281
Good governance, where democracy provides for the government to be accountable to
the people in order to safeguard against arbitrary rule, coupled with a leadership that governs
with the best interest of the state as its overarching objective helps to ensure that individuals are
secure through the establishment of stability. All states experience friction and conflict between
various factions within society, however, a state that maintains good governance provides the
structures for issues to be addressed in a peaceful and diplomatic manner rather than through the
expression of violence.
Economics plays an important role in the human security doctrine due to the connection
between a states' economic conditions and its poverty leve1.282 Poverty is necessarily regarded
as a threat to human security as people who exist in a state of poverty, or with severely low
income, do not maintain any form of security in terms of assurance that they will be able to
afford to purchase even the basic necessities of life such as food and shelter. In East Timor, the
poor state of the economy threatens people's well-being as the standard of living is quite low as a
result of the depressed economic conditions.283 The people in East Timor are, in many cases,
unable to provide for themselves adequate amounts of food, let alone generate enough income to
provide a basic level of education for themselves or their children. The poor state of economic
affairs explains the inability of the government to provide social services to the majority of the
280 Refer back to pages 70-72 for a review of the moderate leadership in the FYROM.
281 Refer back to page 66.
282 Refer to: United Nations Development Program, 'Redefining Security: The Human Dimension' Current
History 94 (May 1994) 230-231.
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population due to the lack of revenue that the government is able to generate via economic
means.
Economics does not only address the issue of poverty as a threat to human security, but it
also addresses a higher ideal of human security as the economy begins to develop and
individuals expectations of a raised standard of living increases. Essentially, as people become
accustomed to a particular standard of living and an increasingly advanced and prosperous
economy, expectations rise accordingly, providing for a need to at least maintain that prosperity
or else people will become threatened of losing the standard of living to which they have become
accustomed. This, however, does not mean that if one is not wealthy their human security will
still be threatened, but rather it identifies that people regard their standard of living as a form of
security and thus if their standard of living is to decline substantially then insecurity will
reemerge.
Human security focuses on basic dignity. Economics plays a large role in fostering
human dignity as it dictates the ability for a person to live in a manner that provides for adequate
food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and education for themselves and their family through
personal income as well as state-sponsored social programs.
The final category of human security encompasses the realm of civil society. Civil
society is the organization of individuals within a society to discuss issues and present their ideas .~
and critiques publicly in order to engage further discussion and debate as well as to take action in
their own governance. Historically, civil society has had variant understandings of its concept
and purpose, especially in relation to the state. Alison Van Rooy describes the 'evolution' of
civil society from the Roman era, through the Enlightenment, and to the present post-Cold War
283 The GDP of East Timor is lower than that of both Cambodia and Banladesh. Refer back to page 89.
119
period.284 Van Rooy notes that civil society in the Roman time was an extension of the state as it
was the civil paft (people) of the society that undertook the public and social-roles and upheld the
moral fabric of society, whereas the Enlightenment era provided a line between the state and
civil society as the role of civil society was to remove the state from being the domineering force
over people.285 The line between state and civil society has greatly increased in the post-Cold
War period as civil society is now constructed in a manner that contrasts the state. Van Rooy
quotes Gordon White as defining civil society now as "a certain power relationship between state
and society such that there are limitations on the state's capacity to pervade and control society,
and a certain power on the members of society to insulate themselves from, and exert influence
upon, the state".286 Civil society is, in effect, an expression of public participation in governance
and a means of providing for transparency and accountability of the governing authorities.
Civil society is not only just a counter to the state, but is also a forum for people to work
together and address issues of concern as well as provide solutions to problems that arise, mainly
those that effect people at the social level. From this perspective, civil society is understood to
be track 3 diplomacy where issues are brought down to the public level where solutions are
brokered through open dialogue. It is at this level that the involvement of non-state actors
becomes greatly involved in the human security equation as it the people themselves, with the
assistance of various local and international non-governmental organizations, that are acting to
broker solutions to problems and steer society in general towards an understanding and
acceptance of the changes required in both ideology and practice for peace to prevail. This is
very important as it demonstrates the limits of states in establishing human security, and
284 Alison Van Rooy, 'Civil Society and Democratization: Wishful Thinking?' Building Peace and
Democracy in Post-Conflict Societies Proceedings of a Workshop Held by the Centre for Foreign Policy
Studies Dalhousie University 27 March 1998, Ann L. Griffiths ed. (Halifax, Dalhousie University, 1998),
pp.16-18.
120
ultimately peace-building, as it is provides for a level where individuals and society are the
primary actors, not the state, either-domestic or external.
Again David Last's idea of building relationships as a significant component peace-
building comes into play with the discussion of civil society as civil society is really based
around the development of relationships.287 In the FYROM the role of organizations such as the
Search for Common Ground has been to increase the interaction between the various ethnic
groups through the sponsorship of roundtable discussions and conflict resolution workshops.288
The overall goal is to bring together the various communities to work out issues and find
common solutions to problems.
The role of civil society in the peace-building process is becoming recognized as vital for
sustainability of peace to occur.289 Indeed, Pierre Lizee has pointed to the fact that social
structures and conditions need to be adequately developed to allow for society to adapt to and
support reforms, such as the institution of democracy and a free market economy, that are seen as
necessary for the development of peace in order for the reforms to be effective and successful.290
Civil society plays a central role in the peace-building process as "sustainable peace cannot be
imposed from the outside. It must be cultivated from within - from the community to the state
level, and from the state level to the community.,,291 This statement outlines the bottom-up
dynamic that civil society brings to the peace-building process. Interestingly enough, this
285 Ibid., 16-17.
286 Ibid., 22.
287 Last, p. 80.
288 Refer back to pages 73-74 for a review of these organizations and their programs.
289 David Chandler, 'Democratization in Bosnia: The Limits of Civil Society Building Strategies'
Democratization 5 no. 4 (Winter 1998), p. 79.
290 Refer back to pages 13-14.
291 Sandra J. MacLean, 'Contributions from Civil Society to Building Peace and Democracy' Building
Peace and Democracy in Post-Conflict Societies Proceedings of a Workshop Held by the Centre for
Foreign Policy Studies Dalhousie University 27 March 1998, Ann L. Griffiths ed. (Halifax, Dalhousie
University, 1998), p. 46.
121
statement also points out that the state is still an important element as well in building peace.
Mentioned above was the fact that civil society is now commonly understood to be a counter to
the state. It is true that civil society does act as a buffer between the social or private sphere and
the state,292 however, the state is vital to providing the space for civil society to function by way
of providing security, laws, and upholding democracy.293
In order for civil society to flourish, there is a requirement for an established system that
allows for such interaction and discussion to take place without fear of violence or intimidation
being inflicted upon participants by either extremists or governing authorities. This requires both
an open and free system, namely democracy, coupled with proper security infrastructure
established through effective implementation of the rule of law. As well, there must also be a
degree of acceptance on the part of governing officials to listen to what civil society is saying
and be willing to addresses the issues being brought forth. Essentially, there needs to be
recognition that civil society has a legitimate and valuable role to play in the governing apparatus
or else it will be ineffective.
Civil society is about establishing local spheres of influence. This influence can be used
as a counter or check against the established governing authorities as a means to create increased
accountability and to provide for greater influence over decisions, as well as to create local
solutions to problems and issues that have a great impact on a local population. For example,
Wallace Warfield provides an example from Liberia where the local population responded to
increasing crime due to the return of former guerrilla fighters into the urban area by creating a
Neighbourhood Watch program, which consequently did prove to decrease the crime rate.294
The organization of civil society can take many forms and be brokered in many ways depending
292 Chandler, p. 79.
293 Van Rooy, p. 25.
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on the various reasons and causes that are bringing people together to act. Civil society can
include diverse-associations and organizations such as environmental groups, charity-
organizations, grass roots political associations, youth groups, unions, or consumer protection
establishments.
In the attempt to rebuild or strengthen failed and fragile states, the peace-building process
looks to civil society to mend the tears in the social fabric that have either resulted from, or been
exasperated by, an internal conflict whereby ethnic groups were combating with each other. The
idea is to either establish or rebuild relationships through common interaction and create a venue
where conflicts can be worked out in a peaceful and diplomatic fashion. In many cases, the goal
is to breakdown or remove the 'we-they' identities that have been formed between groups.295
Basically the idea is that even if a government tells the society that all groups are equal, and even
if the rule of law is established to enforce this idea, people must still themselves come to the
resolve that barriers do not, and should not exist between each group. An effort must therefore
be made to work with civil society to create the necessary changes in attitudes in order for
tensions to be reduced, and respect and harmony to prosper between the groups or else peace will
not be sustainable.
The ability to express oneself and participate in community and governing structures,
which the role of civil society provides·for, builds on the idea of dignity as being a constituent
part of human security.296 Having control over one's own life through the ability to become
involved in various capacities at the civil society level in order to have influence over decisions
and build relationships to address issues that one believes to be of importance provides people
294 Wallace Warfield, 'Moving From Civil War to Civil Society' Peace Review 9 no. 2 (June 1997), p. 250.
295 Warfield, p. 250.
296 Caroline Thomas, 'Global Governance, Development and Human Security: Exploring the Links' Third
World Quarterly 22 no. 2 (April 2001), 163.
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with the feeling of self-respect as they believe that they maintain a degree of power and
importance witliin their society. From this, people derive a sense of self-security as they
believe that they have control over both themselves and how they are governed, rather than not
having a means of both monitoring and influencing governing structures.
Human security is also increased through the reduction or removal of the animosity that
commonly exists between ethnic groups in cases of civil conflict. Animosity creates insecurity
by perpetuating distrust and thus concern and fear about how each group will treat the other.
Working together to find common ground and breakdown hatreds provides for an environment
where people become more comfortable and trusting, and eventually more secure.
A Model for Sustainable Peace-building
On the surface, the analysis of these five categories of human security reiterate that
human security is a multi-faceted concept that addresses many dynamics about human needs and
desires. More importantly, however, the analysis distinguishes between the categories of human
security and it illustrates how human security exists in a hierarchy where there exists more
fundamental dynamics and more refined ones, however, stressing that all are imperative for
sustainable peace-building to transpire. Indeed, throughout the case studies of both the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and East Timor, the hierarchical structure began to emerge as
it became apparent that certain dynamics were required in order for other dynamics to be
implemented and operate properly. An interaction between the dynamics thus could be observed
in individual instances. All of those interactions can now be analyzed and brought together into
one structure that will ultimately create a comprehensive hierarchical structure that can be
universally applied.
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What emerges through this analysis is an understanding that human security does not
exist on a flat ptane where all of its dynamics are in line with one another, but rather human
security exists as a pyramid where the five dynamics that were outlined fit on individual levels.
Although the dynamics exist on their own level, they are by no means independent, as they each
rely on the other levels below them to support them and the levels above them to complete them.
This in essence provides a design very much like Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs in that as one
level is achieved, the next level becomes both capable of being addressed as well as desired to be
achieved.
Constructed in pyramid formation, human security looks as follows:
CIVIL
SOCIETY
ECONOMICS
POLITICAL GOVERNANCE
RULE OF LAW
SECURITY
Security is the base of the structure that serves to be the pillar which all of the other dynamics
need in order to operate. It was evident in both case studies that security was the primary
concern for establishing peace and for providing human security to the populations. In East
Timor, for example, the first action undertaken by the international community in response to the
crisis following the referendum was the deployment of INTERFET in order to stop the conflict
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and secure the territory_ Indeed, the UNTAET mission which took over from INTERFET
included -a strong military force to maintain the security of the territory_ If people do not have
this basic form of security then there is little ability for them to be able to focus upon the other
dynamics, as they are necessarily preoccupied with ensuring their survival. Coupled with this,
without basic security the other dynamics are not provided the space in which to properly
commence and function. For example, if people do not have a sense of basic security it will
become very difficult for them to have confidence in the installation of the rule of law to protect
them from others. Instead of trusting the system of the rule of law, they would feel more
-confidant to continue relying on themselves and their immediate community to provide
protection. Surrendering to, and abiding by the laws of a system becomes very difficult to do
when one's own security continues to be greatly threatened. When people feel their basic
security is threatened they will necessarily revert back into a survival state where their only focus
can only be upon themselves and immediate community, thus effectively pulling back and
waning their support for the other dynamics.
Security is the basic building block for the construction of human security and peace-
building. When security starts to breakdown or fail, the rest of the dynamics come into jeopardy
and the entire process can be brought to a halt. When the Albanian rebels rose up against the
Macedonian forces in the spring of 2001, creating a security crisis in the FYROM, tensions
mounted between the two ethnic groups, which put strains on the other institutions and dynamics
within the country.297 All efforts became focused upon ending the security crisis while trying to
stabilize the other dynamics, .mainly maintaining co-operative political governance. Recognizing
the great repercussions that the deteriorating security situation can have on the entire human
297 Refer back to page 66.
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security and peace-building process it can thus be understood that security becomes the base for
which all other dynamics of human security-and peace-building are constructed.
Once security has been established and is able to be maintained, provisions for the institution
of the rule of law can be implemented. The rule of law provides for a society that becomes
predictable in that people begin to act in accordance with established laws and those who do not
are in threat of being punished for disregarding or defying the laws. People also receive greater
protection on a broader range of issues ranging from theft of property to fraud to abuse from
elites and authorities. Of course the administration of the rule of law will never be perfect as
there are always transgressors, some of whom will be able to elude capture or penalization for
their crimes, however, providing that these occurrences are not rampant the system still functions
effectively.
With the increased stability in the society that law and order creates, security
necessarily benefits as trust increases and there becomes an alternative venue rather than
violence and harassment to address problems. Essentially, justice can be served in a recognized
and legitimate manner. In East Timor, with the presence of the CivPol force and the
commencement of the restoration of a judicial system for example, order began to establish itself
as people were able to seek protection from the authorities and thus not be forced to resort to
violence as the sole means to settling disputes and providing protection for oneself.
The next two levels of the pyramid are good governance and economics. The case
studies placed these two 'above' the rule of law and 'below' civil society as each were seen to
require the rule of law to function and were regarded as prerequisites for the development of civil
society. The rule of law sets the stage for good governance to ensue by first ensuring people will
be secure enough to vote their conscience with little fear of intimidation from factions supporting
127
particular parties or candidates. Democracy can therefore be pursued. Second, elected officials
can expect that fhey are safe to govern also without fear of intimidation by opposing extremist
factions. Third, with the establishment of the rule of law, the governing bodies and officials are
checked by the legal system to ensure that they are not abusing citizens or acting in a corrupt
manner. Economics requires the rule of law, as well as security, in order to attract investment as
it is difficult to attract businesses if there is little guarantee that their property/merchandise or
employees will be safe or protected.298 Indeed, the IMF report concerning East Timor
specifically stated that the establishment of internal security was necessary for investment to
occur.
299 The report also stated, however, that a stable political situatIon was also essential for
investment. Good governance was also noted in the FYROM case to be a factor in obtaining
investment and thus developing a strong economy as the FYROM has been experiencing
difficulty with attracting investment due to financial scandals in which government officials have
been implicated in.30o Businesses are loath to invest in a country that is either politically
unstable or corrupt, as their investments are in greater jeopardy due to an increased potential for
an uprising by the citizens protesting to governing authority, as well as not being able to be
confident that the government is not cheating them as well as its citizens. With a stable political
situation, investment opportunities are expanded which will help to develop a stronger economy.
From this information, it can be understood that good governance is placed 'below' economics in
the pyramid.
Although good governance is placed 'below' economics in the hierarchy, the
economy does have an effect on governing structures. For example, with a strengthened
298 See Erin A. Robinson, 'Hard Responses - Soft Power: Military Force, Failed States and Human
Security' Compendium ofPapers Presented at the 2nd Annual Graduate Student Seminar: The Role of
NGOs and Civil Society in Conflict and Humanitarian Efforts, Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy
Development, Ottawa Ontario, April 30 - May 5, 2000, pp. 64-65.
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economy, the government benefits by having a larger tax base from which to draw resources to
use in governing the state and provide more resources for the people. Conversely, political
structures suffer when the economy struggles as rifts begin to either form or become even larger
as was the case in the FYROM.301
The development of civil society rests at the top of the pyramid, as there is a need to have
all of the other four dynamics in place in order that civil society can begin to flourish. There is
no doubt that civil society will have begun organize itself prior to this point, however, a civil
society movement will not reach its full potential unless it is being supported from below by the
other four dynamics. The lack of organization of civil society in East Timor can be now be
understood as there are not as of yet the required structures in the society for such action to take
place to any great extent. By contrast, however, the fact that the FYROM does have more
established structures provides for ability of the numerous organizations that have begun to
operate within the country.
From an economic standpoint, there needs to be an economy that is prosperous enough to
allow people to focus on other issues other than just ensuring that they have enough money to
provide for their families, a civil society movement will not reach its full potential. The fostering
of civil society requires and investment in time and resources from the community, little of
which people whom are not economically secure will have to spare. There also needs to be a
proper governing structure in place that is willing to entertain the ideas presented to it from the
grass roots or else it will be very difficult for civil society to have an effect on and influence the
governing structures. Finally, people must feel that they are physically safe from attack or abuse
299 Refer back to page 102.
300 Refer back to page 68.
301 Refer back to page 68.
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from those whom may hold dissenting views, that there is a fair legal system in place which can
be utilized for tfieir protection, and in some cases, as a means to having their" issues addressed.
People can and will only come to invest their time and resources in various civil organizations
once they have a relatively strong sense of security in all of the previous four levels.
This new understanding of how human security is structured provides a configuration for
sustainable peace-building. In order for sustainable peace to transpire all five levels of human
security must be fulfilled, however, this obviously cannot occur all at once, as there is a need for
the pyramid to build itself in the logical format outlined or else it will not be able to sustain itself.
With the fulfillment of the five levels of the human security - peace-building pyramid, the three
elements that were identified and discussed in the introduction as the main contributors to failed
and fragile states due to intrastate conflict - leadership, intergroup discord and weak state
structures302 - are addressed and are subsequently 'repaired' and supported. For example, the
leadership element is addressed at the political governance level with the institution of
democracy. Intergroup discord is decreased through the establishment of security structures,
creating equality with the institution of the rule of law and increasing intergroup communication
within civil society. Finally, weak state structures are strengthened through the build up of
security and law and order structures, rebuilding the economy to provide money for development
and working with civil society to increase involvement in and support for the governing
structures. The human security - peace-building pyramid thus includes the necessary elements
required to remedy the three main elements that contribute to the creation of failed and fragile
states.
At this point the questions posed by the East Timor case study regarding how should the
peace-building process progress can be answered. Security is still being upheld by an
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international force while the rule of law is steadily progressing to allow for the system to
administer itsel~ and there has begun some movement towards the establishment of good
governance through the establishment of the National Consultative Council. Now with the
election of the East Timor Constituent Assembly, the focus must be to ensuring that governing
structures are reinforced and expanded. In order to do this, however, there must be constant
support for the maintenance of both security and the rule of law or else the political structures
will experience pressures that it will simply not be able to handle. One must keep in mind that
neither security nor the rule of law can be implemented or maintained domestically at this point,
which is one reason why East Timor is still under executive authority of the United Nations. The
international community must therefore ensure that these two elements are supported through the
continued deployment of military peacekeepers and civilian police.
Once good governance is established and functioning, the East Timorese will desire more
securities as their lower level human security requirements will be satisfied. The economy will
become the next focus where the East Timorese people will want to feel secure. International
investment for the development of infrastructure and funding of business and industry will be
required, however, intervention and support must still continue for ensuring that security, the rule
of law, and good governance are upheld or else the economy will not be able to succeed. Good
political governance at this point is an important key to focus upon as there is still some concern
regarding the views of the newly elected assembly,303 and as such, the international community
needs to continue to provide guidance and support for the maintenance of good governance.
Civil society will eventually be supported as people will want, and be able to, become more
greatly involved in the governance of themselves and finding ways to address issues and find
302 Refer back to pages 23-27.
303 Refer back to page 104.
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solutions to problems. It is at this point where sustainable peace-building will have been
implemented inEast Timor as all of the requirements for human security have been met.
Through the discussion of East Timor, the issue that was brought to light through the
FYROM case study, namely an understanding of how human security will provide for the
maintenance of all phases of peace-building, has effectively been answered. As repeatedly
stated, each stage or level of human security can only be maintained if the previous levels do not
deteriorate or collapse all together. Understanding that, requires that the larger picture be always
kept in view in order to ensure that human security is still being maintained at the various levels.
This mea-ns, that despite that there may be a main focus at one of the upper levels, such as a
concentration on improving economic growth, there will always be monitoring, and provisions
provided for support if and when required, to ensure that the foundation stays strongly in tack.
This is because there will be a fundamental understanding that the project which is the focal
point will inevitably collapse and fail if the supporting pillars below it are allowed to erode.
Ensuring that human security is being maintained thus provides for sustainable peace-building to
transpire.
Human security is no longer understood in a linear fashion as it has been demonstrated
that there are various levels of human security, which essentially construct a pyramid formation.
The human security pyramid illustrates how each level is dependent upon the level below in
order that that level can be addressed and implemented itself. This necessarily requires that all
levels of human security are continually being monitored, and when required, supported to
ensure that the integrity of the pyramid is maintained. The result of this understanding of human
security and its connection to the development of sustainable peace-building is that greater
direction is now provided for peace-building operations by being able to understand where the
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focus needs to proceed towards as the process progresses, coupled with emphasis being placed
on maintaining support for preceding levels of human- security, adding further calls f6r long-term
commitments by the international community for peace-building engagements.
The discussion regarding linking human security with peace-building goes beyond the
establishment of the human security pyramid that effectively outlines the way or order that
peace-building needs to be implemented. The discussion needs to include a broader
conceptualization about both theoretical aspects and practical implications of connecting the two
ideas to develop sustainable peace-building. This will provide the ability to understand where
the theories of peace-building and human security have now advanced due to their interaction
with one another, as well as gain a better idea of how the actual implementation of the new
concept of sustainable peace-building will transpire.
Mentioned in the first part of this paper is the fact that human security has not been fully
conceptualized nor articulated. In fact, it was stated that human security is still undergoing the
development process due to it being both so current and it undertaking an idea that diverges from
the traditional norm of security studies. As a result, there is much room for the fundamental
dynamics of the doctrine to be further developed and refined. The insertion of the human
security doctrine into the peace-building concept helps to establish a more concise yet greater
encompassing definition of the human security doctrine, which in turn actually helps to
understand the peace-building process even better. It was outlined that there are two prevailing
models of human security. To recapitulate, the Japanese model understands human security to
mean freedom from want, while the Canadian model provides for a doctrine built around the idea
of freedom from fear. 304 Upon first consideration, there appears to be two somewhat differing
304 Refer back to page 18.
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ideas about what the fundamental nature of what human security both involves and represents.
Indeed, there is adifference between the two ideas about what human security entails: however,
these differences converge when human security is understood in the pyramid formation. The
freedom from fear concept can be applied to the lower levels of the pyramid, namely the
security, and rule of law sections. In these two phases, the focus of peace-building is the control
and removal of fear in the society through the institution of competent security forces and
providing for law and order via the institution of the rule of law, thus removing fear from the
lives of individuals. The freedom from want idea can be understood to apply to the upper
echelons of the pyramid, economics and civil society. These two phases focus -on providing the
ability for individuals to fulfill their desires to obtain material goods as well as participate in the
governing of their society. With these two elements fulfilled, people will become relieved of
their wanting desires.
The middle section, or political level, has not been applied to either freedom from want
and freedom from fear. The reason for this is because this is the transition phase where the focus
on freedom from fear will change into a focus on freedom from want. The political level also
encompasses both ideas as a free and democratic society governed by leaders who are ruling in
the best interest of the country provide for a decrease in the fear factor by allowing individuals to
hold trust in their governing structure, as well as allows the society to have greater participation
in governing through the democratic process, thereby appeasing a desire to have some control
over the governance of one's own life. The following diagram provides an illustration of the
human security pyramid with the inclusion of the freedom from fear and freedom from want
indicators.
Freedom from
Fear
Freedom from
Want CIVIL
SOCIETY
ECONOMICS
POLITICAL GOVERNANCE
RULE OF LAW
SECURITY
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It is seen in the above diagram that the notions of human security as freedom from fear as well as
freedom from want can be understood as partners rather than opponents as they have been
portrayed in the literature thus far. Indeed, there is both a focus upon the violence and dignity
notions that lay behind the freedom from fear and freedom from want concepts, resulting in a
unified understanding of the human security concept and its relationship to peace-building.
The theory behind peace-building also undergoes an evolutionary process due to the insertion
of the human security doctrine into the existing peace-building ideology. Traditionally, peace-
building has been based upon the idea of stability. A successful peace-building campaign was
judged on the degree of stability that was brought to a nation that had effectively collapsed into
chaos due to political and military strife. To be more specific, stability was measured in terms of
successfully keeping the belligerents from engaging one another and re-igniting the physical
conflict through the installment of international peacekeepers and by the development of political
stability. Indeed, traditional peacekeeping operations were primarily about maintaining a
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physical separation between the warring factions, as was, and still is the case in Cyprus. The
idea of creating political stability as part of the peace-building was recognize-d in the Agenda for
Peace, as the Agenda clearly establishes a focus upon implementing a democratic political
system as the principal method for building peace in failed or fragile states. In the initial part of
this work, the Agenda for Peace was discussed in depth and it was highlighted that the major
premise behind the work was that democracy is the means to providing for a stable and peaceful
state.305 This idea has been challenged over the past few years as peace-building has undergone
intensive testing in many different countries throughout the world. Indeed, as pointed out earlier,
Lizee used the example of the peace process in Cambodia to counter the argument that peace-
building should principally be about the establishment of politically stability based upon
democratic governance, as he outlined the clear need to focus to also be on the development of
societal and economic structures in order for peace-building to be successful306.
With the inclusion of human security into the peace-building agenda, another dynamic is
entered into the equation as human security brings with it a very strong emphasis on the
institution of justice within the state and society. The fact that the doctrine works from the level
of the individual, as it focuses on understanding security from the perspective of a person,
necessarily makes justice a fundamental issue since it is justice that is at the core of providing
individuals with both the palpable and the sensed notions of being and feeling secure. The-
concept of justice incorporates more than simply the affiliation with the legal system that most
people automatically understand justice to be. The fundamental nature of justice is broader than
this one idea, as the basic tenet of justice is equality. This provides for justice to span into not
only the legal system, but into the social, economic and governing structures. Equality is one of
305 Refer back to pages 12-13.
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the major keys to providing security for individuals, as equality allows for people to hold the
ability to live and function in society with minimal or no fear of being persecuted or -
discriminated against based on gender, race, religious beliefs or socioeconomic status, as well as
allowing people the opportunity to participate in elements of society and thus maintain control
over their own lives.
In many ways, this idea of justice is referring to the idea of horizontal legitimacy that
Kalevi Holsti refers to in his discussion of the strength of states.30? Holsti understands horizontal
legitimacy to be an accepting relationship between the many groups (ethnic, religious, gender
and socioeconomic) within a society in that each group generally believes that all other groups
have a right to both exist and participate within the society.
The human security pyramid provides for the institution and maintenance of justice
throughout each of its levels. Security allows for the physical protection of those who may be at
increased risk of directed violence. The rule of law provides the means for everyone to be
regarded as equal in the eyes of the law thus being able to seek protection as well as have
disputes settled in a diplomatic and impartial theatre. Since the political level necessarily
includes the installation of a democratic governing structure and the fundamental nature of
democracy provides for each person to have an equal vote in choosing representatives, every
individual becomes equal under the governing structure. The establishment of an economy that
is strong enough to provide a level of income for almost all individuals308 to have at least a
minimal standard of living allows for greater socioeconomic equality in a society. Finally, the
role of an active and involved civil society provides the ability for every individual to become
306 Refer back to page 13.
307 Refer to chapter 5 in Holsti, pp. 82-98.
308 It is noted that in every state and society, except for perfectly implemented communist systems, there is
always at least a small portion of the population that does not maintain an acceptable income level. To
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involved in the social governing of the society, therefore making each person maintain social
equality. It should be noted that perfect equality will never fully exist in any of these-levels,
however, the level of equality that is provided for will be acceptable within the society.
Justice, it can be seen, has taken on a role that in many ways provides for the rights and
powers of individuals within a state. This is commonly seen as an opposing force to the
traditional peace-building idea of creating stability as the primary means to brokering a peaceful
state. The state-strength dilemma outlined by Holsti outlines the tension that can exist between
these two ideas.309 When a governing body tries to strengthen or stabilize a state that is, or has
become, weakened (this can be due to a state being underdeveloped or having fallen due to
internal or external conflict) it tends to act in a manner that requires the suppression of some
rights and the governance of the state and society in a more authoritarian manner. As the
governing structure increases stability, especially in the political sense, social stability declines
due to the lack of, or reduction in the level of justice within the state and society. This social
instability creates a backlash and the society becomes more out of control, eventually causing the
state to collapse under the pressure. In a word, as a state attempts to strengthen and stabilize
itself, its means of doing so inadvertently weaken and destabilize the state further.
Although there is great merit to Holsti's analysis, stability and justice do not have to be
understood as opposing forces in peace-building. In fact, both are needed and actually feed off
of one another in order to be properly and effectively established and sustained, however, the
pyramid configuration needs to be adhered to in order for it to work. Just as it was outlined that
each level in the pyramid needs to be fulfilled before the next phase can be focused on and
counteract this, many states have resorted to providing social assistance to people who are unable to earn
the amount of money required to provide for a minimum standard of living.
309 Refer to chapter 6 in Holsti, pp. 99-122.
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implemented, the stability-justice dynamic also requires that same implementation pattern to be
upheld.
Stability remains the initial goal as security is the primary focus. With a state and society
ripped apart by civil war, violence must be controlled and security for all individuals needs to be
provided. During this phase, there will necessarily be strict regulations governing the activities
of individuals in order that control can be established, however, this does not in any way mean
that individuals can become victim to state abuse or gross human rights violations. It must
always be kept in mind what the desired end state will look like in order to ensure that what is
being done in the initial stages does not greatly defy, or work against what is supposed to be
accomplished in the end. The best way to understand this is in the context of the case of the
FYROM, as it provides a case where peace-building is not starting from the bottom due to the
fact that there were existing and functioning structures at all levels, thus it would be hard to
imagine taking away peoples rights or greatly suppressing them, as it would work against what
already exists as well as desired end state. The pyramid thus acts as an essential layout to ensure
that the peace-building process does not occur in a counterproductive manner.
The institution of the rule of law allows for increased stability with the onset of an
established set of laws which are required to be obeyed by all and are to be enforced by
~ sanctioned authorities in order to protect people and their possessions. Predictability increases
with the institution of established rules and codes of conduct as society begins to act in
accordance with the instituted laws, and as such, stability results from the predictability.31o The
institution of a governing structure that is elected by the people also increases stability by
providing for a system that is supported by the people and thus acts in the best interest of the
310 The idea of the rule of law contributing to stability was discussed in-depth on pages 111-1 12 through the
discussion of the rule of law providing for security.
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people, as it needs to retain the support of the people in order for the governing powers to be re-
elected.
Once the state and society start to become stable, justice becomes incorporated into the
peace-building process. It should be noted that justice has already started to be implemented
through the creation of stability, and some of the institutions that are created also provide for
establishment of justice. Indeed, the discussion of justice in the context of each level provided in
the previous pages outlined how justice was achieved and advanced in the various phases. For
example, the rule of law naturally provides for justice as there is the creation of an institution for
all individuals to be subjected to established laws in an equal manner.
The institution of justice also acts to reinforce stability due to people being able to feel
increasingly secure in the society due to the establishment of institutions that treat all people
equally and ensure that they do not suffer abuse at the hands of the state, institutions and other
individuals in the society. When people are able to seek justice in their society, there becomes
an outlet and a means for people to have their concerns heard and addressed in a diplomatic
manner, which helps to remove the need or desire for individuals to resort to violence or illegal
activities to have their concerns addressed.
·Stability and justice do not work against each other in the peace-building process but
rather end up working together. ·Creating stability is still the primary action that needs to be
implemented, however, as the peace-building process advances, justice becomes built into the
equation in order for the society to remain stable in the long term. From this perspective, adding
justice to the peace-building equation does not create a new formulation of peace-building, but
rather provides a necessary contribution to what has already been developed and implemented in
past incidences
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This discussion of justice provided a lead into the issue of how institutions will be
transformed or developed in regards to their relationship with individuals in society as a result of
the introduction of human security in to the peace-building agenda. Human security puts the
individual first and provides for the individual to hold control over his/her life. When this
dynamic becomes incorporated into the peace-building process, the result is the establishment of
institutions that must cater to the fact that individuals are now regarded as the centre of gravity.
In many cases, institutions such as the justice system and governing structures, function in a
manner that allows the state to have a stronghold over its citizens, thereby having the state as the
focal point for institutions to base their structure and operations around. The relationship that
people would thus have with institutions would therefore be subordinate as the power structure in
the state and society does not provide for institutions to be accountable to the people.
Institutions that are developed under a peace-building model that incorporates human security,
experience a different power structure that requires them to be effectively governed by and cater
to providing security for the people. The most obvious institutions that undergo this change are
the governing political ones due to the institution of democracy. Since democracy provides for
the governing officials to be elected, thereby making them accountable to the people, the
governing institutions must function in a manner that caters to the needs and desires of the
citizens of the state.
The involvement of a strong civil society acts to compliment the democratic political
elements through the increased involvement of individuals in the governing of their society, thus
helping to ensure that these institutions act in a manner that is for the betterment of individuals,
rather than mainly for the betterment of the institutions themselves. Civil society also acts on a
grander scale to ensure that other institutions are kept reasonably disciplined in terms of being
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accountable to and focused upon the needs and desires of the individuals in the society. For
example, consumer groups curb business' and corporations' activities and product development
to reflect the wants and beliefs of the people. It should be noted that civil society cannot have
complete control over institutions as institutions do have other dynamics which they necessarily
have to consider, such as profit, efficiency and stability, however, civil society can and does
influence and affect many of their activities.
The rule of law also creates an institution that inverses the traditional relationship between
institutions and people due to the creation of equality before the law. Even though the
establishment of laws does necessarily result in people being dictated to by law enforcement and
judicial officers based on established laws, the fact that everyone is equal before the law means
that each person cannot justifiably have his/her established rights violated without a means of
recourse. This provides for each person to hold greater control over every institution in the
society as each person is on equal footing with institutions and the people who head them up,
which allows for people to resist being taken advantage of or having their rights violated by
institutions.
Vertical legitimacy is created through the ability of individuals to have institutions
accountable to and be influenced by the average person in society. Holsti provides the
understanding of vertical legitimacy to be the belief of the people that the state and its
institutions hold a legitimate authority over the society.311 Essentially it is an acceptance by the
people that the ruling powers, in all aspects of society, have the support of society to govern.
Vertical legitimacy will not exist when institutions do not act in accordance with needs and
wants of the society which they govern. The peace-building model based on human security
311 Refer to Holsti, pp. 91, 93 & 104-105.
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provides for institutions to be accountable to the people as well as influenced by them, thus
allowing for veiticallegitimacy to be created and sustainable.
This understanding of how vertical legitimacy is fulfilled through the institution of
human security raises an important comprehension about the role of non-state actors in the
peace-building process. In the introduction of this paper, it was stated that the institution of
sustainable peace-building requires more than simply the involvement of states and for initiatives
to be focused beyond just the state level. 312 Non-state actors needed to become involved in
building peace in order to ensure that peace was properly built and that it could be sustained.
This discussion of vertical legitimacy has clearly pointed out the state and its institutions do not
act alone in building peace and that it must at all times be accountable to the people. The
powerful role that individuals thus play in the human security and peace-building processes
demonstrates the involvement of non-state actors in the equation, providing for the
understanding that building sustainable peace incorporates both state and non-state actors.
Vertical and horizontal legitimacy is created through the establishment of human security
in the peace-building process. The establishment of justice along with the creation of institutions
that are accountable to and influenced by the people, provide for these two forms of legitimacy
to arise and endure. Holsti makes it clear that when these two forms of legitimacy are
established, stability and peace are the result.313 Legitimacy thus becomes a great factor in the
creation of a peaceful and stable state, and it is human security that provides for and creates such
legitimacy.
312 Refer back to pages 12-13.
313 This statement can be made based on Holsti' s claim that if either vertical or horizontal legitimacy
become low or absent, the state weakens, creating instability and quite possibly civil unrest and war. Refer
to Holsti, pp. 104-106.
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The final dynamic that will be examined in terms of how human security influences the
peace-building process is the involvement of both military and civilian actors in implementing
the peace-building process. Military peacekeepers have been the most common actors involved
in the peace-building process as the emphasis was on creating stability, as mentioned previously.
The preceding discussion has identified, however, that stability is no longer the sole objective in
the peace-building, as the creation of justice in the society is also required. With the various
levels that are involved in human security based peace-building, there necessarily becomes an
involvement of other actors into the equation. Civilian organizations enter into the process in
order to assist with the building of the various institutions as well as to act as monitors of the
progression of the peace-building process. In the FYROM for example, there were various
organizations such as Search for Common Ground and the Soros Society that worked with civil
society in order to build better relationships between the Macedonians and Albanians.314 The
United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) had many civilian
administrators working under its authority on a variety of issues from judicial administration to
education and training.315
Cooperation and coordination between civilian and military agencies becomes necessary
in order for peace-building to be successfully implemented and maintained, as they are both
required in order for all elements of the peace-building pyramid to be implemented. Despite the
fact that civil-military cooperation is vital, the relationship between the two entities is commonly
contentious. The issue of civil-military relations traditionally address the issues of state
governance, namely which agency controlled which elements as well as which agency was
314 Refer to pages 73-74.
315 Refer back to pages 99-100.
144
superior to the other.316 With the advent of peacekeeping and peace-building operations, a new
area was createcf that looked specifically at civil-military relations in thes-e situations and is
commonly referred to as civil-military cooperation (CIMIC). Again there have been many
articles published that discuss the relationship in the peacekeeping/peace-building context.317
The main focus of the discussion revolves around the fact that civilian and military organizations
have different aims, objectives and modes of operation in regards to their roles in the theatre of
peacekeeping and peace-building that often clash with one another.
The lack of cooperation and coordination between military and civilian agencies can be
easily understood from observing the interactions between the two at the Lester B. Pearson
Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre where the focus is to bring the civilian and
military peacekeeping actors together in order to gain a better understanding of each others' roles
and how to better coordinate activities in the field. 318 The Centre recognizes the partnership
required in order to make peacekeeping and peace-building effective, and works to strengthen
that partnership, however, the initial lack of cohesion between the two groups is quite
apparent. 319 It is quite common for the two groups to literally have a completely different
316 For a greater understanding of the issue of civil-military relations, refer to : Larry Diamond and Marc F.
Plattner (eds), Civil-Military Relatiosn and Democracy (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1996);
Douglas Bland, 'A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations' Armed Forces and Society 26 no. ] (Fall
1999), pp. 7-26.; Rebecca L. Schiff, 'Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance'
Armed Forces and Society 22 no. 1 (Fall 1995), 99. 7-24; Colin Powell, John Lehman William Odom,
Samuel Huntington & Richard H. Khon, 'An Exchange on Civil-Military Relations' The National Interest
36 (Summer 1994), pp. 23-31.
317 Refer to articles such as: Par Eriksson, 'Civil-Military Co-ordination in Peace Support Operations - An
Impossible Necessity?' Journal ofHumanitarian Assistance (16 September 2000) available online at
www.jha.ac/articles/a061.htm. pp 1-36; Lyle J. Goldstein, 'General John Shalikashvili and the Civil-
Military Relations of Peacekeeping' Armed Forces and Society 26 no. 3 (Spring 2000), pp 387-412; Trevor
Findlay, 'Military-Civilian Cooperation in Crisis Situations' in La Consolidation de la Paix: L'/ntervention
Internatioale et le Concepts des Casques Blancs Charles-Philippe David (ed) 89-128. (Montreal:
Harmattan, 1997); Michael C. Williams Civil-Military Relations and Peacekeeping Adelphi Paper #321
(New York: Oxford University Press for the IISS, 1998).
318 The mandate of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre can be found online at www.cdnpeacekeeping.ns.ca/
English!AboutIMission.htm.
319 I had the opportunity to intern at the Centre for 4 months where I was able to observe the interactions
between the groups in various courses as well as in a Nato/Partnership of Peace exercise that was
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understanding of essentially the same situation. These differing understandings provide for the
divergent and sometimes completely opposite approaches to the issues that arise. An-example
that can be provided from an exercise that took place at the Centre illustrates the disconnection
between the civilian and military agencies. A scenario was established whereby an NGO was
regularly distributing food to a group of internally displaced people at various transit camps. The
military peacekeepers discovered that a number of the displaced people were in fact individuals
who were identified as members of a militia group that were conducting assaults on civilians
belonging to the opposing ethnic group, as well as firing their weapons at the military
peacekeepers that were patrolling the area. The military, not wanting the militia to be
inadvertently supported by the food distribution program asked the NGO to stop issuing food
rations to the particular individuals that had been identified, however, the NGO would not, and
could not comply with the request as their neutrality would no longer exist.32o Both groups are
faced with the same issue, however, they each have different modes of operation that provide for
difficulties in effectively addressing a situation in a cooperative manner. In this scenario, the
military had to concede to the NGO's need to maintain its impartiality and therefore establish
another means of dealing with the militia group.
A second example from the same exercise provides a model for coordination between the
two agencies. The military decides that it ·would like to rebuild a church that had been destroyed
in a town that was in their sector, as it would provide the soldiers with a task and it would be
good for relations with the community. An NGO that is also working in the area has received
funding of its own to rebuild a church that was destroyed. The problem arises when it is
specifically designed to force the military participants to understand and deal with the various civilian
organizations that would be in theatre on a peacekeeping operation.
320 This scenario was injected in Exercise Cooperative Osprey in March 2001 at the Pearson Peacekeeping
Centre.
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discovered that both the military and the NGO were each rebuilding a church that caters to the
same ethnic group, therefore building two churches for ethnic group A while not building any for
ethnic group B. Upon this discovery, the military and the NGO consulted with one another and
decided that the military would instead rebuild a church for ethnic group B and the NGO would
go ahead with its plans to rebuild the church for ethnic group A, thereby ensuring that each
ethnic group is treated equally. The coordination between the two agencies resulted in the
aversion of a potentially contentious situation that would have created increased animosity
between the two ethnic groups and therefore driving them further apart, which ultimately works
against peacekeeping and peace-building.
With both military and civilian agencies required for the implementation of the peace-
building agenda that is based on human security, cooperation and coordination between the two
groups becomes vital. It is clear that the differences between the two groups in terms of how
they operate and their objectives provides for a situation where conflict between the groups can
easily occur and the result being inefficient and potentially ineffective implementation of peace-
building strategies. A push must therefore be made to increase the interaction between civilian
and military agencies in order that greater understanding between the two groups is created and
cooperation and coordination in theatre is significantly increased.
The discussion so far has outlined how both peace-building and human security have
progressed as a result of linking the two ideas to create a model for sustainable peace-building.
Although there are many positives that come with this new model, there also arises some
difficult questions and issues that are not able to be resolved by this model. Although adding
human security into the peace-building equation does provide for the proper structure for peace-
building operations to follow in order for the outcome to be sustainable peace, human security
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does not provide for one very important factor: a means of measurement. The entire peace-
building process was developed upon the idea that human security can be understood-as a
hierarchy, which results in the creation of levels in the peace-building process. It was
established that in order to embark upon the next level, the previous level must first be fulfilled,
thus requiring the corresponding human security dynamics to be satisfied. The problem is that
there is no way to measure if and when human security is satisfied. It was mentioned in the
introduction of this paper that part of the lack of definition for human security is the fact that
there is no established threshold line to determine at what point human security has been
violated, and conversely when is it satisfied.321 Establishing a threshold is virtually impossible
due to the fact that human security works at the individual level, and as such, each person thus
determines whether or not he/she feels threatened. With so many individual perceptions having
to be considered, it becomes almost impossible to ascertain at what point human security is
achieved. This is especially the case when looking at the top level of the pyramid (civil society),
as there would also be so many variables that would have to be considered in terms of the desires
of individuals being fulfilled.
Even though there is no way of precisely measuring human security, it is reasonable to
use certain indicators in order to make some value judgements on whether human security at
each level has been achieved. For example, one could look at crime statistics to identify how
safe people are in a particular community or area, or one could use the poverty rate and average
level of income statistics to get an idea of the level of economic security that exists. Once this
peace-building model is implemented in a number of cases it may become easier to identify the
321 Refer back to page 16 of this work.
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indicators as well as become easier to determine levels of human security, however, there will
still not be a ·specific formula for measurement.
Without proper measurement of human security levels, it becomes possible to misjudge
when to begin implementing the next stage in peace-building, which could cause the process to
collapse. Conversely, if the peace-building process focuses on one level for too long, and
subsequently stalls or hinders progression due to an underestimate of the level of human security
that has been attained, momentum could be lost as frustration begins to set in from the lack of
advancement. It must also be considered that there will be fluctuation in the degree of human
sec·urity at each level of the pyramid as dynamics in the state and society shift due to varying
events such as a recession or even violent clashes between rival groups, such has been the case
recently in the FYROM. The fluctuations need to be monitored in order to identify if and when
levels of human security drop below an acceptable level, or become dangerously close do doing
so, in order that the problems can be identified and an appropriate amount of attention is
provided to addressing the issues and raising the level of human security once again. The
problem is, there is no indicator that states that the level of human security has dropped below
the threshold, as there is no threshold established.
It can now be understood why being able to measure the factor that determines
progression in the peace-building process is very important to providing for success.
Unfortunately human security does not have any precise measuring capabilities. There are
general indicators, and while it is always easy to identify when human security has grossly been
lacking or violated, the goal is to prevent such situations by being able to recognize and solve the
problems or issues before they create a human security crisis, and ultimately threaten the peace-
building process. The creation of a sustainable peace-building agenda that is built around the
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establishment of human security created a requirement for the theoretical and practical
understanding of both human security and peace-building to be examined due to the transitions
that necessarily take place when these two concepts are merged with one anther to form
sustainable peace-building.
The discussion that examined the theoretical and practical implications of sustainable
peace-building provided a more advanced definition and understanding of the human security
doctrine, as well as laid out new dynamics that peace-building necessarily encompasses when
human security is applied, subsequently discussing how these new dynamics correlate with the
traditional ideas of peace-building. The result of these discussions is the creation of a
comprehensive understanding of how peace-building has evolved due to the injection of human
security into its agenda, and where shortcomings may still exist due to the inherent limitations of
the doctrine of human security. This understanding is invaluable to the progression of peace-
building in both its theoretical and practical application as it helps to further identify what
elements and dynamics are required in order to provide for peace-building to be sustainable.
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Chapter V
Policy Implications for Canada
Historically, Canada has undertaken a very active role in peacekeeping operations throughout
the world. Indeed it was a Canadian, External Affairs Minister Lester B. Pearson, who invented
the concept as a response to the Suez crisis in 1956. Since this first mission, Canada has
participated in almost every peacekeeping operation to date, both under the auspices of the
United Nations as well as by proxy. Throughout the evolution of peacekeeping, Canada has
continued to respond to the changing demands required to address the increasingly complex and
brutal nature of conflict, in an attempt to bring lasting peace to tom states and regions.
About 40 years after the introduction of peacekeeping to world stage, Canada was
determined to carve out a place for itself on the international stage once again as a vanguard to a
new understanding about addressing conflict and security issues. Foreign Affairs Minister,
Lloyd Axworthy, embraced the idea of human security as a new means of understanding global
security in the post-Cold War international order. Although the idea of human security was not
conceived by Axworthy himself, it was he who pushed for it to be discussed and pursued at the
international level. Indeed, when Canada became a rotating member of the United Nations
Security Council·in 1999, it brought with it to the table a desire to have human security become
reflected in the mandates brought about by the Counci1.322 Success was met, when for the first
time, 2 missions (East Timor and Sierra Leone) were approved by the Council that held
322 Grant Dawson, 'In Support of Peace: Canada, the Brahimi Report, and Human Security' Canada Among
Nations 2001: The Axworthy Legacy Fen Osler Hampson, Norman Hillmer and Maureen Appel Molot
(eds.) pp. 294-317 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 304.
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mandates that "explicitly include[d] the protection of civilians".323 With Canada being the
vanguard for pursuing this agenda on the international stage, Canada maintains a resp-onsibility
to ensure that the agenda is supported through Canadian foreign policy, which necessarily
includes involvement in intrastate conflicts. With human security being seen as a necessary
requirement for the development of sustainable peace-building, Canada must decide how and
where it is to become involved in the institution and maintenance of human security in failed and
fragile states in order to support sustainable peace-building. Indeed it was established that there
are five areas of human security that need to be established and supported in order for successful
peace-building to ensue.
Canada already takes an active role in peace-building through many initiatives that are
implemented by various government departments and agencies, as well as non-governmental
organizations (NGOs). For example, the Department of National Defence is responsible for the
deployment of military forces that act both in initial intervention engagement capacities as well
as in peace support operations (PSO) to support the various other actors in theatre, while the
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) focuses on implementing programs
designed with the reconstruction and development of a country. Coupled with these, the Pearson
Peacekeeping Centre, based in Nova Scotia, focuses on facilitating the 'peacekeeping
partnership' designed to improve interoperability ana coordination between the various actors in
theatre in order to optimize efforts and contributions. There are numerous other peace-building
initiatives that Canada presently is undertaking such as contributing election monitors, deploying
RCMP for civilian policing duties and training, addressing gender issues, and acting to counter
small arms proliferation. Canada undertook the Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative in 1996 that
323 Lloyd Axworthy, 'Notes for an Address by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy Minister of Foreign Affairs
to the NGO Peacebuilding Consultations' in Department ofForeign Affairs and International Trade:
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recognizes the dynamics involved in types of conflicts that have risen in the post-Cold War era
and the fact thafmultilateral initiatives, such as the ones listed above, are required for~peace-
building.324 The Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative not only outlines the multidimensional
dynamics that are involved with peace-building, but also outlines Canada's commitment to
continued support of missions, programs and activities that are in the interest of building peace
throughout the world.
Increasingly, however, Canada has been supporting programs and initiatives that target
individuals directly as a major part of its peace-building strategy. Under the auspices of
supporting human security in war tom and underdeveloped states and regions, Canada has been
devoting much time and effort to draw attention to issues such as war affected children, banning
the use of anti-personnellandmines, and the development of the International Criminal Court.325
In more specific cases, Canada has sponsored programs that focus on substance abuse prevention
and rehabilitation, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DD&R) programs that focus
on child soldiers, and developing corporation codes of ethics/conduct to help insure
multinational corporations are not exploiting people or circumstances for their own profit.326
In June 2000, the Human Security Program was developed as a "proactive mechanism for
addressing the human dimensions of globalization".327 It is basically a program that centralizes
many projects sponsored by DFAIT which are focused on enhancing human security arid/or
peace-building. The range of projects under this program is extensive and includes such projects
and initiatives as the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, youth action programs, limiting small arms
Statement (February 29, 2000), p. 2.
324 See: Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the Canadian International
Development Agency, Peace in Progress: Canada's Peacebuilding Initiative September 1998.
325 Axworthy, 'NOO Peacebuilding Consultations', pp. 3-4.
326 Ibid., 3-5.
327 Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 'Human Security Program' available
online at www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreignp/humansecurity.HS_projectProfile-e.asp.
153
proliferation, and reducing drug abuse and organized crime.328 Another program that has been
adopted by the FIuman Security Program is the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating'
Committee(CPCC) which was established in 1994 as a network of various agencies including
NGOs, academics and individuals that work together to further develop and coordinate policies
for Canadian NGOs involved in peace-building around the world.329 The Human Security
Program has established a means for Canada to link human security and peace-building as well
as increase coordination between existing and newly established projects.
These various initiatives, including individual projects as well as those that are
administered under the Human Security Program, demonstrate how Canadian foreign policy is
dedicated to further developing and supporting initiatives to increase human security, especially
as part of the peace-building process.
Canada contributes to supporting all forms of human security through its peace-building
initiatives. This is a positive step in that it provides that Canada is well positioned to push both
the human security agenda and sustainable peace-building further by linking the two in the
manner outlined in this paper. A question arises, however, as Lloyd Axworthy has stepped down
as Foreign Affairs Minister and has subsequently been replaced by former Industry Minister
John Manley, who it is felt has a different outlook on issues such as human security. Manley
holds a more realpolitik outlook on foreign policy issues "where trade and economic interests
override idealistic initiatives aimed at making the world more humane.,,33o The impact that
Manley's perspective will have on either maintaining or furthering human security is yet to be
fully determined as he has only held this Cabinet posting since October 2000. Initiatives have
still been undertaken or implemented that focus on supporting human security throughout the
328 Ibid.
329 Ibid.
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world. For example, on March 1st 2001, the Minister announced $475,000 in additional funding
for mine removal and destruction activities331 , and in May 2001, he officially inaugurated the
Regional Human Security Centre (RHSC) in Amman, Jordan and announced Canada's intent for
continued funding of the Centre.332 It is hoped that human security will remain a priority in
Canadian foreign policy due to the fact that human security has now been established to be a
vital component for sustainable peace-building. It is fair to assume, however, that the human
security agenda may not receive the amount of attention or promotion that it did when Lloyd
Axworthy was minister, however, that is to be expected as human security was what Axworthy
used to define his policies, whereas Manley is not defining his policies via the human security
doctrine. This being said, however, Manley presently does continue to maintain human security
as a significant component of Canadian foreign policy.
While maintaining its commitment to supporting all of the various levels of human
security and peace-building, Canada needs to ensure that the basic level is never overlooked in
light of the other projects and investments designed to target the higher levels of human security.
Essentially, Canada needs to stress and ensure that the security dynamic does not collapse,
because it is the pillar on which all of the other dynamics are built. This means that Canada
needs to make a commitment of its military forces to long-term involvement to providing
adequate security in a state until such a time that the state can provide for its own security.
Coupled with this, there needs to be provisions made in order that the Canadian Forces can
rapidly respond to situations where security forces in a country are being challenged to the point
where they are in real threat of not being able to maintain that security_ For example, in the case
330 Julian Beltrame, 'The Manley Way' Maclean's (June 4,2001), p. 23.
331 Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 'Manley Announces New Landmine
Initiatives on the Second Anniversary of the Ottawa Convention' News Release No. 28 (March 1,2001).
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of the FYROM with the recent fighting between the rebels and the Macedonian forces, Canada
should be prepared to deploy in the case that the Macedonian forces are no longer able to keep
the rebels at bay and the situation deteriorates.
Presently, Canada's plan for the role of the Canadian Forces in peacekeeping/peace-
building operations only provides for one of these requirements to be achieved. Although
Canada presently contributes troops to many multinational long-term peacekeeping/peace-
building operations such as in Kosovo, the Golan Heights, East Timor, and on the Iraq/Kuwait
border, the condition of the Canadian Forces does not provide for Canada to continue to maintain
its strengths in these missions. In fact, 2001 statistics provide that there are only 571 Canadian
military personnel deployed throughout the world with United Nations missions333 and
approximately 1,600 deployed in the Balkans with NATO. Canada has cut its troop strength to
60,000 in accordance with the 1994 Defence White Paper, which has provided for the Forces to
be overstretched. The then Chief of Defence Staff, General Baril, has admitted that Canada is
having great difficulty maintaining troop commitment to peacekeeping operations as there are
simply not enough personnel left to provide for proper rotation of troops in and out of theatre.334
With this realization, General Baril outlined the plan for Canada to pursue a strategy for focusing
its contributions through the Multinational Stand By High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG).335
The SHIRBRIG reacts to humanitarian emergencies and Chapter VII United Nations sanctioned
332 Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 'Manley Announces Continued
Funding for Regional Human Security Centre at Official Inauguration' News Release No. 57 (May 10,
2001).
333 Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, 'Global Situation Report of Current United Nations Peacekeeping and
Related Operations' Peacekeeping and International Relations 30 nos. 1,2 &3 (January-March 2001), pp.
14-15.
334 General Maurice Baril, unpublished/private lecture at the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Nova Scotia
Canada, April 30, 2001. Retired Major-General Lewis Mackenzie has voiced the opinion that the Canadian
military is stretched to the limit. He noted that Canada has admitted to the fact that it is not able to
maintain more than 3,000 troops in operation outside Canada. Refer to: Lewis Mackenzie 'Walk Softly
and Carry a Little Stick' National Post 15 November, 1999, A14.
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interventions and is a self-sufficient brigade that is designed to be the first in theatre and sustain
itself for a maximuin of 6 months where reinforcements will have been organized and deployed
to effectively take over command. The development of the SHIRBRIG responds to the need that
was identified in the introduction of this paper for a rapid response corps, such as Schwartzberg's
proposal for a United Nations Peace Corps, in order to provide for greater effectiveness of
interventions.336 Once the SHIRBRIG is relieved, it will fully pullout and begin to restock itself
for the next deployment. For Canada, this strategy will allow for its troops to receive a greater,
and necessary amount of time to recuperate from the last tour before being deployed once again
as there will be a reduced demand to have troops deployed in several countries allover the world
at one given time. This, however, is also a drawback, as Canada will necessarily reduce its
commitment to maintaining troops in fragile states and regions. The solution to this is to
increase the number of military personnel in the Canadian Forces in order that security can be
supported from both angles; rapid reaction and long-term deployments. This way Canada can
act to ensure that the basic level of human security is always maintained in order that sustainable
peace-building can continue to grow and avoid collapse in failed and fragile states.
Increased investment by Canada in its military forces to provide for the capability to both
deploy rapidly as well as maintain itself in theatre over long periods of time in order to provide
the security required for th-e sustainable peace-building structure to be built upon, is not a likely
option for Canada to adopt. It was discussed in the introduction of this paper the difficulty that
countries face for continuing to justify long-term expenditures and military deployments for the
purposes of supporting peace in another country.337 Indeed, this justification becomes more
335 Baril, unpublished lecture. The SHIRBRIG is presently composed of Argentina, Austria, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Spain, and Sweden.
336 Refer back to page 7.
337 Refer back to pages 50-54.
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difficult when a country is geographically far removed from the country or region inflicted by
civil conflict, as-it more difficult to formulate a correlation between the security threats posed to
one's country by a conflict occurring in another that can be understood and accepted by the
general population. A large portion of the introduction was dedicated to precisely outlining the
security implications that civil wars have on international security agenda and the security of
individual states throughout the world. Added to this dialogue to further emphasize the need for
intervention to both take place and be more effective, was the issue of the moral responsible for
the international community to do everything possible to save the lives of the innocent and to end
the horrific suffering that many are forced to endure due to the dynamics of intrastate wars.338
Despite both the security implications and moral obligations for international intervention into
civil wars, there still exists a difficulty for securing long-term engagements for supporting a
sustainable peace-building process.
With the inherent difficulties of convincing a government to provide long-term
investment in peace-building missions coupled with the fact that the Canadian military is not
readily in a position to continue to contribute troops in neither large numbers nor for extended
periods of time to peacekeeping or peace-building missions without a massive injection of
funding to the Department of National Defence for troops and equipment, it becomes unrealistic
for a recommendation for Canadian support for sustainable pe-ace-building to be centralized on
providing military support in theatre.339 Instead, Canada needs to move its focus towards
supporting other means of peace-building such as funding various non-governmental
338 Refer back to page 53.
339 In his speech at the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, General Maurice Baril clearly outlined the fact that
due to the condition of the Canadian Forces, meaning the cutbacks in personnel and funding for equipment,
Canada is forced to cut its contributions to peacekeeping from both the perspective of the number of
missions it can undertake and the number of troops and equipment it can contribute to each. [General
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organizations that are working in theatre to build the upper levels of the human security - peace-
building pyramia or continue to push the international agen-da to further accept the human
security doctrine as both a legitimate and valuable ideology that can provide the framework on
which sustainable peace is built.
Canada has been supporting various peace-building initiatives through its funding and
support of various agencies and projects working towards rebuilding societies and promoting
activities designed to both support and enhance peace in failed and fragile countries throughout
the world. Outlined earlier, were the various means through which Canada has been supporting
peace-building such as providing funding for CIDA to distribute to various organizations that are
heading up peace-building projects, subsidizing the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre to continue its
training of both military and civilians in cooperative peace-building strategies, and using its clout
on the international stage to push for the adoption of protocols and conventions as well as bring
to light many issues that need to be addressed in order for peace to be built and sustained. By
supporting these projects and programs, Canada is serving to contribute to long-term investment
in creating and maintaining peace in failed and fragile states. The human security - peace-
building pyramid clearly establishes that a great amount of investment is required at all levels of
peace-building and the there is necessarily a long-term commitment req-uirect by the international
community on all of these levels to ensure that peace does not collapse back into war. It has
been demonstrated that the maintenance of security is the fundamental element for building
human security and sustainable peace, however, it has also been demonstrated that there is a
requirement for the other dynamics to be established and supported in order for human security
and sustainable peace to be sustained. Although Canada is not presently in the position to
Maurice Baril, unpublished/private lecture at the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Nova Scotia Canada, April
30,2001]
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maintain a large number of military troops in theatre to support the security dynamic of human
security and peace-building, its contributions through the funding of various 'programs and
introduction and support of initiatives on the international stage acts to support the 'higher'
levels of the human security - peace-building pyramid. Although these contributions may not be
as easily recognizable in the media as the contribution of military troops, they are still valuable
and should continue to receive funding and support from the Canadian government. In fact, the
support of these various programs that operate at the 'higher' levels is imperative for ensuring
that the conception of peace-building moves beyond the initial idea of stopping violence and
implementing a democratic election, as was outlined with the initial discussion regarding the
present state of the peace-building ideology340, and moves to incorporate various non-state actors
such as civil society in to the equation in order to break away from the idea that peace-building is
soely a state-centric process. The support of Canada for these programs and continuing the
dialogue at the international level for the development of human security and peace-building,
acts to put an emphasis on the fact the sustainable peace-building requires more than simply a
military force and the installation of democracy. By adding the SHIRBRIG as a means of
providing a rapid reaction to an unstable security situation that may arise, Canada is also able to
offer some continued support to the most fundamental level of human security and peace-
building. Financial investment, however, is required by the Canadian government to maintain
the SHIRBRIG and pay for its deployment when required, meaning that there still needs to be
sufficient funds allotted to the Canadian Forces to build and maintain this force.
Canada is well positioned to implement a sustainable peace-building strategy based upon
the institution and support of human security. Not only does Canada make contributions and
340 Refer back to pages 12-14.
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investments in all five of the fundamental areas of human security in peace-building operations,
but it is also recognized as the lead country in the push for the· adoption of human security as part
of the international agenda. Although Canada has been slowly decreasing its commitments and
contributions of military forces to peacekeeping and peace-building mission, there has been a
move towards supporting other, very valuable, programs and agendas that are acting to support
human security and peace-building at the longer-term and 'higher' levels. Canada's reputation
on the international stage as the 'peacekeeping nation', due to its initial proposal of the idea
coupled with the loyal support that Canada has provided to peacekeeping operations around the
world, has placed the country in a unique position whereby it allows Canada to hold a strong
voice in proposing and legitimizing new ideas concerning peacekeeping and peace-building.
With this distinguished reputation, comes a responsibility whereby Canada must not only
continue to support efforts to bring lasting peace to failed and fragile states, but must also lead by
example in its investment to continually be engaged in all levels of the process and act as the
vanguard for the advancement of ideas on sustainable peace-building. This being said, Canada
needs to ensure that it is able to contribute military troops to missions, even if the contributions
are smaller, to illustrate the importance of maintaining the security foundation in the peace-
building effort, as well as provide support to long-term programs that assist with the
development of a state and its society in order that it will one day be able to attain and maintain a
stable and lasting peace within its borders.
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Chapter VI
Conclusion
Intrastate conflicts have become one of the largest threats to international security in
the post-Cold War era. Indeed, the United Nations and many other organizations have invested
great time and money in discussing the issue of intrastate conflicts, including their dynamics and
their effects on all parts of the world. There is no doubt that civil wars are becoming
increasingly brutal and creating massive humanitarian emergencies that are becoming more
difficult to address. The suffering of innocent civilians is broadcast throughout the world
creating a reaction by the international community that something must be done as these
conditions and atrocious acts are unacceptable for people to experience and exist within.
The international community has responded to the outbreak of intrastate wars through
the intervention of peacekeeping forces that have tried to both protect the innocent and end the
fighting. The initial results of these interventions was disappointing as it was quickly realized
that peacekeeping forces were simply not prepared to address the situations that they were facing
in theatre as these interventions were no longer ones that could rely on the tactics of traditional
peacekeeping. Instead of standing between the combatants, peacekeepers were forced to protect
themselves from attacks by the belligerents as well as try to stop the fighting. Although these
missions cannot be labeled as complete failures, the positive results were few and far between.
Once a cease-fire was eventually negotiated and being enforced by the peacekeepers,
the international community was faced with having to attempt to establish a system where peace
would ensue rather than simply leave the peacekeepers standing between the belligerents; the
Cyprus model. Holding democratic elections followed by an abrupt end of international support
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as a means of establishing long-term peace has proven to be ineffective and flawed. Rather,
long-term intervention is what is required to foster a successful peace-building program.
Although long-term intervention is required, sustainable peace-building requires that
a more comprehensive plan be established to provide direction for peace-building initiatives.
This paper has focused on developing a sustainable peace-building strategy based on the
establishment and maintenance of human security in failed and fragile states in order to avert a
state from regressing back into a state of civil strife. In order to make the connection between
human security and peace-building, the human security doctrine needed to be conceptualized in
an expanded, yet more defined manner, which produced a pyramid type hierarchy. This
hierarchy was developed through analyzing the cases of both the FYROM and East Timor and
understanding how and where the various dynamics of human security 'fit' into each case. The
end result was the development of a sustainable peace-building structure that can provide
direction for peace-building operations as well as clearly demonstrate the importance of long-
term commitments by the international community to ensure that sustainable peace-building is
attained and maintained. Essentially, what has been developed is a model that provides for both
prevention and long-term investment and commitment by the international community to foster
sustainable· peace.
The structure that has now been developed provides a model that can be used to
further the discussion of sustainable peace-building. This structure, although more specific than
previous peace-building models, represents a strategy base that needs to further be built upon as
all of the details concerning the implementation of the strategy (such as how will security best be
provided for, and what specific system of government will be instituted to govern) need to be
injected into the equation. The structure developed, however, provides the fundamental
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framework in which to continue the discussion of the finer points and details of peace-building.
With the proper-framework established, the discussion of the finer points is facilitated through
the fact that there is greater organization of the issues coupled with a clear outline of the goals
within the peace-building process in its entirety.
Canada has a pivotal role to play in this framework for peace due to its role in the
establishment of the human security doctrine onto the international agenda. Since the framework
is built upon the institution of human security, Canada is best positioned to push for this
understanding to be accepted and further discussed on the international stage. Canada already
undertakes and supports initiatives that address all levels of the human security hierarchy. It is
true that Canada's contributions of military troops has diminished, and that it would be beneficial
if troop strength were able to be increased in order to maintain more troops in theater for longer
periods of time to insure that security structures are continually being supported, however, the
other contributions that Canada is making through various programs and agendas is allowing for
resources to be available to support the other levels of the human security - peace-building
pyramid. Canada should continue to provide for the maintenance and expansion of these
programs in order to ensure that peace-building operations are not cut short and that sustainable
peace is properly developed and nourished so that failed and fragile states become strong and
stable peaceful states.
The implementation of sustainable peace-building is necessary for failed and fragile
states that have suffered through, or are at great risk of collapsing into an intrastate war, as the
ultimate goal of sustainable peace-building is to avert this collapse or reoccurrence of the civil
war. It has been demonstrated that the fallout from intrastate conflicts is severe for both the state
and people embroiled and trapped by the violence as well as for states within the region and all
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over the world. The interconnectedness of the global system provides for incidents occurring in
one state to have consequences for all others, making it necessary for the failed and fragile state
problematique resulting from intrastate conflict to be addressed by the international community
in a manner that is conducive to building and establishing a sustainable peace. The events of
September 11,2001 have reinforced this idea that instability in one region or country can very
much create great instability to other nations and the international systems as a whole. It may
indeed now be easier to see and accept the spillover dynamic that was discussed in the
introduction of this paper. In light of the new threat of terrorism around the world, failed and
fragile states can create a grander problem of providing a haven from which terrorists can work
from by providing an area that lacks security, law and order and responsible governing
structures. Hopefully the realities of September 11 will prompt the international community to
increase its investment, and support over the long-term, sustainable peace-building programs in
failed and fragile states.
Ikel may be correct in stating that 'every war must end', however, the challenge lies
in ensuring that it does not begin again; and this challenge will be met by a sustainable peace-
building strategy built upon the human security doctrine.
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